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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between political awareness and 
engagement and the content and structure of Political Belief Systems. 
Specifically, the role of information in determining the inter-relatedness, 
temporal stability and preference direction of political attitudes is evaluated 
using data from the British General Election Study, the British Household 
Panel Study and the SCPR Deliberative Poll on Political Issues. The first two 
chapters provide a review of theorising and research on the political 
sophistication of the general public, setting this debate within the context of 
theoretical discussions of democracy. It is argued that perspectives which seek 
to discount the need for an equitably informed public are both theoretically 
unsound and empirically unsubstantiated.
The empirical chapters of the thesis comprise three inter-related conceptual 
and empirical investigations. First, the contention that the less politically 
informed have labile and ephemeral attitudes toward political issues is 
evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling 
on data from political attitude surveys. In the second section a longitudinal 
factor model is fitted to panel data in order to examine how the over-time 
stability of political attitudes is affected by an individual's political awareness. 
The third section uses deliberative poll data and regression modeling to make 
a more causally focused appraisal of the effect of information on both the 
content and structure of political attitude systems. It is concluded that the 
uneven distribution of political awareness within the general public is the 
cause of the systematic differences in the properties of the belief systems of the 
groups examined and that such differences are likely to hinder the attainment 
of individual and group interests within a modern democratic polity.
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OVERVIEW
On the tenth of June 1999 less than a quarter of the UK electorate turned out to 
vote in the European Parliamentary elections, while legislation passed in 
October of the same year to 'modernise7 the second chamber of the UK 
Parliament abolished hereditary peerages but retained a majority of non­
elected 'representatives7 at its core. Both of these events provoked serious and 
widespread concern about the implications for the democratic legitimacy of the 
polity. These concerns centred on the institutional arrangements for electing 
representatives and the apathy and disengagement of large sections of the 
electorate. The over-riding factor connecting both issues, however, was the 
idea that democracy, somehow, was not being well served.
These examples are merely illustrative of debates over democratic legitimacy 
which have been ongoing for at least the last two to three hundred years. A 
third area, however, equally rooted in commonly held notions of democratic 
theory, currently attracts far less attention. This is the question concerning 
whether the general public possesses sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of politics to fulfil the normative requirements of citizenship within a 
democratic system of government. Although, through the pioneering work of 
the Michigan school and others, this issue became quite prominent during the 
19507s and 19607s, the idea that the 'mass public7 might lack certain basic civic 
competencies has received far less attention than other perceived threats to 
democratic legitimacy and, when it has emerged as a focus of-debate, has 
proved surprisingly controversial. Scholars have taken issue with the 
contention that democracy suffers as a result of civic disengagement on a 
number of different grounds -  arguing both that democracy can function 
adequately without an informed citizenry and that the citizenry, by various 
means, is able to function as if  it were equitably and well informed about 
politics.
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Overview
In this thesis I contest these perspectives on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. I review the theoretical rationale underlying the belief in the 
desirability of an equitably informed electorate and set out the evidence 
supporting assertions that political awareness is unevenly distributed within 
the mass public and that this has negative consequences for both the public 
and the private good. The empirical analyses of this thesis address three 
separate but closely related issues in the debate over the political sophistication 
of the general public. The first of these is to assess the claim that the general 
public organise their Political Belief Systems in terms of higher order value 
dimensions and that these dimensions are useful in understanding and 
predicting people's positions on more concrete, policy-related issues. Second, a 
time dimension is incorporated in the analysis in order to investigate the 
stability of political attitudes and how this is related to political awareness and 
engagement. Third, in order to move beyond an analysis which simply 
examines the distribution of political sophistication within the public from 
w hat might be conceived as a static perspective, a more causally focused 
investigation of the impact of political information on both the direction and 
internal consistency of attitude systems is provided.
In chapter one I set out the 'democratic deficit' hypothesis, introduce the 
nonattitude thesis and explain how the two are related. A brief description of 
theories of democracy is provided and the importance of a politically aware 
citizenry set within this context. I then review a range of theories which have 
challenged the importance of an informed electorate -  both the macro-social 
and the more social-psychologically oriented -  and argue that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence to support assertions that such factors are able to 
compensate for rational decision making within a well informed and engaged 
public. Finally I introduce two recent methodological developments which 
have begun to look empirically at the relation between knowledge and attitude 
-  deliberative polling and simulation modeling.
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In chapter two, I take a closer look at the nonattitude thesis -  how Converse 
originally formulated it and how people have developed and countered it 
since. The four main foci of criticism -  measurement error, changing times, 
inappropriate methodology and core beliefs and values -  are reviewed and the 
problems with each set out. I then discuss the key terms and concepts used in 
the thesis and describe how they have been operationalised as abstraction 
measures, correlational measures, longitudinal stability indicators and direct 
measures of political knowledge.
Chapter three is the first of the empirical chapters. It examines the extent to 
which the British public make use of higher order value dimensions to 
structure political belief systems. In the first sections of the chapter, I review 
the literature on attitude 'constraint' as a dimension of political sophistication 
and discuss the various ways in which it has been operationalised and 
measured. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) are introduced as methods which avoid some of the problems 
that are apparent in a number of earlier investigations of the issue. The 
analysis uses the six item scale developed by Heath et al (1993) to measure the 
'left-right' political value dimension. Confirmatory factor models are fitted to 
data from the 1997 British General Election Study and the 1991 British 
Household Panel Study at the population aggregate level and at the level of 
sub-groups which differ in political awareness. Parameter estimates are 
compared across models and conclusions are drawn about the structural 
properties of the belief systems of both groups.
Chapter four extends the analyses of chapter three to look at the extent to 
which the left-right value dimension -  as measured by the Heath et al scale -  
can be said to lend structure and coherence to more proximal attitudes toward 
policy issues. It has been argued that the reason we often fail to find 
relationships between single item measures of issue positions in the general 
public is that we are looking in the wrong place - rather than looking for
13
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horizontal consistency, we should more appropriately be searching for evidence 
of vertical constraint 'from above'. The analysis extends the measurement 
models fitted in chapter three by incorporating regression paths from the left- 
right latent construct to a number of different single item policy attitude 
variables traditionally related to left-right political discourse. Again, 
conclusions are drawn concerning the extent to which such higher order value 
dimensions can be said to lend coherence to individual policy attitudes for the 
population as a whole and across groups varying in political awareness.
In chapter five I incorporate a longitudinal dimension to the analysis. This 
allows a more fine-grained decomposition of item variance and the ability to 
examine, not just the consistency between related items, but also the stability of 
responses to the same item over time. Response stability and it7s relation to 
political sophistication is discussed and the problems of separating out true 
change from random 'churn' are reviewed. SEM is introduced as a potentially 
powerful method for achieving this objective and a longitudinal common and 
unique factor model is fitted to the six items of the 'left-right' scale on waves 
one to three of the British Household Panel Study.
In chapters three to five, the analyses presented rely on pre-existing and self- 
reported measures of political knowledge as the basis for between group 
comparisons. There is always the possibility with such analyses, that there 
may be some other unmeasured characteristics that are actually the causal 
factors underlying any observed relationship between political awareness and 
attitudinal properties. In chapter six, therefore, I use data from a deliberative 
poll on political issues to take a more causally focused look at how political 
awareness is related to the internal cohesion of PBSs. A longitudinal factor 
model is fitted to waves one and two of the deliberative poll and a number of 
different model parameters are examined in order to evaluate the effect of an 
'information intervention' on the inter-relatedness and stability of a latent 
attitude measuring 'left-right7 value orientation. Attention is also paid to the
14
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representativeness of the deliberative poll sample and how this relates to 
conclusions drawn about the impact of information on belief system structure. 
In chapter seven a different technique is used to address essentially the same 
question but with a slightly different emphasis and focus. While the analyses 
in chapter six were concerned with the direct effect of information on attitude 
constraint, in this chapter the focus shifts to how increases in information 
affect the actual positions taken on individual issues. Logistic regression 
models are used to simulate the opinions of a 'better informed' public in order 
to evaluate the effect of increases in information on the direction of expressed 
preferences at both the individual and aggregate level. Subsequently, I take an 
exploratory look at how changes in issue preference direction, engendered by 
increases in information, impact on statistical measures of attitude constraint. 
Through replicating models on independent samples and using different 
measures of political knowledge to simulate a better informed public, evidence 
is also presented to assess the general robustness and validity of the simulation 
methodology.
Chapter eight is the final empirical chapter and looks more closely at some key 
methodological issues arising from the analyses presented in the preceding 
chapters: the measurement of political knowledge and how opinion change is 
related to existing levels of political awareness; and the similarities and 
differences between predictions made about opinion change under the 
simulation and deliberative polling methods. The first issue is concerned both 
with how the political knowledge construct is operationalised and the nature 
of its relationship with attitude preference direction. The second serves as a 
kind of mutual construct validation -  two different methods purporting to 
reveal the opinions that a better informed public would hold should come up 
with the same, or at least similar results. Where differences do arise, it is 
informative to examine any systematic patterns and how these might be 
related to the way in which the information effects were estimated. Additional 
analyses examine the extent of increases in political awareness over the course
15
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of the deliberative poll weekend and how the amount of over-time opinion 
change is related to prior levels of political awareness. In the concluding 
chapter I draw together the empirical findings from chapters three to eight and 
discuss their implications for the theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
debates introduced in the first three chapters. I then take a broader look at the 
normative implications of the empirical work, consider how uneven 
distribution of political sophistication might be countered and discuss 
potential avenues of future research.
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1 POLITICAL INFORMATION, CHOICE AND EFFICACY
"Knowledge is Power"
FRANCIS BACON, Sacred Meditations
There has, in recent years, been something of a resurgence of interest in the 
political awareness of the general public and the extent to which this affects 
both the public and the private good. The key feature of this debate has been 
the idea that without accurate factual information about the content, structure 
and process of politics, it is not possible for individuals to determine which 
policies, candidates and parties best reflect their own interests (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996, Luskin 1987, Bartels 1996, Althaus,- 1998) and that, where 
divergences in political awareness exist, inequalities in political efficacy 
emerge as a result.
In this thesis I employ a range of data sources and statistical techniques to first 
establish the validity of the argument that a significant proportion of the 
British public do not hold meaningful or well thought-out political attitudes 
within coherent and internally consistent political belief systems. I then move 
on to explicitly evaluate the hypothesis that it is knowledge or information 
that primarily underlies the structure and stability of political attitudes by 
examining the effect of increases in information, and the interaction of such 
increases with existing levels of political interest, awareness and involvement, 
on both the structure of Political Belief Systems and the direction of individual 
issue positions.
This first chapter provides a brief overview of the literature addressing the 
political sophistication of the general public that emanated from Philip 
Converse's (1964) seminal article and reviews and evaluates the range of
17
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perspectives that have emerged to counter the notion of a 'democratic deficit7 
caused by low levels of political knowledge and ideological sophistication. The 
importance of political knowledge or information as a determinant of political 
efficacy is discussed and simulation models (Althaus 1998, Bartels 1996) and 
deliberative polling (Fishkin 1991, 1995) are introduced as two alternative 
means of empirically assessing the impact of increases in information on the 
content and structure of political belief systems.
1.1 Political Sophistication and the Democratic Polity
The study of how people organise and utilise their political attitudes and 
beliefs has proved fertile ground for researchers in the social sciences. The 
multi-disciplinary nature of work in this area is testament to the substantive 
importance of a field which speaks directly to the question of how democracy 
works in practice. A politically informed electorate is axiomatic in most, if not 
all, conceptions of democracy and beliefs about high levels of ignorance 
amongst the mass public long provided the underpinning rationale for those 
who wished to deny the franchise to the 'masses' during the slow 
encroachment of suffrage. Before the development of the sample survey and 
systematic measurement techniques, which heralded the arrival of the 
quantitative social sciences in the early decades of the 20th Century, beliefs 
about levels of political sophistication in the general public were based on little 
more than commonsense supposition. With the advent of psychometric scaling 
techniques and the increasing sophistication of probabilistic survey methods, 
however, such beliefs were soon easily put to the test. Early studies in the 
United Sates confirmed these intuitive suspicions by revealing alarmingly low 
levels of knowledge in the general public about political institutions, parties, 
candidates and issues (Berelson, et al. 1954, Hyman and Sheatsley 1947).
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, levels of political awareness 
were not evenly distributed in the population but were systematically related
18
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to characteristics of individuals and groups: political ignorance was greatest 
amongst, inter alia, the working classes, the poor and the poorly educated 
(Campbell, et al. I960, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Hyman and Sheatsley 
1947). Since then survey after survey has reiterated the impoverished state of 
political awareness amongst large sections of the electorate in both the United 
States, where the majority of such surveys have been conducted, and in other 
modern western democracies such as Britain, France, Canada, Germany, Italy 
and Spain (Baker, et al. 1996, Butler and Stokes 1969, Dimock and Popkin 1995).
Yet the critique of the political sophistication and awareness of the general 
public has not been limited to simple tests of political knowledge. During the 
1950s and 1960s political scientists and social psychologists based at the 
University of Michigan began to elaborate the picture of the uninterested and 
uninformed voter (Campbell, et a l 1960). Philip Converse (1964, 1970, 1974, 
1975, 1979) argued that, in addition to low levels of political knowledge, the 
public failed to organise their 'Political Belief Systems' (PBSs) in any sort of 
coherent or consistent manner. Through analysis of the American National 
Election Studies (NES) between 1956 and 1960, Converse revealed that a 
significant number of respondents could or would not place themselves on an 
abstract 'liberal-conservative' dimension and that only a very small proportion 
of the population were able to relate to and discuss political issues in terms of 
some overarching ideology or value dimension(s).
This was not necessarily problematic in and of itself but Converse went on to 
show that the attitudes and opinions reported by non-ideologues were so 
poorly inter-related and unstable over time that he was led to conclude that 
such 'attitudes' were in fact merely random, 'top of the head' responses, 
unrelated to any real underlying attitude -  at least insofar as attitudes are 
standardly defined. The empirical evidence starkly revealed w hat came to be
19
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known as the 'Black-and White'1 model of nonattitudes: that despite providing 
substantive responses to survey questions, large sections of the public actually 
hold no underlying attitude across a broad range of political issues. A 
response alternative is selected at random to satisfy the demands of the 
interview protocol, hence the observed lack of longitudinal consistency on the 
same items and the low correlations between sets of items that Converse and 
his colleagues observed. Such findings confirmed w hat many had long feared 
about the discrepancy between democratic theory and practice and constitutes 
what Lupia and McCubbins have called 'the democratic dilemma': "that the 
people who are called upon to make reasoned choices may not be capable of 
doing so" (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).
Converse did not hesitate in spelling out the implications of his research for 
democracies and those who govern and live within them. He pointed to the 
fact that the base of the increase in Nazi support between 1928 and 1932 was 
draw n primarily from rural areas with high concentrations of uneducated and 
illiterate peasants: "It seems safe to conclude that the mass base of the Nazi 
movement represented one of the more unrelievedly ill-informed clienteles 
that a major political party has assembled in a m odem  state" (Converse 1964, 
224). With low levels of political knowledge and no ideological framework 
with which to contextualise and evaluate election pledges, such a constituency 
was particularly prone to the empty promises and sloganeering of the Nazi 
propaganda machine.
Less dramatic, but perhaps equally serious for democracy, is the question 
Converse's findings raise concerning the ability of the electorate to decide 
which policies are in their best interests and to derive attitudes and vote 
accordingly. Despite the problems of defining w hat is meant by an
1 The 'Black-Wliite' model is so-called because respondents are classified in terms of a binary 
latent class -  they are seen as either holding an attitude or not holding an attitude.
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individual's best interests (see later discussion of definitions of self-interest in 
section 2.8), it would seem uncontroversial to assert that when evaluating 
policy and candidate alternatives to that end, a well-informed individual will 
be better able to make the 'correct7 decision than an ill-informed one. Indeed, 
recent research, to be reviewed in detail later, has begun to provide strong 
evidence that a hypothetically 'fully informed' electorate expresses 
significantly different preferences than a poorly informed one for both 
candidate and policy alternatives (Althaus 1998, Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996).
Since Converse's seminal contribution, the debate has essentially swung 
between those who broadly support his pessimistic conception of a politically 
disinterested and ill-informed public and those who, on various grounds, have 
challenged his position and argued that the electorate is, in fact, largely 
rational and responsive. Sniderman and Tetlock have described this as a 
debate between 'maximalists' and 'minimalists', "a maximalist interpretation 
emphasises the connectedness and consistency of belief systems; a minimalist, 
their lack of connectedness" (1986). Perspectives within the maximalist 
tradition range from those who base their position on methodological criticism 
of Converse's research: as being due to measurement error in the survey 
instruments on which his conclusions were based (Achen 1975, Erikson 1979), 
or the inappropriate use of quantitative correlational techniques (Lane 1972) 
through those who agree with Converse's conclusions but argue that changing 
times have led to large increases in ideological consistency in mass publics 
(Nie, et al. 1979). These accounts, while extremely varied in terms of the 
grounds on which they dispute Converse's position, are nonetheless united in 
that they all more or less accept the basic position that political awareness or 
sophistication -  however one cares to label it - is a 'good thing' - knowledge of 
politics and a coherent political outlook are beneficial to both the individual 
and society. Converse and those who share his position -  they argue - have
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merely failed to prove the case that the general public really do lack these 
attributes.
A second level of critique though denies even the basic assumption of the 
importance of an engaged and politically aware citizenry. The underlying 
rationale of these perspectives is that the importance of political knowledge is 
exaggerated due to an over-simplistic view both of how individuals make 
sense of politics and of how democracies actually function in practice rather 
than in relation to some normative ideal. In the following sections of this 
chapter I provide a brief overview of the main strands of democratic theory 
and the role accorded in its various manifestations to the political engagement 
and awareness of the mass public, before moving on to a review of the various 
grounds on which the importance of a politically well-informed citizenry has 
been challenged.
1.2 Political Information and Democratic Theory
An informed citizenry is often taken as a sine qua non of democratic theory, yet, 
as Dahl has noted, " there is no democratic theory, there are only democratic 
theories" (Dahl 1956, p. 1). While most normative models of democracy 
require a politically informed and involved citizenry, other, more descriptive 
approaches have seen widespread political ignorance as largely 
unproblematic. Thus, while space clearly precludes a detailed review of 
theories of democracy, a consideration of the main themes will serve to place 
the arguments presented later in this thesis within the broader context of 
general political efficacy and emphasise the practical importance of the debate.
Modern notions of democracy can be traced to the development of new forms 
of government and political representation that emerged in the Greek city 
states during the fifth century BC. Indeed, the word democracy itself is 
derived from the Greek words demos (people) and Kratos (rule) and is taken to
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mean, in its original Greek sense 'rule by the people' (from Judge 1999, p. 2). 
Prior to this political transformation, government had consisted of a mixture of 
monarchic, oligarchic and aristocratic structures. Central to the Athenian idea 
of citizenship was a direct involvement in legislative and judicial decision 
making. The public good was therefore ensured by making the governed and 
the government one and the same, effectively vetoing the pursuit of limited or 
sectional interests. Clearly, such a constitution would require a highly 
knowledgeable and engaged public with a necessary requirement for every 
citizen "to acquire the knowledge of their city and their fellow citizens, from 
observation, experience, and discussion, that would enable them to 
understand the common good" (Dahl 1989, p. 19). In practice, such 
requirements were not so unattainable as they may appear to the modern 
reader, given that citizenship was restricted to a rather homogenous group of 
middle-aged Athenian males. Nonetheless, even under this restrictive notion, 
both Plato and Aristotle expressed grave doubts over the wisdom of relying on 
ordinary citizens to make the decisions of state due to fears over their moral 
and intellectual competence (Judge 1999).
Such a model has, however, been criticised for being an unattainable ideal in 
the modern world2: the political landscape has become unmanageably large 
and far too complex for such a system to work at all, let alone with any degree 
of effectiveness. The sheer number of decisions to be made and offices to be 
filled in a modern nation state effectively precludes widespread civic 
participation in government. In recognition of such logistical constraints, 
liberal democratic theorists such as Locke, Bentham and the two Mills moved 
toward more representative conceptions of democracy which, if perhaps not 
living up to the Athenian ideal, were seen as the closest practical alternatives.
2 Indeed some authors have argued that the Athenian model was some way short of ideal 
itself, in its concessions to majority decision making and the use of Council for determining the 
Assembly's agenda (See Manin 1997).
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The rise to prominence of representative as opposed to participative models of 
democracy was engendered not just by the increasingly large and complex 
nature of the nation state but also by a transformation in economic systems 
and political economies (Ashcraft 1987, Tully 1979). With the development and 
growth of capitalist economies in the 18th and 19th centuries came a re- 
evaluation of conceptions of what constitutes the public good. In contrast to 
the natural social hierarchy espoused by Plato and Aristotle, the Lockean 
account of the social contract propounded the human right to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of material wealth and property. Within the social contract, 
individual citizens were seen as acting selfishly in pursuit of these goals 
(particularly the latter two) and the job of government was to ensure that, once 
attained, these things could not be taken away from them by other, selfishly 
motivated individuals (Judge 1999). The utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, 
while maintaining that the motivational instincts of individuals were 
essentially selfish3, incorporated into government a further guiding principle: 
the need to ensure the greatest happiness for the greatest num ber as opposed 
to merely protecting existing propertied interests.
The confluence of these forces resulted in theories of democracy in which the 
primary, if not the sole, element of citizenship was participation in the election 
of representatives. As such, elections were to act primarily as a safeguard 
against the natural tendency of the executive and legislature to act in their 
own, rather than the public interest. Representative forms of government, 
however, also held out the further possibility that, in addition to acting as a 
check on tyrannical or self-interested legislatures, elections might afford 
citizens the opportunity to choose those individuals best qualified to hold
3 The pursuit of selfish interests should not necessarily be seen restrictively as synonym ous 
with the pursuit of personal wealth and resources, as it may equally well be equated with an 
individual's desire to pursue more communitarian or altruistic aims (see Ashcraft 1987).
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office and most likely to pursue policies in line with their best interests, a sort 
of natural selection of those 'fittesf to govern. Thus, despite being a 'weaker' 
form of democracy, representative government still requires a citizenry 
equipped with at least basic levels of political understanding. True, the 
informational requirement is not considerable in comparison with Athenian 
and other participatory models but certain basic competencies must 
nevertheless be present in order for a polity based on indirect decision making 
to function effectively.
Yet do even these less restrictive, representative forms of democracy perhaps 
still expect too much of the electorate? Is it really necessary for each and every 
citizen to know the names of their representatives and the positions they hold 
across the major issues of the day for a democracy to function properly? If this 
were so, then how has twentieth century western liberal democracy managed 
to operate in an apparently healthy state in the face of the seemingly 
incontrovertible evidence of mass political ignorance? As a resolution to this 
problem, several theorists have argued that, rather than developing normative 
models derived, usually, from the starting point of Athenian democracy, a 
more useful approach is to look at how democracy actually works in practice. 
Within such a framework, the 'paradox' disappears and normative models of 
democracy rather than the citizenry become the villain, "the most disastrous 
shortcomings of the system have been those of the intellectuals whose 
concepts of democracy have been amazingly rigid and uninventive" 
(Schattschneider 1960, 135-136).
Early 'descriptive' theories of democracy are typified by the work of 
Schumpeter (1943) and Schattschneider (1942) who dismissed the liberal 
principles of the 'common good' and the 'will of the people' as romantic 
fallacies. Developing his idea of 'competitive elite democracy', Schattschneider 
argued that democracies did not need an informed or involved electorate. The 
role of the citizen in the functioning of the polity was strictly limited to an
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occasional mandatory provision at election time. Democracies were run by 
competent elites who gained and maintained power by performing 
satisfactorily in office and not giving in to tyrannical tendencies. In some 
respects the ignorance of the mass of the electorate was seen as advantageous 
through its role in "cushioning the shock of disagreement, adjustment and 
change" (Pateman 1970, p. 7).
Akin to Schattschneider's descriptive approach but more positive in its 
evaluation of the role of the citizen was the development of theories of 
pluralistic democracy, most notably in the work of Robert Dahl (1956, 1961). 
While sharing Schattschneider7s view that liberal democracy held an 
unattainably idealistic view of the role of the citizen, Dahl argued that, 
although citizens may not be political polymaths, they are nevertheless able 
and motivated to act on single, or at least small clusters of issues. They exert 
political influence through narrowly defined organisations such as trade 
unions, community associations and single issue pressure groups. Democracy 
is therefore 'rescued' from the ignorance of the public by the fact that, in the 
aggregate at least, the public is rational and involved in the political process, 
despite being largely unaware of, or uninformed about the broader political 
landscape.
Yet the solution of the competitive elite perspective seems to go too far in its 
complacent rejection of the need for at least some weak form of civic 
participation. For it is surely a move too far away from the basic tenet of 
democracy being 'rule by the people' to accept governance by an elite clique 
unfettered by the concerns and aspirations of the broader electorate. It presents 
a patronising and patriarchal view in which the ruling elite knows w hat is best 
for the masses and acts accordingly. Quite apart from the openness to abuse 
that such a system presents, it is entirely unclear what mechanisms the 
executive would or should use to determine what the best interests of the 
public actually are. And if the electorate is afforded a role in determining the
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make up and direction of the executive within the competitive elitist account -  
through, for example, the influence of opinion polls, focus groups and other 
measures of public opinion - then is this descriptive approach really any less 
normative than the liberal democratic theories that it seeks to critique?
Likewise the pluralist and neo-pluralist approaches of Dahl and others 
(Lindblom 1977, Truman 1951) assume a model of voting in which each 
individual acts as if they were participating in a referendum, evaluating 
candidate and party positions in terms of only one or some small subset of 
issues. Notwithstanding the fact that pluralist accounts of democracy still 
require a significant amount of public knowledge, individual voting calculus 
in referenda is quite different from that found in general elections. In the latter 
instance, one is voting for a candidate on the basis of, not just one but of all the 
things they might do in office. As such it is far from certain that a system in 
which groups of 'experts' vote on the basis of single issues will, in the 
aggregate, result in a general election outcome which maximises the best 
interests of either the aggregate public or the individual voter.
Barber (1984) has characterised models of democracy as denoting either a 
'thick' or a 'thin' role for the citizen. In this section I have provided a brief 
review of some of the main strands of democratic theory, ranging from the 
'thick' citizenship espoused by Athenian and subsequent participative 
democratic theorists, through the 'thinner' accounts provided by classic liberal 
notions of representative democracy to Schumpeter's competitive elite 
perspective where the role of the citizen is so thin as to be almost non-existent. 
Yet despite the historical progression toward a less and less active role for the 
public in theoretical accounts, it nevertheless seems clear that, so long as we 
maintain the basic definition of democracy as being somehow linked to the 
notion of 'rule by the people', then the jury is still out on whether an 
uninformed citizenry 'matters' . Even the weaker forms of citizenship outlined 
in representative and pluralistic accounts still require the sorts of basic
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information that countless studies have shown large sections of the public to 
be lacking (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). The increasing proliferation and 
technical sophistication of measures of public opinion and their influence 
through the media on the direction of government policy also suggests that 
scepticism about the importance of how and what citizens think about politics 
is fast becoming a dangerous and anachronistic position.
So how is the paradox of democracy to be solved? Perhaps, as Delli-Carpini 
and Keeter suggest "the paradox itself is illusory - to the extent that citizens 
are uninformed, the system is less democratic" (1996, p. 49). Thus, democracy 
is not an all or nothing category in which a polity either is, or is not democratic 
but operates as a kind of descriptive continuum such that different systems of 
government and social organisation can be regarded as either more or less 
democratic in relation to alternate social structures. Crucially, such a view 
implies that, not only can alternative political systems be seen to be more 
democratic than others, but also that within a single polity the democratic 
process may function more effectively for certain individuals than it does for 
others.
By democracy 'functioning more effectively' I mean that some individuals are 
better able to affect the political decision making process to their own future 
advantage than other individuals. How might such an inequality be related to 
political knowledge? Well, to the extent that 'good decision making requires 
good information', we might expect that people with more information about 
politics are better able to form political preferences that accurately reflect their 
own best interests. This is because, with greater amounts of (accurate) 
information, we are better able to assess the likely outcomes of alternate 
courses of action and to determine which are most consistent with our 
individual and group preferences. And if this is the case, the adequacy of 
theories of democracy which discount the importance of a politically informed 
citizenry is seriously called into question. Later in this chapter I discuss
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methods of assessing empirically the extent to which the structure and 
direction of political attitudes are affected by an individual's level of political 
knowledge. First however, the discussion moves on to other areas in which it 
has been asserted that rational political judgements can be made in the 
absence, or near absence, of information.
1.3 Political Information and Voting Behaviour
In relation to theories of democracy, models of voting behaviour may in some 
respects be considered as the other side of the same coin; while the former 
have been concerned with defining and evaluating different systems of 
government in relation to some normative model or other, the latter have been 
focussed on how individuals actually make political judgements and form 
political preferences -  the social-psychological as opposed to the macro- 
sociological level of analysis. The focus here then, has been on isolating and 
explaining the social and psychological factors that lead individuals and 
groups to support particular policies, candidates and parties rather than 
others. In the following sections I provide a brief over-view of such 
perspectives and discuss the role that each accords to knowledge or 
information in the political calculus of individual voters.
1.3.1 Identity or Rational Choice?
In the face of the apparently low levels of political sophistication unearthed by 
the first systematic studies of electoral behaviour, researchers at the University 
of Michigan (who had conducted the surveys), were left trying to explain the 
anomaly of low electoral volatility. If people were uninformed and 
inconsistent about political issues, candidates and party policies, why were
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levels of net volatility4 between elections so low? In 'The American Voter' 
Campbell et al (1960) developed the idea of Party Identification to explain this 
individual and aggregate level stability in vote choice. They argued that, due 
to the general lack of interest in politics and the costs to the individual of 
acquiring detailed political knowledge, people relied instead on developing an 
affiliation with a particular political party to guide them at elections. Once 
developed, this affiliation proved long-lasting and resilient, acting as the major 
force underlying the stability which characterised American politics in the 
1950s.
In support of their theory they provided survey data to show that large 
proportions of the electorate reported being 'strongly' or 'very strongly' 
identified with a particular political party and, furthermore, the stronger the 
reported identification, the more likely an individual was to vote for the same 
party in successive elections. Those who reported no partisanship at all were 
most likely to switch between parties from election to election. Party 
identification, argued Campbell et al, developed during adolescence and was 
most likely to be absorbed through family and other key social networks. 
Further empirical support for this socialisation hypothesis was provided by 
the finding that one of the strongest predictors of current vote was parental 
party affiliation. Once an individual has voted for a party once, the likelihood 
of them becoming a partisan supporter increases as party identification 
solidifies through a process of self-labelling. The party then acts as a sort of 
ideological orientation mechanism through which new information can be 
weighed up and evaluated in addition to providing a lead in terms of policy 
preference:
4 Net volatility refers to the change in the aggregate distribution of the vote between parties 
between elections. Overall volatility denotes the proportion of the electorate that switched 
votes between elections (Heath e t al 1991).
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"Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual 
tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, 
the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion w ill be"
Campbell et al (I960, p. 133)
In Britain the concept of party identification was picked up and developed by 
Butler and Stokes (1969, 1971, 1974). Through analysis of the time series of 
British Election Studies they uncovered a similar picture to that found in the 
United States of apathetic and uninformed voters in conjunction with a more 
or less stable share of the vote across parties through time. They developed the 
concept of 'partisan-self image' which, although essentially the same as Party 
Identification, was more rooted in the social class cleavages that had always 
been a more powerful force in British political life than in America. Voters 
aligned themselves with particular groups which shared the same social and 
economic interests and parties emerged as their natural representatives. 
Parties were therefore seen as inextricably linked to class interests and class 
membership became the primary determinant of party affiliation in the Butler 
and Stokes model of voting behaviour.
Yet, as with the 'thin ' role for the citizen discussed in section 1.2 - and 
notwithstanding the obvious problems such models have in explaining short­
term fluctuations in political allegiance (Crewe 1974, Heath 1991, Himmelweit, 
et al. 1985) -  identity based models of political choice are also unsatisfactory as 
a means of negating the importance of an informed electorate. Not only do 
they provide no real protection against elite tyranny, they also offer a 
procrustean and inflexible basis for the derivation of political preferences. So, 
while identity based models may provide an accurate account of how many 
people actually do derive their political preferences, we can be far from certain 
that an individual who supports a particular party through mechanisms of 
social identity would still do so if they had greater knowledge of the true
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range of policy alternatives. Evidence indicating that better informed 
individuals are more likely to vote on the basis of issues (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, Heath and McDonald 1988) also suggests that developing one's 
political preferences through long-term identification processes is likely to be a 
poor substitute for more rational choice based strategies. If it weren't, the 
better informed would no doubt use it.
1.3.2 Information Short-cuts and Cognitive Heuristics
In all walks of life, people frequently use information short-cuts or cognitive 
heuristics and 'rules of thumb' in order to make a decision about a course of 
action which would entail a good deal of time and effort to become 'fully- 
informed' about personally. Recourse to such time and labour saving cognitive 
devices is "an inevitable feature of the cognitive apparatus of any organism 
that must make as many judgements, inferences, and decisions as humans 
have to" (Nisbett and Ross 1980, p. 18). Downs (1957) and Key (1966) both 
pointed out that, due to the high opportunity costs of being fully informed 
about politics, the rational citizen would actually remain uninformed and use 
strategies of "low information rationality" (Popkin 1991) in order to determine 
their own candidate preferences and positions on particular issues. Such 
strategies tend to rely predominantly on following the lead of some trusted 
person or group with whom an individual voter believes themselves to have 
common interests or beliefs. I may not know the position of a particular party 
across a range of specific policy issues but if I know they are supported by my 
trade union, this will prove sufficient information to conclude that they are the 
party I too should support. Sniderman Brody and Tetlock argue that such 
strategies enable the public to make rational political choices despite their 
apparent political ignorance:
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"Citizens can compensate for their limited information about politics by taking 
advantage of judgmental heuristics. Heuristics are judgmental shortcuts, efficient 
ways to organise and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of 
requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even 
to complex problems of choice".
Sniderman et al (1991, p. 19)
Indeed, such strategies are often implicit within the expressive theories of 
voting behaviour discussed in section 1.3.1. Developing a partisan self-image 
allows us to follow the lead of a political party which we feel confident has the 
best interests of ourselves and those from similar social groups at heart. More 
recent theories of low information rationality have, however, looked beyond 
the confines of political parties as opinion leaders, to examine the extent to 
which factors such as media consumption (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), 
affiliations with other organised social and community groups (Lupia 1994, 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998) and following the lead given by political elites 
(Brody 1991) are able to act as proxies for encyclopaedic knowledge. For 
example, Lupia (Lupia 1994) shows that, even if respondents were uninformed 
about the details of a referendum on motor insurance, they could still make 
'rational choices'5 if they knew the positions of relevant interest groups.
In a different vein, Milton Lodge and his co-workers have developed a 
cognitive model of information processing which, they argue, shows that 
people may not need to possess databanks of political knowledge in long-term 
memory in order to hold rational and informed political opinions (Lodge, et al. 
1989, McGraw, et al. 1990). Drawing on recent developments in cognitive 
psychology (see Hastie and Park 1986), the basis of this line of argument is that
5 Rational choice being defined here as choices no different from those made by fully informed 
respondents.
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people process information "on-line", updating attitudes immediately as new 
information comes in but not storing this new information in long-term 
memory. Using laboratory studies Lodge and Steenberg (1995) show that new 
information significantly altered subjects' candidate evaluations despite their 
later being unable to recall the specifics of the information they had received.
"Do heuristics solve the democratic problem of miserably informed citizens? 
No." concludes Kinder (1998, p. 786). For, firstly, despite the reduction in 
necessary levels of knowledge relative to traditional rational choice models, 
much of the information upon which such short-cuts are based is precisely 
w hat much of the public have repeatedly been shown to lack. For example, 
using media or other sources of elite opinion leadership involves knowledge 
of, inter alia, issues, issue stands, reputations of public figures and groups in 
addition to more general information about important issues of the day. So, 
while such studies may show that efficient, low-information rationality is 
possible, they have not really demonstrated its widespread prevalence. Secondly, 
the fact that the key element in most information short-cut models involves 
following  the opinion of others is problematic because it specifies a polity in 
which a social and intellectual elite are left to govern, free from the constraints 
of the will of the people. If the mass of the public are merely following elite, or 
other opinion leaders, then where is the protection against mis-information 
whether it be deliberate or not and howr can the performance of the incumbent 
party be effectively evaluated and directed by the entire populace as opposed 
to just some section of it?
This connects with a third objection to those who propose low-information 
rationality as a 'solution' to the problem of widespread political ignorance: 
exactly how valid and efficient are these cognitive strategies? Indeed, much of 
the research into the use of heuristics and information short-cuts in cognitive 
psychology has focused on the errors and biases that such heuristics can 
produce (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). Even though most of these heuristic
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based models show that choices can be made without large amounts of 
information, they also show that their effectiveness increases with greater 
levels of knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). For example the "on-line" 
information processing work of Lodge et al showed that if subjects were 
warned they were about to receive information, political 'sophisticates'6 were 
most likely to use on-line processing and, significantly, that if no warning were 
provided, this group were also most likely to make use of information stored 
in long-term memory in making their evaluations (Lodge, et al. 1989).
Therefore, arguments that such 'cognitive rules of thumb' can act as adequate 
replacements for general political knowledge and sophistication are 
unconvincing. They fail to provide for a satisfactory 'watchdog' role over the 
legislature in their reliance on opinion following, they require certain basic 
levels of information that large sections of the public lack, they do not 
necessarily lead to valid decisions and they do not function equally effectively 
for all citizens but seem to operate more effectively for the more politically 
sophisticated echelons of society. So how then do we explain the 
responsiveness of public opinion and voting behaviour to short and medium 
term fluctuations in the political and economic landscape? A final approach to 
be addressed, and one that is crucial to the central line of argum ent of this 
thesis, is that, despite individual level instability in opinions and low levels of 
political sophistication, the process of aggregation per se results in a mass 
public which is capable, in its entirety, of instrumental political decision 
making.
1.3.3 Rationality through Aggregation
Aristotle first ventured the notion that through aggregation alone public 
opinion could become rational and 'good', arguing in pre-Gestalt days that
6 Defined as those subjects with high scores on a political knowledge quiz.
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"the many, no one of whom taken singly is a good man, may yet taken all 
together be better than the few, not individually but collectively" (Aristotle 
1962, p. 123). Although ambiguous as to the precise mechanisms through 
which aggregation achieved this effect, later applications of probability theory 
supported this early position. Condorcet (1785 (1972)) proved mathematically 
that in a jury of equally (poorly) informed individuals, the probability of 
coming to the correct verdict increased linearly with the size of the jury (see 
Miller 1986). However, as is usually the case when mathematical equations are 
used to explain human social behaviour, the limitations of Condorcet's 
theorem soon became apparent. Most notably, the model assumes that all 
'errors' are random and uncorrelated which is particularly unlikely in the area 
of either jury deliberation or voting behaviour. For example any 'sources of 
error' (say, a particularly persuasive barrister or a partisan newspaper) are 
unlikely to produce self-cancelling errors but, instead, errors which compound 
each other (see Berg 1993, for a fuller account).
Less statistically complex but equally supportive of the rationalising influence 
of statistical aggregation is the idea that, due to the self-cancelling effects of 
random responses from uninformed voters, rational public opinion emerges 
untarnished by the uninformed opinions or votes of the politically 
'incompetent' sections of society (Page and Shapiro 1992). This idea is 
supported by a broad range of studies (Gelman and King 1993, Schuman, et al. 
1985, Zaller 1991) which have shown public opinion in the aggregate to be 
"responsive to social, economic and political change - often exquisitely so" 
(Kinder 1998, p. 799). In the language of signal detection theory, the 'signal' of 
the informed voters emerges untainted by the 'noise' of the uninformed 
(Converse 1990).
Notwithstanding the difficulties of establishing what is meant by a 'rational 
response' in aggregate public opinion to changes in the social, political or
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economic landscape7, the rationale of such approaches appears seriously 
flawed. For its logic, at least insofar as it is used to allay concerns over mass 
political ignorance, rests on the assumption that, had those providing the 
'noise' been better informed, their opinions would have made no difference to 
the distribution of votes or measures of political opinion. Thus, so long as 
there is no systematic bias in aggregate opinion emanating from the 
uninformed, we are safe in the hands of the rational and informed portion of 
the electorate.
However, while this may again be a reasonably accurate representation of the 
dynamics of aggregate political opinion, the problem with the argument is that 
we cannot be in any way certain, or even very confident, that the errors would 
remain self-cancelling were the politically unaware to become better informed. 
As Delli Carpini and Keeter put it, "in all theories that depend on the few to 
speak for the many, the representativeness of the voices that emerge out of the 
din produced by the collision of ignorance is critical" (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996, p. 44). For, essentially, the aggregation 'solution' rests on the assumption 
that the 'random ' votes or responses of uninformed citizens are the same as 
those they would have expressed had they been better informed, all things 
being equal. Yet what empirical evidence is there to suggest that levels of 
political information are independent of vote choice and issue position? 
Anecdotally at least, it would seem strange to argue that increased levels of 
political knowledge will have no impact on an individual's position on 
political issues or on candidate preferences. Or, more importantly, that any 
such effects will be random and, hence, self-cancelling amongst the section of 
the public who initially hold no real opinion on particular issues, or whose 
opinions are based on very little information.
7 For example Page and Shapiro (1992) cite the example of the fabricated missile gap which  
falsely led public opinion to support the Kennedy candidacy in 1960.
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In all three of the positions discussed above, then, the key factor which 
sustains their denial of the importance of a politically informed electorate is 
the assumption that a lack of political knowledge 'doesn 't matter' -  that, in the 
aggregate, publics with low levels of information would have the same 
political preferences and make the same political choices that they would were 
they better informed. Such perspectives, however, seem to be based on little 
more than speculation and quite general historical observation. Recently, 
however, a growing number of studies have begun to look at this question 
empirically.
1.4 Simulating a 'Better Informed' Public
Bartels (1996), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and Althaus (1998) have all used 
regression based models to estimate the distribution of public opinion on 
particular issues and candidate preferences for 'fully informed' publics. All 
found that, controlling for a broad range of important background variables, 
the opinions of informed and uninformed voters were significantly different. 
Imputing the information levels of the best informed for the least informed 
respondents and re-estimating support for presidential candidates and 
positions on individual policy questions, revealed large discrepancies at the 
individual level which, while diminished through the effects self-cancelling, 
nonetheless, remained significant in the aggregate.
Modeling the outcomes of the last five US presidential elections Bartels, for 
example, finds that incumbent presidents did five percentage points better, 
and Democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they 
would have had voters been 'fully informed'. Bartels argues that the 
assumption that low-information rationality is effective (i.e. that citizens are 
able to come up with rational issue positions and candidate preferences in the 
absence of relevant information) is "particularly seductive because it allows 
analysts to proceed to the (arguably) more tractable question of how  they
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(heuristics)8 work, which in turn seems to provide support for the 
unsubstantiated claim that they do, in fact, work" (Bartels 1996, p. 198).
And it is not only in the area of electoral choice that this question is important. 
In modern democracies the growing influence of opinion polls on policy 
making (Herbst 1998) means that the uninformed may be increasingly 
disenfranchised. Both Althaus and Delli-Carpini and Keeter have shown 
significant shifts in opinion across a range of issues at both the individual and 
aggregate level in a simulated 'fully informed' public. Delli-Carpini and Keeter 
also maintain that these shifts can be seen to move opinion more in line with 
individual and group interests (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).9 The problem is 
further exacerbated by the un-informed being less likely to participate in a 
survey in the first place and less likely to give an opinion even if they do 
(Althaus 1996, Krosnkick and Milburn 1990). Althaus summarises the situation 
thus:
"As a result, the interests of respondents who are relatively well informed may come to 
be more accurately reflected in measures of collective opinion. In other words, such 
measures may reflect the needs, wants, and values of whites better than those o f blacks, 
men better than women, and the rich better than the poor"
Althaus (1998, p. 547)
Considering the significance of such conclusions, it is indeed surprising that so 
little attention has been paid to the issue of information effects on both 
individual and aggregate level political preferences. In contrast to the
My addition.
9 For example, the less well-off were more likely to support government welfare initiatives and 
women were more likely to support 'pro-women policies.
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repeatedly voiced concerns over low voter registration and turn out10 and their 
impact on electoral outcomes, low levels of political knowledge and awareness 
remains largely an empirical non-issue. Within public life, this state of affairs, 
is undoubtedly due to an implicit assumption that "while times are good", the 
provision of the opportunity to vote per se is sufficient to maintain democratic 
accountability, or that voters somehow manage to muddle through using 
heuristics, opinion leadership and the like but, as Bartels points out, the lack of 
attention paid to this issue within the field of political sophistication research 
is surprising:
"What is striking is that political scientists have done so little to investigate 
empirically the electoral consequences of voter ignorance. If those who have viewed a 
well-informed electorate as crucial to the functioning of democracy have been too little 
burdened by the scientific demand for supporting evidence, the same could be said for 
those who have viewed the political ignorance of the average voter as largely or wholly 
irrelevant".
Bartels (1996, p. 195)
1.5 Deliberative Polls
A very different approach toward an understanding of the role of information 
on political opinion has been introduced by James Fishkin in the United States, 
Australia and Britain (Fishkin 1991,1995). Fishkin has developed the notion of 
the "deliberative poll", the basic methodology of which involves interviewing a 
randomly selected sample of individuals on their views on a particular 
political issue or range of issues before selecting a representative sub-sample 
to participate in a weekend of "balanced" briefings by experts, discussion
10 The low  turnout in the 1999 UK European Parliament elections, for example, led the 
Observer newspaper to call for voting in the UK to be made compulsory.
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amongst poll participants and an opportunity to put questions to both 
academic and other experts as well as politicians. The sub-sample is then re­
interviewed at the end of the week. Fishkin argues that this method of polling 
produces meaningful opinions which are representative of what the broader 
electorate would think, were they better informed and motivated to think 
about the issues:
“A deliberative poll...has a recommending force: these are the conclusions people 
would come to, were they better informed on the issues and had the opportunity and 
motivation to examine those issues seriously. It allows a microcosm of the country to 
make recommendations to us all after it has had the chance to think through the 
issues"
Fishkin (1995, p. 162)
The results of the polls that Fishkin and his colleagues have thus far conducted 
across a broad range of topics confirm the general findings from the simulation 
models discussed above -  information has a significant impact on political 
attitudes at both the individual and the aggregate level. Indeed, in terms of the 
actual direction of effects, a number of similarities can be seen in the findings 
of these two very different methodologies (Althaus 1998). This would seem to 
pose critical questions for those who seek to downplay the importance of an 
informed electorate and reawakens fears over the democratic deficit caused by 
a poorly informed and unengaged public. While the general tenor of the 
political sophistication debate over the last ten to twenty years has been one in 
which the rationality and responsiveness of the electorate has been 
emphasised (Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000), we are perhaps now 
beginning to see a return to the more normative concerns of the Michigan 
school (Bartel, 2000).
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1.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter the concept of political sophistication was introduced and the 
long-standing debate concerning nonattitudes and the general political 
competence of the public and how this relates to the effective functioning of 
democratic forms of government was discussed. It was argued that weaker 
'non-normative' theories of democracy and 'low-information rationality7 
models of voter choice, while perhaps presenting an accurate assessment of 
how most voters actually decide, fail to convince that such strategies are an 
adequate replacement for informed, rational choice. In addition to theoretical 
and normative concerns over the utility of such perspectives, empirical 
research was introduced which calls directly into question the ability of such 
strategies to act as effective surrogates for informed choice. Results from 
deliberative polls and simulation models suggest that the distribution of 
public opinion and voter choice would be significantly different were the 
public better informed. In the next chapter a more detailed examination of the 
political sophistication debate will be laid out and key theories and concepts to 
be utilised in the remainder of this thesis will be presented before turning to 
the empirical analyses of chapters three to eight.
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2 POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT
In chapter one a general introduction to the focus of this thesis was provided 
and Philip Converse's nonattitude perspective was briefly summarised and 
placed within the context of democratic theory and models of voting 
behaviour. Recent research was also discussed which suggests that widespread 
discrepancies in levels of political awareness and engagement amongst the 
general public might lead to divergences in the extent to which individuals and 
groups are able to derive political attitudes and preferences which correspond 
with their best interests. In the remaining chapters I employ a range of 
empirical analytical techniques in order, firstly, to establish the extent to which 
cleavages in political sophistication actually do exist within the British public. 
Secondly I shall assess the validity of claims that such discrepancies result 
primarily from differences in levels of political information and, thirdly, that 
were differences in political awareness to be controlled for or removed, 
aggregate public opinion would be altered and the low internal cohesion and 
longitudinal consistency of political belief systems within certain sections of 
the public would increase to levels found amongst political 'elites'. Before 
turning to empirical analysis though, it is necessary to present a more detailed 
account of the nonattitude thesis and to examine how this theoretically and 
methodologically complex area has developed since Converse's original 
treatment. In this chapter I shall also look more closely at some of the key 
constructs, operationalisations and terminology to be used throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.
2.1 Attitudes and Nonattitudes
Gordon Allport once famously described the concept of the attitude as "the 
primary building block in the edifice of social psychology" (Allport 1954, p.
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43). Nearly fifty years on, it would be difficult, even for those opposed to 
Allport's particular brand of social psychology, to argue with this proposition 
(Olson and Zanna 1993). The general utility of the concept has pushed it from 
the preserve of a small band of psychologists and sociologists in the early 
decades of the twentieth century to being "the single most interdisciplinary 
concept in the social sciences" (Latane and Nowak 1994, p. 219). While there is 
still a good deal of debate over the exact meaning of the construct and the 
extent to which the affective, cognitive and behavioural aspects interact (see 
Eagly and Chaiken 1993), a general consensus does appear to have formed 
around the idea that an attitude is a relatively stable, favourable or 
disfavourable disposition toward a stimulus object The following formulation 
is taken from Petty and Cacioppo's definitive historical review of the area and 
is used as a concise standard definition in a number of undergraduate texts:
"the term attitude should be used to refer to a general, enduring positive or negative 
feeling about some person, object or issue"
Petty (1981, p. 7)
The value of the attitude construct derives primarily from the inferred 
association between the expressed attitude and overt behaviour. Governments 
and commercial enterprises alike invest heavily in sample surveys that collect 
attitudinal data on the basis that (a) attitudes predict behaviour and (b) 
attitudes can be changed through targeted persuasive communications. To be 
sure, the controversy over the relation between attitude and behaviour (see 
McGuire 1986, Wicker 1969) has focused primarily on the situational, historical 
and measurement factors that influence the strength of observed relationships 
rather than on whether such a relationship actually exists (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975). The practical utility and relative ease of collecting attitudinal data has 
therefore led to a gradual formalisation of measurement techniques and their 
incorporation within the sample survey method.
44
Chapter Two
2.2 Attitudes and Survey Measurement
Key to the idea of the modern sample survey is the standardisation of 
procedures across sample elements -  all respondents should, as far as possible, 
be asked the same questions in the same order, in the same manner, in the 
same basic environment (Sudman and Bradbum 1974). To the extent that 
standard procedures are not enforced, extraneous factors (i.e. all those 
unrelated to the underlying attitude) will increase the level of error, both 
random and systematic, captured by the measurement instrument. 
Standardisation of survey procedures, then, is seen as a means of ensuring that 
each sample member is responding to the same question in the same way -  in 
the attitudinal domain, that they are faithfully reporting their true underlying 
attitudinal position rather than reflecting some idiosyncrasy of the interview 
context. This, though, introduces one important additional assumption into the 
theoretical rationale, namely that every respondent does in fact hold an attitude 
on the issue to which a particular question pertains. A closer look at textbook 
definitions of the attitude, however, makes it clear that this is not necessarily a 
very realistic or plausible assumption.
For unless we are to fundamentally reassess our conception of the attitude 
construct, in order to have an attitude toward "a person, object or issue" we 
must surely possess at least some simple form of information about the object 
of the attitude itself. Even recent attempts to move away from the idea of pre­
existing, crystallised attitudes in favour of 'on-line' attitude construction 
models (Anderson 1981, Zaller 1992) still rely fundamentally on 'bits of 
information' relevant to the attitude object in determining an attitudinal 
position in whatever specific context. To take a contemporaneous example, 
how is it possible for someone to hold an attitude toward European tax 
harmonisation when they do not even know w hat 'European tax 
harmonisation' is?
45
Political Sophistication: Theory and M easurem ent
Converse initially came to his non-attitude thesis, not in his capacity as an 
analyst, but during time spent as a survey interviewer (Converse 1974). Noting 
the unwillingness of respondents to use Don't Know response alternatives 
(which were perceived pejoratively as an admission of 'ignorance' rather than a 
truthful response) in conjunction with the often extreme behavioural 
manifestations of ambivalence and doubt when responding to political attitude 
items, Converse came to suspect that the 1-2% of Don't Know responses 
commonly observed on such questions11 was "an underestimate of heroic 
proportions" (1974, p. 650). This hunch was confirmed by the subsequent 
inclusion of an 'opinion filter'12 which saw the proportions claiming not to 
have an opinion soar to around 30% on some items (see Schuman and Presser 
1981, for a full review of the effects of opinion filtering). Selecting an item 
about whether the provision of housing and power should be in state or 
private hands, Converse found that, despite there being virtually no aggregate 
change in the marginal totals across three waves of a panel survey, the across- 
wave correlation coefficient on this item was only 0.3 -  indicating that massive 
'churn' was occurring at the individual level, w ithout any corresponding 
movement in the aggregate marginal frequencies due to true attitude change13.
11 Until relatively recently it was common practice in survey organisations to train 
interviewers to pressure respondents into providing a substantive response rather than accept 
a Don't Know alternative.
12 An opinion filter first asks respondents whether they have an attitude toward some object or 
issue before proceeding to elicit the attitudinal response.
13 That no true change should be apparent over time is an essential but often ignored element 
of the Black-and-White model. However, the idea that stable marginal frequencies equate to 
no true change is not strictly true, as perfect self-cancelling with true change could result in 
constant marginals. However, Converse also supported his no true change position with the 
fact that the correlation between attitude at time 1 and attitude at time 2 was the same as the 
correlation between attitude at time 1 and attitude at time 3, indicating that if true change was 
occurring, it was unrelated to the passage of time.
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As this analysis was performed on the sample excluding the 30% of 
respondents who had been filtered out after expressing no opinion, Converse 
was led to conclude that:
"Large portions of the electorate simply do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues 
that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial 
periods of time".
Converse (1964, p. 245)
In choosing this particular item to form the centre-piece of his analysis, 
Converse was examining what he termed a "limiting case". By this he meant 
that it was something of an extreme example and that on other, more familiar 
or salient issues, the proportion of the population exhibiting nonattitudes 
would be smaller. Neither was it Converse's contention that the same 
individuals lacked attitudes across all issues but that "issue publics" -  those 
holding true attitudes - formed around particular issues to the extent that they 
were interested, involved in and above all knowledgeable about a particular 
content domain.
Those with stable, crystallised attitudes in a particular policy arena may well 
be the nonattitude holders in another. However, despite the caveats and 
reservations that Converse expressed in delineating his nonattitude thesis over 
the years, the implications of even weakened versions of the theory are both 
serious and pessimistic in their implications. Not only do his conclusions call 
into question the wisdom and usefulness of collecting and analysing 
quantitative attitudinal data as an academic, governmental or commercial 
enterprise, they also raise serious issues concerning the even distribution of 
political efficacy within society as a whole. In the following sections I review 
the major challenges that have been made against the non-attitude thesis over 
the years in order to evaluate the validity of the arguments and methodologies
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to be applied in later chapters in assessing the political competence of the 
British public.
2.3 Locus of Error in  Attitude Measurement
That large proportions of the variance in survey items and scales can be 
attributed to measurement error has long been recognised in survey research 
(Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992) and its presence constitutes the foundation of 
perhaps the foremost line of criticism against the non-attitude thesis. 
Measurement error in surveys is defined as the discrepancy between the 
survey value obtained on a particular variable and the subject7s true score on 
that variable (O'Muircheartaigh 1977, Sukhatme and Sukhatme 1970). It may be 
manifested in the form of larger standard errors, in biased estimates or a 
combination of both. The sources of survey measurement error are many and 
varied. Groves (1989) categorises the primary ones as being the interviewer, the 
questionnaire, the mode of data collection and the respondent.
A number of researchers have suggested that the lack of internal and 
longitudinal consistency between issue positions observed by Converse and 
others is due primarily to the first of these -  the questionnaire - while the 
nonattitude thesis is premised on the fact that it resides in the last -  the 
respondent. Pierce and Rose (1974), for example, in line with classic 
measurement theory, argue for a distinction to be drawn between attitudes as 
psychological entities and as survey measures of these entities. They contend 
that attitudes should not be regarded as points on a dimension but as latitudes 
or regions of acceptance or rejection -  an idea originally popularised by Sherif 
and Hovland (1961). So, while people do in fact hold fairly stable and 
meaningful attitudes, their expressions of these attitudes are more labile and 
can be heavily influenced by context. It is this lability in attitude measurement 
rather than in the underlying attitude itself that is the cause of low inter-item 
constraint and temporal consistency.
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Similarly, Achen (1975, 1983, see also Erikson 1979) has argued that the poor 
construction and "vagueness" of the questions analysed by Converse were 
responsible for the nonattitudes he found and, by 'correcting' for the 
measurement error in the questionnaire items, associations between attitudes 
increase dramatically. Yet as Kinder (1983) has pointed out, the 'error in the 
questions' approach ignores some rather glaring anomalies. Firstly, the authors 
who adopt this line are all more or less silent on what it is that constitutes 
'vagueness' in these questions (Smith 1984). To wit, comparing the correlations 
between the items Converse analysed to those of other, similarly worded 
questions reveals large differences in levels of constraint. The same is true of 
the degree of longitudinal consistency. If the error is in the questions, why do 
certain types of question (for example, about party identity) contain 
consistently less measurement error than others? One could suggest that it is 
simply a case of some questions being badly and some well written. However, 
such a line is difficult to maintain without being able to identify w hat is meant 
by 'badly' as opposed to well written. Questions on surveys like the NES have 
often undergone years of rigorous testing and development by teams of 
experts without any obvious indication of how they may be improved beyond 
their current format. Furthermore, and perhaps more damaging, is the non- 
random nature of much of this 'measurement error'. While no clear and 
definitive picture has emerged of which respondent characteristics are strongly 
and consistently associated with higher levels of error variance in these types 
of political attitude questions, the error structure is, nevertheless, far from 
random (Jackson 1979). And to the extent that this is the case, the argument 
that measurement error purely in the questions is responsible for low inter-item 
associations becomes untenable. As Smith puts it:
"If a measurement error is correlated with attributes of the respondent, then at least to 
some extent measurement error is no longer ju s t instrum ent error but is partly  
respondent error".
Smith (1984, p. 226 )
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Finally, Luskin (1987) introduces a less direct, but equally persuasive line of 
reasoning to dissuade us from the "error in the questions' approach. He draws 
on the 'fictive issues' literature (Bishop, et al. 1980, Hartley 1946, Schuman and 
Presser 1981) to demonstrate the willingness of respondents to provide 
responses to questions about non-existent issues, which, by definition, they 
cannot have thought about or hold an attitude towards14. Bishop et al (1980), 
for example, found that more than a third of a general population sample in 
the US were willing to give their attitude toward a non-existent piece of 
legislation. Because providing responses to non-cognized issues is the crux of 
the non-attitude thesis, the fact that respondents are willing to do exactly that 
in such large numbers provides a strong counter-argument to the 'error in the 
questions' critique of the nonattitude thesis.
So, while the measurement error caused by vaguely worded or badly written 
questions is clearly an important factor in explaining the meagre associations 
commonly found between individual issue items, it is insufficient as an 
explanation of how the level of these associations is stratified within the 
population. It is implausible to argue that the vagueness of the questions does 
not affect political elites15 for, once measurement error is seen to vary 
systematically with the background characteristics of respondents, it ceases to 
be measurement error in the strict sense and becomes inextricably linked with 
the individual characteristics of the respondent. Evidence suggests that these 
characteristics are predominantly related to people's general cognitive ability
14 Many respondents in fictitious issue studies may be responding on the grounds that the 
non-existent issue sounds like a real issue about which they do hold an attitudinal position. 
However Kolson and Green (1970) have provided evidence to show that, such respondents 
notwithstanding, large numbers still respond to fictitious issues without any such contextual 
'clue-taking'.
15 Whether 'political elite' be defined in terms of those involved directly in the political 
process, or less restrictively in terms of those who are interested in politics or support a 
political party etc.
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and their awareness of and interest in politics, which of course takes us back to 
the nonattitude perspective.
But, if measurement error is an insufficient explanation of Converse's findings 
then perhaps his results were merely a function of the political landscape at the 
time during which the data Converse studied were collected, ungeneralisable 
to the better educated and more media savvy electorate of today. As the PBSs 
of the public are, to a large extent, shaped and structured 'from above' by 
political actors in government and the media (Barton 1974, Sears, et al. 1978), 
perhaps the pessimistic conclusions concerning the public's political 
competence that Converse drew were more to do with the specific historical 
period studied than the fundamental nature of belief system organisation in 
the mass public.
2.4 Changing Times Changing Attitudes?
The idea that Converse's findings related only to the specific historical period 
he studied was the basis of a series of articles by Nie and his colleagues during 
the late 1970s (Nie and Anderson 1974, Nie and Verba 1975, Nie, et a l 1979). 
They argued that the period during the late 1950s, upon which Converse's 
conclusions were based, was a time characterised by political consensus and a 
lack of ideological polarisation in US politics. During such periods of political 
stability we should not expect the electorate to exhibit strongly held political 
attitudes and ideological thinking but, as the political landscape becomes more 
ideologically polarised, we should see an increase in the internal consistency of 
PBSs, of issue-based voting and of the use of ideological terminology in 
everyday political discourse. In the British context a similar hypothesis was 
proposed by Sarlvik and Crewe (1983), Franklin (1985) and later by Rose and 
McAllister (1986, 1990) who argued that a more sophisticated, volatile and 
issue conscious public was eroding traditional class-based ties in determining 
voter choice.
51
Political Sophistication: Theory and M easurem ent
In the US this hypothesis was supported by analysis of data from the National 
Election Studies between 1956 and 1972 which showed marked increases in 
levels of issue constraint between 1960 and 1964. Indeed the associations 
between the time-series of individual issues studied by Converse had increased 
amongst the mass public to levels exceeding those found in the elite sample in 
his original study. This sudden increase in attitude constraint came at a time 
during which issues of race and poverty had taken centre stage in national life 
and a new, charismatic president was convincing the public that politics could 
make a difference16.With corresponding increases found in the proportion of 
respondents making Active Use (AU)17 of ideological terminology when 
discussing politics Nie and Anderson were led to conclude that
/fWe have located a substantial and widespread increase in the consistency of political 
attitudes in the post-1960 era and we have argued that this finding is indicative of the 
growth of a more ideologically oriented mass public"
Nie (1974, 580)
Nie and Anderson's account was soon to become the new accepted wisdom 
but this ultimately proved premature (Kinder 1998). For the increases in 
constraint upon which they had based their conclusions turned out to be 
largely artefactual consequences of alterations in question wording and 
response categories in the 1964 wave of the National Election Studies (Bishop, 
et al. 1978, Sullivan, et al. 1978). Unbalanced items which presented only one 
side of a particular issue and asked respondents to either agree or disagree 
were replaced with balanced questions in which both sides of the argument 
were presented before the respondent was asked to express their attitude. 
Experimental manipulations demonstrated that the change in question format
16 "Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country".
17 See section 2.7.1 for a fuller description of this measure of ideological sophistication.
52
Chapter Two
per se accounted for the vast majority of the increase in attitude constraint 
(Sullivan, et a l 1979).
Furthermore Bishop (1976) showed that Nie's measure of the salience of 
politics18 in the electorate as a whole had increased most markedly in the years 
between 1956 and 1960 -  the period Converse had studied - and only modestly 
between 1960 and 1964 -  the time during which they contended a large 
upsurge in political involvement and, hence, constraint had occurred. It also 
emerged that the apparent increase in the use of ideological terminology was 
due partially to a difference between Nie and Andersen's and Converse's 
coding procedure. What increase was left once the same coding frame was 
employed fell almost entirely in the category Converse labelled 'near­
ideologues' which constituted those respondents who used ideological 
terminology but did not seem to understand it. Subsequent reanalyses which 
examined questions with an unchanging wording and format (Klingemann 
1979, Smith 1989) found little or no change in the level of constraint, indicating 
that "despite profound changes in US politics through the 1960s, the structure 
of public opinion had hardly changed at all" (Kinder and Sears 1985, p. 666-7).
In Britain the parallel idea that voting behaviour rooted in social-class loyalties 
and identities was giving way to a more rational, issue based decision-making 
public (which by definition should have more stable and crystallised political 
attitudes) was also being comprehensively challenged. It was not class based 
voting that was in decline but the traditional class structure itself. Once 
changes in the relative proportions that each social class comprised in the 
electorate were held constant over time, the apparent increase in issue-based 
voting disappeared (Heath, et a l 1991).
18 Self-reported interest in the election campaign.
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2.5 An Inappropriate Methodological Paradigm?
A number of opponents of the nonattitude thesis have argued that the 
methodology used by Converse, and for that matter by many of his critics, is 
simply inappropriate for detecting structural organisation of belief systems at 
the level of the individual. Foremost among such voices is that of Robert Lane 
(Lane 1973, Lane 1962, Lane 1972). Lane argues that Converse's methodology 
starts with a preconceived idea of what an ideologically structured PBS should 
be and when he fails to find it, concludes that none exists w ithout bothering to 
look for other forms of organisational structure. Just because people do not use 
abstract ideological terminology when discussing politics, does not mean they 
do not structure their political beliefs in a coherent manner.
Converse's approach, argues Lane, is particularly likely to underestimate the 
ideological content of the belief systems of the merely inarticulate. Others have 
joined Lane in arguing that only by studying belief systems at the level of the 
individual can more idiosyncratic structures be uncovered (Bennett 1976, 
Conover and Feldman 1984, Hochschild 1981, Luker 1984, Marcus, et al. 1974) 
and that, by looking at aggregate correlational statistics we will only ever find 
structure amongst those who share the dominant ideological belief systems. 
Lane used in-depth interviews with a group of working-class men to show 
that, while not adhering to conventional systems of value structure, they 
nevertheless based their positions on individual political issues coherently in 
terms of "latent ideological structures...premise, inference, application" (Lane 
1962, p. 9-10).
However, while the 'ideographic' approach of Lane and others makes a 
number of telling criticisms against specific aspects of Converse's position, 
when looked at in its entirety, the argument that low levels of constraint are 
merely indicative of idiosyncratic belief systems does not stand up. For while 
we might attribute lqw inter-item correlations and non-ideological terminology 
to idiosyncrasy and inarticulateness, why should we expect the attitudes of
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these groups to be any less stable over time? A key plank of Converse's 
argument is based on the high levels of longitudinal inconsistency which, in 
fact, served as the starting point for his 1964 article. If a substantial number of 
respondents provide ephemeral and labile responses to political attitude 
questions, inter and intra-item inconsistency is w hat we should expect to find. 
If on the other hand, as Lane protests, low inter-item constraint is caused not 
by non-attitudes, but by unusual and non-conformist belief system structures, 
there is no reason to expect any less stability over time. Yet this is precisely 
w hat Converse found when comparing his 'elite' sample data with that from 
the general public -  not only were the items much more constrained in the elite 
sample, they also showed much higher levels of stability over time. 
Furthermore, the individual-centred approach has itself been criticised on the 
grounds that, through the discursive, constructional nature of the in-depth 
interview methodology the researcher "has not so much discovered the 
ordinary person's ideology as he has contributed to its momentary creation" 
(Kinder and Sears 1985, p. 669).
2.6 Measurement at the Appropriate Level
Are we measuring belief system structure at the appropriate level? This is a 
question that has been posed by a number of researchers seeking to rescue the 
mass public from the charge of basic political ignorance. In Converse's original 
treatment, positions on individual policy issues were seen to be related to one 
another only in an indirect manner through their common linkage to "some 
superordinate value or posture toward man and society" (Converse 1964). This 
relationship results from the hierarchical nature of PBSs and is illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. While no direct relationship may exist between, say, an 
individual's attitude toward a proposed political asylum bill and their stance 
on penal reform, the two attitudes may nevertheless be connected by dint of 
their common linkage to a more general value orientation regarding, say, civil 
liberties. Recent developments in PBS research have proposed that inter-item
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or 'horizontal' consistency is not the appropriate measure of constraint and 
that, instead, we should be evaluating the extent to which idea elements are 
constrained 'vertically' by more general value dimensions.
value A
►Issue 1 Issue 2
Figure 2.1 Issue positions and Higher Order Value Dimension
The idea of central or core values as general political orienting principles has a 
long pedigree and dates back at least as far as Tocqueville (Lipset 1959). The 
basis of this perspective is that, while people may not conceive of each 
individual political issue they encounter as representing an element within 
some integrated political ideology in the Marxist sense of the word, they may 
nevertheless be able to form an evaluative position toward it on the basis of its 
implications in relation to some strongly held value or belief (Rokeach 1973). 
Such 'core values' are deeply ingrained within the social and political fabric of 
society and, like the collective representations of Durkheim, are so pervasive 
and persistent that their presence may go largely un-noticed and unquestioned 
(Lane 1962). Being only weakly related to one another, these superordinate 
beliefs cannot be said to constitute an ideology in the more traditional sense 
but nonetheless serve as a meaningful framework within which individual 
attitudinal positions may be structured (Williams 1979).
Many different core values and beliefs have been mooted over the years, often 
with different names for what is essentially the same construct (see McClosky 
and Zaller 1984, for a full review) but in the political realm, those most 
frequently suggested centre around notions of freedom of the individual, the
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size and role of the state and economic individualism (Lipset 1959). To 
understand the ontological status of individual issue positions from this 
perspective, we must look to how these issues conflict or converge with 
people's core beliefs and values rather than how they are related to one another 
at the lowest level of the hierarchy (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). Peffley and 
Hurwitz (1985,1987), for example, use hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis 
to show that, while inter-item consistency may be weak to non-existent in 
specific policy areas, if we reconceptualise constraint as being the vertical 
relationship between general and specific attitudes, much higher levels of 
association are observed. Drawing on schema theory (Fiske and Taylor 1991) 
they contend that novel incoming information is nearly always interpreted in 
relation to more general pre-existing knowledge schemas and that, "from this 
perspective, attitude structure centers primarily on the linkages between 
abstract idea elements, where the former are assumed to 'constrain' the latter" 
(Peffley and Hurwitz 1987, p. 1100).
In the US, Feldman (1988) has developed a set of short scales to measure the 
dominant core beliefs within the American public. Finding that internally 
reliable scales representing 'equality of opportunity'; 'economic individualism'; 
and 'free enterprise' were strongly related to policy positions, incumbent 
performance and candidate evaluations, Feldman too argues that by analysing 
public opinion at the appropriate level (i.e. core beliefs and values) the public 
emerges as rational, coherent and structured in its political preferences. The 
issue is also one of measurement. In Britain Heath et al (Heath, et al. 1996, 
Heath, et a l 1993) have developed similar scales to those of Feldman which 
cover two major dimensions of the British political landscape: 'socialism /left v 
laissez faire/right' and 'libertarian v authoritarian' values. Heath et al make 
the point that most of the work showing low levels of attitudinal consistency 
within the mass public has been based on single item measures. They list the 
disadvantages of single item measures as being their inability to address the 
complexity of multi-faceted topics; their susceptibility to extraneous influences
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such as question wording; and their lower levels of discrimination relative to 
multi-item scales. Finding internal reliability of 0.64 and 0.53 (Cronbach's 
Alpha) respectively19 in their short six item scales20, Heath et al go on to show 
that respondents' positions on these value dimensions are significant 
predictors of both their attitudes toward the two main political parties and the 
likelihood of their participating in political protest. Taking this in conjunction 
with the levels of longitudinal consistency exhibited by these scales (Pearson's 
r = 0.70 between time 1 and time 2), the authors were led to conclude that:
"when examined in a more appropriate fashion the British electorate does have 
consistent and stable views on underlying value principles, which in turn would seem 
to be useful for explaining support for the main political parties both during and 
between elections"
Heath (1993, p. 107)
However, a problem with the core beliefs and values approach to reasserting 
the political competence of the mass public is that, methodologically at least, in 
the search for statistical evidence of inter-relatedness and stability it tends to 
lump everyone in together. The net effect of summing related items is to 
increase the amount of true score variance relative to random error variance in 
comparison to the ratio for each individual item. This is because, while the true 
score is systematic, the error component is random and therefore self­
cancelling across items. To be sure, the effect of this aggregation is to enhance 
statistical associations relative to those obtained with single item measures, but 
can we be sure with this approach that we have really unveiled the core beliefs
19 The libertarian-authoritarian scale obtained Alpha coefficients of .60 in the 1992 and 1997 
British Election Studies which had considerably larger sample sizes.
2t,The scales were formed by recoding all six items so that 1 indicated a right/authoritarian 
response and 5 a left/libertarian response and then summing across items to give a scale 
ranging from 6 to 29 with a mean of 19.2 and a standard deviation of 3.7 for the left-right scale 
an a mean of 18.5 and a standard deviation of 3.2 for the libertarian-authoritarian scale.
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and values of the entire public and not merely some more sophisticated sub­
group thereof -  leaving the responses of the less politically aware lost in a 
collision of random noise? If the latter possibility were found to be the case, 
then we might be led to conclude that, rather than providing evidence for the 
underlying structure of the PBSs of the general public, the scaling approaches 
of the core beliefs and values perspective reveal exactly the opposite -  that 
even when looked at in this more methodologically sophisticated manner, the 
belief systems of large sections of the public do not appear to be structured by 
even broad and general guiding principles such as deeply held values and 
beliefs.
Heath et al do in fact note this problem and find the over-time stability of their 
summed scales to be lower amongst the less well educated members of their 
sample. However, this analysis would seem insufficient to conclude that even 
the less politically aware members of society can be said to structure their 
belief systems according to these core values. This is because firstly, education 
has been strongly criticised as an indicator of political sophistication as it is too 
general an indicator of cognitive ability and largely unrelated to political 
involvement and awareness (Converse 1979, Wray 1979). Second, while 
looking at the over-time correlations across groups is useful for examining 
longitudinal stability, it passes over the prior and perhaps more important 
question of whether the items can really be said to form a single scale across 
groups differing in their level of political awareness. So, while the core beliefs 
and values approach helps to show that when appropriate steps are taken to 
correct for measurement error in survey items, enhanced statistical associations 
can be found between measured constructs, it cannot assure us of the political 
competence of the entire public.
In the sections above I have described the four main perspectives from which 
the nonattitude thesis has been challenged -  measurement error, changing 
times, inappropriate methodology and inappropriate level of measurement.
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And while all four can be said to raise legitimate concerns about Converse's 
somewhat dark conclusions about the political sophistication of the mass 
public, none of them on their own or taken in their entirety seem capable of 
convincing us that these conclusions are unfounded. In later chapters I conduct 
a range of empirical analyses to investigate the validity of the nonattitude 
thesis more thoroughly. Next, however, I turn to a discussion of the key 
concepts and terminology to be used in this thesis and how they have been 
operationalised and measured in the past.
2.7 Political Sophistication -  Measurement and Terminology 
Throughout this and the previous chapter I have repeatedly referred to 
political 'awareness' and other related concepts such as 'competence', 
'involvement7, 'engagements and 'knowledge'. These terms have often been 
used more or less interchangeably to refer to specific aspects of the broader 
notion of political 'sophistication'. This very useful concept, which may be 
thought of as somewhat akin to an individual's political intelligence, has 
proved notoriously difficult to pin down and operationalise. It will therefore be 
beneficial to provide an overview here of the main definitions and 
operationalisations that have been proposed to inform the analysis and 
discussion of later chapters.
Political sophistication is essentially about cognition; how and what people 
think about politics defines the size and structure of their political belief system 
(PBS) which in turn determines the way that they evaluate political choices and 
interpret incoming political information. Luskin (1987) has argued that the 
three primary organisational dimensions of political belief systems are (a) size: 
the number of idea elements contained within the PBS (b) range: the breadth of 
coverage of the political domain (knowledge about a range of different policy 
areas rather than specialisation in one or just a few domains) and (c) constraint:
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the extent to which idea elements are structured hierarchically such that 
broader more inclusive values or beliefs organise positions on specific issues.
The first two dimensions are therefore primarily to do with political 
information and knowledge while the latter, although inextricably linked to the 
first two, is more concerned with how individual pieces of political information 
are structured into a coherent organisational whole. More information and 
greater internal integration of idea elements are indicative of greater political 
sophistication. More sophisticated individuals, it is proposed, experience 
greater political efficacy through deriving attitudes and partisan tendencies 
which are more in line with their own and with group interests. A range of 
measures have been developed to capture each of these different aspects of 
belief system structure. Correlational measures, for example, primarily tap the 
extent to which political belief systems are internally constrained, while 
measures of political knowledge are more reflective of the size and range 
dimensions. Another means of assessing the internal coherence of belief 
systems has been to study the abstract ideological content of people's political 
vocabulary. These approaches have been termed 'abstraction measures' and 
are discussed in more detail below.
2.7.1 Abstraction Measures
The basic idea behind measures of abstraction is to assess the extent to which 
people are able to use and relate to abstract principles of political reasoning 
such as 'left-right' or 'liberal-conservative'. One of the simplest approaches to 
measuring abstraction, referred to as ideological self-location, involves asking 
respondents to locate themselves and /o r parties and candidates on graphical 
representations of these dimensions (Bennett, et al. 1979, Hikel and Segal 1973). 
A second approach, known as Active Use (AU) involves recording respondents 
talking freely about politics and then coding their verbatim speech to various 
Levels of Conceptualisation (LC) (Campbell, et al. 1960, Converse 1964,
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Neuman 1981). Respondents can then be categorised by the extent to which 
they refer to and utilise higher order organisational principles in their political 
deliberation. A related method, also developed by Converse (1964) is known as 
the Recognition and Understanding (RU) measure. This requires respondents 
to identify the ideological position of a particular party and then to give 
reasons for this placement. Respondents are coded on the basis of correctness 
and ability to give adequate ideological justification for their choice. Measures 
of abstraction, then, speak most directly to the constraint and hierarchical 
organisational aspects of political sophistication.
The problem with this type of measure of course, is the validity of the 
operationalisations. Errors of classification may be of both the false-positive 
and the false-negative variety. As Lane's ideographic perspective asserts, it is 
eminently possible for someone to have a left or right wing political outlook 
without explicitly recognising it as such. The high proportions of respondents 
failing to locate themselves on traditional left-right self-placement scales fuel 
the suspicion that individuals with a genuine 'left-right' political outlook fail to 
label themselves accordingly. Follow-ups of ideological self-locations have also 
shown that respondents provide very vague and often factually incorrect 
definitions of the dimension they have located themselves on and fail to 
identify the correct positions of main political parties on the same dimension 
(Butler and Stokes 1969, Erikson and Luttberg 1973).
As regards specific operationalisations of AU and RU, Smith (1980) has argued 
that these measures of ideological reasoning are very weak and suffer from a 
lack of reliability in the coding frames used. For example, just mentioning the 
word 'left7 would categorise someone as an 'ideologue' w ithout their having 
demonstrated any real understanding of the abstract concept. It is this concern 
over the extent to which use of ideological terminology is actually indicative of 
ideological thinking, that has led some observers to reject these measures on 
the grounds that "the words are epiphenomenal; it is the cognition behind
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them that matters" (Luskin 1987, p. 879). Furthermore, relative to other 
measures of political sophistication, abstraction measures are costly and time 
consuming to collect and have been rarely, if ever, used in Great Britain. 
Measures of abstraction, therefore, are not used as a measure of political 
sophistication in the empirical chapters of this thesis.
2.7.2 Correlational Measures
Correlational measures have been used extensively and in a wide variety of 
ways, to gauge the inter-connectedness of belief systems and form a central 
part of the analyses employed in this thesis. A detailed review and 
consideration of the problems and advantages of these techniques appears in 
section 3.2 so only the more general points will be covered in this section. More 
constraint between attitudes within the belief system, as indicated by 
correlational statistics of greater magnitude, is argued to be indicative of 
political sophistication. This speaks to both the information holding and the 
interconnectedness aspects of sophistication: the less an individual knows 
about politics the more attitudes will be weak, non-cognized and labile, which 
will in turn lead to attenuated correlations between attitude items due to the 
high proportion of random variance or measurement error in each attitude 
item. Additionally, to the extent that the individual does hold attitudes toward 
political issues but perceives each one in isolation and as unconnected, through 
higher order values, to other issues in the belief system, correlations between 
these items will also be of lower magnitude.
Thus, while there are a number of problems with the correlational approach, 
centring around unit and item nonresponse bias, response set effects and the 
use of inappropriate correlational measures, the approach nonetheless retains a 
useful role in that respondents with stronger, more stable attitudes, organised 
within a coherent hierarchical structure should, all things equal, exhibit 
correlations of greater magnitude between items. These analytic techniques 
form an integral part of the empirical work presented in this thesis and the
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debate as to their proper use and interpretation is addressed in detail at 
various points throughout chapters three, four and five.
2.7.3 Longitudinal A ttitude Stability
To the extent that an individual's attitude is w eak ,' uncrystalized' or even non­
existent, we would expect it to exhibit low over-time consistency. If we ask the 
same individuals the same question at different points in time and observe 
inconsistency, not only in the exact response alternatives selected but also in 
terms of the side of the issue they take, we may wonder if we are actually 
measuring anything 'real' at all. That attitudes are relatively stable and 
enduring psychological dispositions is usually taken as a fundamental 
definitional criterion. Yet massive instability in attitude responses was exactly 
w hat Converse found in his analysis of NES panel data between 1956 and 1960 
and became the basis for his celebrated (or infamous -  depending on one's 
viewpoint) 'Black-and-White' model of attitude holding. Converse argued that 
low levels of longitudinal stability was further evidence of the political 
ignorance of a large proportion of the US public, caused by the tendency to 
provide a random 'coin-flip' response to survey questions when people actully 
hold no real attitude.
Another possible cause of such high individual level volatility is true change in 
the respondent's opinion. However, Converse rejected this explanation on the 
grounds that marginal aggregate distributions remained virtually unchanged 
throughout the duration of the panel and because correlations between time 1 
and time 3 were of the same order as those between time 1 and time 2, 
indicating that switching was independent of time between measurements21. 
This is not to suggest that true change is not the causal factor behind some of 
the longitudinal instability - such a position would clearly be absurd - but that
21 Theoretically, w e would assume that more 'true change' should occur between time 1 and 
time 3 than between time 1 and time 2, all things being equal.
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with data showing little or no longitudinal change in marginal distributions, it 
is unlikely to be anything more than a trivial influence on such large amounts 
of individual 'churn'.
As such, then, longitudinal instability can be taken as a measure of the extent 
to which individuals are politically aware and, consequently hold strong 
attitudes that are resistant to change (Bartle 2000, Iyengar 1973). The problem, 
of course, is in separating out response instability in observed items that is due 
to true attitude change from that which is merely random 'flipping'. Recent 
developments in confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling have meant that this goal is now more easily attainable. These 
techniques and their application in assessing response instability as a measure 
of political sophistication are discussed in greater detail in chapter five.
2.7.4 Political Knowledge or 'Information Holding'
As we have seen in earlier sections in this chapter, most if not all theories of 
voting behaviour and models of- democracy require at least basic levels of 
political knowledge amongst the citizenry. And, while various theorists have 
demonstrated that it may be possible in certain situations to make quasi- 
rational choices with minimal information, others maintain that "democracy 
functions best when its citizens are politically informed" (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, p. 1). Factual knowledge about government was the first aspect of 
political sophistication to be researched via the survey method (Hyman and 
Sheatsley 1947) and formed the original basis for the longstanding 
characterisation of the American public as uninformed about and uninterested 
in politics. It is probably the most fundamental aspect of political sophistication 
and would seem to ontologically precede all measures discussed so far. It is not 
possible for a belief system to obtain structure without the 'building blocks' of 
political information to work upon. The importance of political knowledge in 
determining the content and structure of political thinking has been shown by
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its positive association with political tolerance; political participation; attitude 
holding, stability and constraint (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Krosnkick and 
Milburn 1990, Leighley 1991).
Standardly measured by administering a set of questions covering topics such 
as the relationship between governmental institutions, the names of office­
holders or electoral candidates, the role and function of legislative bodies and 
the relative position of parties and candidates on policy dimensions, these 
question batteries provide an index of knowledge ranging from zero to a 
maximum correct score. Performance on these indices by the American public 
has been consistently poor since they were first introduced (Bennett 1988, Delli 
Carpini 1985, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In a comprehensive study, Delli- 
Carpini and Keeter have argued that political knowledge in the United States 
can be summarised in terms of three major dimensions -  'who government is'; 
'w hat government is' and 'w hat government does'. The first of these involves 
being able to put names and faces to political actors, while the second speaks to 
constitutional knowledge and familiarity with the major institutions of the 
state. The 'w hat government does' dimension pertains to knowledge of the 
major political issues of the day and where the major parties stand on them 
relative to one another.
While people vary in their exact areas of specialisation (or perhaps more 
appropriately, ignorance) across dimensions, there is also a strong tendency for 
people to be generalists -  if you score highly on one dimension you are likely 
to score quite highly on all three (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Expectations 
that increased access to education and rising academic attainment since the 
War would lead to concomitant increases in civic competence (Converse 1972, 
Thompson 1970) have proved unfounded, with levels of factual knowledge 
about politics showing no discernible increase. Indeed, Bennett concludes from 
a recent knowledge survey of the American public that "using the standard 
academic grading system, the typical grade was a D+, hardly a sterling
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performance given the leniency with which some items were 'graded'" (1988, 
p. 481). Despite a relative paucity of similar studies in Britain, where such 
knowledge batteries have been administered, the general picture has shown 
the British to perform little better than their American counterparts (Baker, et 
al. 1996, Bartle 2000, Butler and Stokes 1969).
There are obvious problems in obtaining satisfactory measures of political 
knowledge via sample surveys. In an area that Albert Einstein once described 
as "more difficult than physics" (from Neuman 1986, p. 169), it is hard to see 
how short batteries of items in a survey interview can accurately and 
sensitively reflect the true heterogeneity of the political knowledge of the 
general public. Nonetheless, these indices are not really intended to present a 
full and accurate account of an individual's political knowledge but, rather, are 
intended to be population level 'diagnostic' indicators which tend to group 
people into quite broad bands of political awareness in more or less the correct 
order. They also seem to differentiate people in quite predictable and 
theoretically meaningful ways and are highly correlated with other indicators 
of cognitive ability, political interest and behaviour (Bartle 2000, Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996).
Apart from abstraction measures then, which have not really been collected on 
political attitude surveys in Great Britain, all three of these operationalisations 
of the political sophistication construct will be used at various points in this 
thesis. In particular, I shall be examining how information or knowledge is 
related to both the inter-connectedness and stability of political attitudes. 
Terminologically, although all of these concepts refer to slightly different 
aspects of the sophistication construct, I shall refer to the informational aspect 
more or less inter-changeably as 'awareness', 'information' and 'knowledge'. 
More detailed considerations of the methodological strengths and weaknesses 
of various operationalisations of the construct are provided in the empirical 
chapters in which they are used.
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2.8 A Note on Defining 'Self-Interest'
A central line of argument presented throughout this thesis is that individuals 
are better able to determine their self-interest and derive attitudes consistent 
with its attainment, to the extent that they are better informed about politics. 
Determining w hat exactly is meant by 'self-interest7, however, is far from 
straightforward. While, it would seem uncontroversial to assert the 
importance of information for good decision-making in areas where there are 
clear criteria for the evaluation of outcomes -  financial investment or business 
management for instance -  in politics, where no independent evaluative 
criteria exist, asserting that people's interests are not best served by their own 
actions and decisions raises the pejorative charge of assigning 'false­
consciousness' to those who do not happen to share our opinions.
A means of moving beyond this subjective/objective dichotomy has been 
suggested by the concept of 'enlightened preferences' (Connolly 1983, Dahl 
1989, Mansbridge 1983). This perspective leaves different individuals free to 
rationally evaluate diverging self-interests by defining them as "whatever that 
person would choose with fullest attainable understanding of the experiences 
resulting from that choice and its most relevant alternatives" (Dahl 1989, p. 
180-181). Such a formulation highlights the importance of information for 
making decisions that maximise individual utility but avoids the problem of 
inevitable drift toward homogeneity of opinion with increasing information by 
allowing the determination of self-interest to be weighted by the idiosyncratic 
value configuration of the individuals and groups concerned (Bartels 1990). It 
is this 'enlightened preferences' formulation that I adopt in the discussions of 
the relationship between knowledge, attitude and political efficacy at various 
points throughout the following chapters.
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2.9 Conclusion
In chapters one and two I have described the theoretical background to 
concerns about the level of political sophistication of the mass public, reviewed 
perspectives which have sought to downplay the importance of an informed 
citizenry and provided a detailed review of developments in the nonattitude 
debate since Converse's original treatment. In the following chapters I adopt a 
range of different quantitative techniques and data sources to examine the 
relationship between political information and the content and structure of 
political attitude systems. This focus on the factors underlying political 
sophistication and its various manifestations will hopefully go some way 
toward addressing the fact that, after years of research into political belief 
systems and the sophistication of the mass public, we know far more about the 
distribution of political sophistication in the public than we do about its causes 
and consequences Luskin (1990).
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3 POLITICAL AWARENESS AND BELIEF SYSTEM CONSTRAINT
In chapters one and two the concept of political sophistication and its 
importance in relation to theories of democracy and voting behaviour was 
introduced. It was argued that the existence of wide discrepancies in levels of 
political awareness amongst the mass public has serious negative implications 
for the ability of the polity to exercise power in the public interest -  
irrespective of one's exact definition of democracy. Evidence relating low 
levels of political sophistication to more or less fixed characteristics of 
individuals suggests that sub-groups of the population may not only be socio­
economically disadvantaged but may also be endowed with less political 
efficacy than others. The following chapters use a range of statistical 
techniques to address two related research questions: to w hat extent are 
discrepancies in political sophistication actually apparent within the British 
public; and what are the effects of increases in political information on the 
direction and internal coherence of political attitudes.
In this chapter Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and other techniques are 
used on data from two independent, nationally representative sample surveys 
to assess whether a significant cleavage exists in the British electorate in the 
extent to which people structure their PBSs in terms of coherent, overarching 
value dimensions. The focus of this chapter, then, is on the degree of 
consistency between individual elements of belief systems and how this 
consistency is stratified within the public as a whole. While consistency may 
be conceived of as residing between different elements at the same point in time 
or within  the same element longitudinally, the focus in this chapter is solely on 
the former, cross-sectional type of consistency -  which shall be defined here as
70
Chapter Three
constraint. Longitudinal consistency, and its relation to constraint is addressed 
in chapter five.
3.1 Cognitive Consistency and Political Belief Systems
The idea of cognitive consistency has long been of central importance in 
psychological thought. Heider's (1944,1946) Balance theory proposed the idea 
that the need for cognitive consistency is a basic human motivational drive 
and paved the way for later dominant social psychological theories such as 
Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957), Self-Perception Theory (Bern 1965, Bern 
1972) and Associative Networks (Anderson 1983) all of which, implicitly at 
least, rest on the notion of consistency as a central tenet of human interaction 
and psychology. And despite the recent decline in the popularity of these 
approaches, the idea of cognitive consistency remains of strong underlying 
importance in much contemporary psychological theorising (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). That individual elements within broader cognitive structures, 
however defined, are in some way (and to varying degrees) 'consistent7 with 
one another also has a strong intuitive rationale: we expect 'consistency7 in the 
expressed views and actions of others and are keen to portray our own outlook 
as comprising a coherent and integrated whole (Aronson 1968, Tedeschi and 
Rosenfeld 1981).
In the area of PBS research, the issue of consistency has been no less influential 
and has focused on the extent to which the mass public, and different sub­
groups thereof, organise their PBSs in terms of some higher order value system 
or political ideology. As outlined in chapters one and two, Philip Converse 
(1964, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1990) set the research agenda 
in this area with his seminal 'nonattitude7 thesis. Observing low to zero-order 
correlations between different individual issue positions in the 1956-60 
National Election Studies and comparing these associations with the
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consistently high ones found in a survey of political 'elites'22, Converse 
concluded that the "remarkably low levels of cohesion or internal integration 
among the mass public" was indicative of non-ideological belief system 
organisation. This claim of ideological innocence was further supported by the 
overwhelming unfamiliarity of the survey respondents with ideological 
concepts such as 'left-right' and 'liberal-conservative' -  the bread and butter of 
elite political discourse. Converse found that less than fifteen percent of the US 
public used such ideological terminology when discussing politics and that 
two thirds of these seemed to show little understanding of the terminology 
when subsequently asked to explain their usage of it.
Indeed, not only were these measures indicative of non-ideological thinking 
among the majority of the electorate, they led Converse to further postulate 
that many individuals do not possess attitudes on these issues at all -  
responses are simply selected more or less at random in order to conform to 
the survey interview protocol. Such random responses, Converse argued, were 
responsible for the low levels of consistency that he and his colleagues 
observed between different issues at the same point in time and between the 
same issues over time. The inconsistency in responding was therefore seen as a 
function of two related factors, the fact that many responses to political 
attitude items were not based on any underlying cognitive entity and were 
therefore essentially random and, additionally, that where responses were 
underpinned by a 'true' attitude, these orientations were not seen as relating to 
any higher level organising principles or abstract value dimensions. Similar 
results have been reported from surveys of the British electorate (Butler and 
Stokes 1969, 1974). As was outlined in the previous chapters, Converse's 
pessimistic characterisation of the political innocence of the mass public has 
certainly not gone unchallenged and, in many respects, subsequent work in
22 The sample for the political elites survey was made up of candidates for the US House of 
Representatives.
72
Chapter Three
this area has been characterised primarily by attempts to either refute his 
initial thesis or to refute these later counter-claims (Sniderman and Tetlock
1986). Controversy has centred around such issues as how consistency should 
be measured, what constitutes a level of consistency acceptable as indicative of 
ideological organisation of PBSs and which are the demographic 
characteristics that are associated with belief system structure or lack thereof. 
In the following sections, I shall review the most important strands of the 
debate over the past thirty or so years before introducing the approach and 
methodology of the empirical analysis in this chapter in greater detail.
3.2 The Nature of Constraint
Political parties and movements may be thought of as being primarily defined 
by the amalgam of positions taken across the range of issues over which the 
polity exercises power. The way in which these individual positions are 
meshed together in relation to higher-order values or beliefs to form an 
integrated political outlook or agenda is what constitutes the ideology or belief 
system of a particular political orientation. At the level of the individual voter, 
the picture is essentially the same. In Converse's words, the discrete and 
seemingly unrelated issue positions that constitute psychological belief 
systems are bound together by
"some superordinate value or posture toward man and society, involving premises 
about the nature of social justice, social chance, "natural law" and the like. Thus a few  
crowning postures -  like premises about survival of the fitte s t in the spirit of social 
Darwinism -  serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and 
beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole"
Converse (1964, p. 211)
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The nature or source of this constraint between individual issue positions is not 
strictly logical in nature but derives primarily from socio-historical, cultural 
and psychological influences (Heath 1986, Lipset, et al. 1954). Even the few 
instances of apparent logical correspondence between idea elements may be 
clouded by question content and format. For example, it may appear to the 
analyst that those respondents in favour of increasing public spending cannot 
logically also be in favour of reducing taxation. However, depending on how 
the question is asked, this may not necessarily be the case. For example, 
someone may be in favour of reducing certain types of tax and raising others, 
resulting in a net overall increase in taxation to fund higher public spending. 
The greater proportion of the 'glue' binding attitudes together, therefore, is 
social psychological in nature. Packages of beliefs are circulated in society 
through mass and interpersonal communications and picked up, to varying 
degrees, by different sections and social groups within the broader public. We 
seem to learn to understand 'w hat goes with what' more through attention to 
political dialogue and debate than we do through our own personal 
introspection.
Therefore, the idea that a particular belief 'goes with' another should not be 
seen as syllogistically proscriptive but as reflective of the historical and 
cultural influences brought to bear on the social and political fabric of a given 
society at a particular point in time -  together with the 'idiosyncratic twist7 
engendered by the individual's own experiential history. The exact causal 
mechanisms underlying the internal consistency of PBSs, however, need not 
concern us overly here. Suffice to say that coherent, hierarchically structured 
political thinking entails some form of meaningful relation between individual 
issue positions. One might reasonably ask what benefit is to be derived from 
such internal and hierarchical consistency of PBSs. Surely it is possible to judge 
each issue on its own merits rather than having to assess how it fits into some 
grand scheme of things? This, however, is to misunderstand the nature of the 
constraint construct. For internal consistency of attitude systems does not, as is
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often assumed, equate to ideological dogmatism in the Maoist or Marxist 
sense. It requires that meaningful relationships should exist between 
individual issue positions but does not specify what the nature of this 
relationship should be.
Possession of coherent and structured belief systems then is important at the 
individual level as it allows the easy assimilation and retention of novel 
information and provides a meaningful framework through which it is 
possible to assess the optimal course(s) of action to be taken to achieve one's 
political objectives. At the social-structural level, communication between 
political actors and opinion leaders and the public is greatly facilitated to the 
extent that they all conceptualise political issues and debate within a common 
framework (Kinder and Sears 1985). As Peffley and Hurwitz put it:
"The importance of this topic (PBSs) is certainly warranted, for i t  has profound 
implications both at the macro level, where it speaks to the positive and normative 
dimensions of democratic theory, and to the micro level, where it addresses questions of 
mass sophistication and the extent to which individuals can make rational and 
consistent choices".
Peffley and Hurwitz (1985, p. 871)
Thus, when Converse announced that the American public was largely 
innocent of ideology, the implications were both profound and controversial. 
Was it really possible to draw such drastic conclusions through the number 
crunching of survey data? Some of the strongest criticism of Converse's 
position has been in terms of the methodology he employed -  including those 
who accept his empirical approach but reject his conclusions on technical 
methodological grounds, as well as those who argue that aggregated survey 
data are simply incapable of yielding insights into the belief systems of 
individuals. These perspectives were reviewed in chapters one and two. Here,
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the discussion turns to the more technical and methodological issues of how 
the constraint aspect of sophistication might actually be measured.
3.3 Measuring Attitude Constraint
The apparently technical matter of how constraint should be operationalised 
has received a good deal of consideration in the PBS research literature. Much 
criticism has been levelled at the use of inappropriate correlational statistics. 
The frequently used Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, for example, have been 
shown to provide consistently inflated estimates -  often approaching unity for 
far from consistent associations (Balch 1979). Furthermore, because 
correlational statistics conflate slope and the distribution of points about the 
regression line, they can be affected by the distributional properties of the 
variables being correlated to such an extent that between-group differences are 
often attributable to differences in item variance rather than the actual level of 
association between the two variables (Achen 1982, King 1986, Weissberg 
1976).
The frequently used approach of comparing averaged correlation coefficients 
across a matrix of variables suffers from at least two major problems. First, as 
this technique involves either pair-wise or listwise deletion of missing cases, 
with levels of missing data on these types of attitudinal variables often ranging 
between 10-30%, the effects of non-random item missing data can lead to 
substantial over-estimates of constraint23 (Bennett, et al. 1979, Luskin 1987). 
Second, the lack of parametric statistical tests for differences in these averaged 
coefficients means that comparing levels of constraint between groups, while 
of some descriptive value, is usually done by 'eyeball' methods with no idea as
23 The direction of the bias is toward overestimates as it is the least politically involved and 
therefore the least ideologically constrained sample members who are most likely to provide 
item missing data.
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to what constitutes a sizeable, a small, or even a significant difference between 
groups.
Multivariate correlational methods such as Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
have also been used to examine the relatedness of individual issues and 
dimensionality of belief systems within the general public (Himmelweit, et a l 
1985, Jackson and Marcus 1975, Stimson 1975). These exploratory approaches 
have been argued to allow the factorial structure underlying positions on these 
issues to emerge rather than being specified by the researcher (Luttbeg 1968). 
In terms of political sophistication, the rationale underlying these factor 
analytic approaches is that, to the extent that belief systems are more 
constrained, the factorial structure should be simpler and the percentage of 
variance explained greater the more sophisticated the individual's political 
thinking (Stimson 1975). For example, people who have highly constrained 
belief systems with issue positions structured by a higher order value 
dimension(s), should show a simpler factor structure while those who do not 
order their issue positions in terms of such higher order values should exhibit 
a more fractured, multi-factor solution. While this general hypothesis has been 
largely confirmed, there is a lack of consensus as to whether more constrained 
belief systems should always result in simpler factorial structure (see Luskin
1987). Furthermore, solutions for exploratory factor analyses are heavily 
determined by issue content and the number of variables included in the 
analysis, which makes it difficult to argue that such atheoretical approaches 
reflect the true ideological structuring of belief systems in the mass public 
(Rosenberg 1988).
Because of such problems, a number of more recent treatments of constraint 
have moved away from bivariate correlational measures and EFA and have 
adopted the method of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) or its extension - 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) (Joreskog 1973, Joreskog 1993, Joreskog 
and Sorbom 1989). CFA involves the analyst specifying a measurement model
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with imperfectly observed indicator variables measuring latent factors or 
constructs. The pattern of relationships between latent variables and observed 
variables is specified a priori and if the measurement model is seen to hold, it 
can be extended to include regression and covariance paths between latent 
constructs24. Through various estimation procedures (most commonly 
Maximum Likelihood), SEM provides estimates of the standardised and 
unstandardised factor loadings between the latent variables and each of their 
indicators, in addition to estimates of the error of measurement in each of the 
observed variables and regression paths between latent constructs.
Judd and Milburn (1980, see also Judd, et al. 1981) have argued that, in 
conjunction with measures of overall model fit, the pattern of unstandardised 
factor loadings between each indicator variable and the latent construct it 
measures may be taken as indicative of the level of belief system constraint in a 
population. Using the unstandardised coefficients, they argue, avoids the 
potential problem of unequal variances in the observed variables across 
groups causing spurious differences in constraint in standardised measures. 
By stratifying the NES 1972-76 sample into groups differing in the extent to 
which they utilised ideological terminology when discussing politics (Level of 
Conceptualisation), they showed that, while the pattern of unstandardised 
factor loadings did differ significantly between groups, there was no consistent 
trend in terms of one group having larger or smaller coefficients than the 
other. This led them to conclude that neither group exhibited greater 
attitudinal constraint than the other.
However, as both Martin (1981) and Converse himself (1980) have argued, the 
unstandardised factor loadings between indicator variables and the latent 
construct they measure are not particularly useful measures of constraint. This
24 Although note that this separation of the measurement and the structural parts of the model 
has been and remains of some controversy (see Fomell and Yi, 1992).
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is because they do not represent absolute magnitudes but are meaningful only 
relative to the factor loading that is fixed to unity in order to set the scale of the 
latent variable25. They argue that differences across groups in standardised 
parameters and measurement errors of the observed variables are more 
informative indicators of the internal coherence of political belief systems. In 
this chapter I also use CFA and SEM to investigate differing patterns of belief 
system organisation across political awareness groups but consider a number 
of different model parameters, in addition to the unstandardised factor 
loadings examined by Judd and Milburn. The pros and cons of these model 
parameters as measures of belief system structure are addressed at various 
points throughout this and the following chapters. By presenting a number of 
different indicators of constraint, recognising the pros and cons of each and 
observing how they vary across groups differing in political awareness and 
engagement, I hope to evaluate the idea that a significant minority of the 
public are characterised by weak attitudes and unconstrained belief systems 
by presenting a pattern of results to be judged in their entirety rather than 
standing or falling on the interpretation of a particular statistic or model 
coefficient.
3.4 The Data
The data sources for this study are wave 1 (1991)26 of the British Household 
Panel Study (BHPS) and the 1997 British General Election Study (BGES). The 
BHPS began in 1991 and is conducted by the ESRC Centre for Micro-social 
Change at the University of Essex, Colchester. The survey used a multistage 
stratified cluster design covering all of Great Britain. The survey instrument
25 see later discussion of CFA and SEM in section 3.5.1 for a more detailed consideration of this 
point.
2(1 Wave 1 was used  rather than a wave closer to the BGES 1997 as the response rate and 
representativeness cof the sample was greatest at this wave due to sample attrition over 
subsequent waves.
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comprised a short household level questionnaire followed by a 45 minute face- 
to-face interview and a short self-completion schedule for every adult aged 
16+ in the household (see BHPS Technical Report 1992). This chapter focuses 
on Wave 1 of the BHPS which achieved a household response rate of 65%27. 
The 1997 BGES is the latest in a series of election studies initiated by Butler and 
Stokes in 1963. It was conducted by the National Centre for Social Research28 
and uses a multistage stratified cluster design covering all of Great Britain. The 
survey comprises a face-to-face interview followed by a short self-completion 
questionnaire with one randomly selected adult aged 18+ in each selected 
household (see Thomson, et al. 1999, for Technical Report).
Both studies contained the six items of the Heath et al Teft-right' value scale 
referred to in section 2.6. The six items are all asked in an 'agree-disagree' 
format with five response categories and a 'don 't know7 option. The subject 
matter of the items covers collectivism v individualism; government 
intervention v free enterprise; and economic and political equality. To control 
for response sets some of the items were reverse coded in the questionnaire. 
For the analysis, then, all items were recoded so that 'strongly agree' (5) 
always indicated a right wing response and 'strongly disagree' (1) a left wing 
response. The exact wordings of the six items are provided in full below.
Question Wordings for Heath et al. (1993) ' Left-Right Value Scale
1. Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth.
2. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.
3. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems.
27 This response; rale refers lo proportion of issued addresses at which the household interview 
was completed. Calculation of an individual response rate is problematic as it involves making 
an estimate of the number of individuals sampled and within scope.
28 Formerly Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR).
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4. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.
5. It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants 
one.
6. There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employee's working 
conditions and wages.
3.5 Method
As the primary aim of this chapter is to explore how belief system structure 
and organisation varies across groups with different levels of political 
awareness and engagement, the first step in the analysis was to divide the 
sample into groups which vary on these dimensions. Once the comparison 
groups had been defined, the next stage was to evaluate whether a single 
factor solution was a valid representation of the dimensional structure 
underlying the six items of the 'left-right' scale and, specifically, whether this 
structure would hold, not just for the whole sample, but across the two 
political awareness groups. The technique used to make this evaluation was 
CFA with Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation (FIML29). The 
software application used was Amos 4.0 (Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). In the 
following section I provide a brief outline of and introduction to CFA and SEM 
to inform the later presentation and discussion of results. A detailed 
discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis but see Bollen (1989) or Kline 
(1998) for excellent in-depth treatments.
3.5.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) grows out of and works in ways similar 
to multiple regression, but it additionally takes into account the modeling of 
interactions, correlated independent variables, measurement error, correlated
29 FIML is ML with an item missing data imputation routine. See Wothke (1998)
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error terms, multiple latent independent variables, each measured by multiple 
indicators and one or more latent dependent variables (also each with multiple 
indicators). SEM may be used as a more powerful alternative to multiple 
regression, path analysis, factor analysis and analysis of covariance. That is, 
SEM can be seen as an extension of the General Linear Model (GLM) of which 
multiple regression is a part. While in multiple regression and ANOVA, 
modeling is based on minimising the difference between observed and 
predicted values at the individual (or case) level, SEM involves the analysis of 
covariance structures (the pattern of covariation between all observed 
variables in the model) and model fitting is based on minimising the 
discrepancy between the sample covariances and the covariances predicted by 
the model.
Most SEM software applications provide a large number of model parameter 
estimates, the primary ones of interest being the factor loadings between latent 
variables and their observed indicators, regression paths between latent 
variables (standardised and unstandardised), disturbance and residual error 
terms as well as means, intercepts and variances for both observed and latent 
variables. An error term refers to the measurement error of a given indicator 
(which can either be estimated by the model or specified by the researcher) 
while disturbance terms denote the unexplained variance in the latent 
endogenous variable(s) due to all unmeasured causes. The very complex set of 
simultaneous equations and matrix algebra which underlie a structural 
equation model can be represented in the form of a path diagram. Figure 3.1 
defines the standard symbol notation for SEM.
SEM is often conceptualised as a two step process: one first validates the 
measurement model and then fits the structural model. The former is 
accomplished primarily through confirmatory factor analysis, while the latter 
is achieved through regression analysis with latent variables. One starts by 
specifying a model on the basis of theory. Each variable in the model is
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conceptualised as a latent one, measured (where possible) by multiple 
indicators. They are categorised as either 'exogenous' or 'endogenous', the 
former being variables that are independents with no prior causal variable 
while the latter are both mediating variables - variables which are both effects 
of other exogenous or mediating variables, and are causes of other mediating 
and dependent variables - and pure dependent variables.
XI Observed variable or indicator
Latent variable or factor
LI XI
f3
Latent variable measured by 
indicator with error term
Correlation or covariance path
vi/1 ) \ T.9 ) Regression paths between latent
factors
Figure 3.1 Primary Symbols used in Path Analysis30
In SEM, each unobserved latent variable must be explicitly assigned a metric, 
or measurement range. This is normally done by constraining one of the paths 
from the latent variable to one of its indicator variables to the value '1'. This is
3(1 From Bollen, 1989; p. 33
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necessary as, otherwise, the scale of the latent variable would be unknown and 
the model would be unidentified31. Given this constraint, the remaining paths 
can then be estimated. The indicator selected to be constrained to 1 is termed 
the reference item. Which indicator is selected as the reference item is an 
essentially arbitrary choice although it is common practice to select that 
indicator which has the highest standardised factor loading on the latent 
variable. This generally results in all the other unstandardised loadings being 
below unity. As an alternative to using a reference item to set the scale of the 
latent variable, one can specify a value for its variance and let all the factor 
loadings be estimated, although this is not recommended as there is no a priori 
means of establishing what this value might be (Bollen 1989). Not specifying a 
reference item results in only a standardised solution to the model being 
estimated.
Common or principal components factor analysis is used to establish whether 
the indicators adequately measure their corresponding latent variables. The 
researcher proceeds to structural modeling when the measurement model has 
been validated, i.e. when the observed variables have been shown to act as 
adequate measures of the latent constructs. Validity of the measurement 
model is assessed on the basis of overall model fit, direction and magnitude of 
factor loadings and the proportion of variance accounted for in the observed 
variables by the latent construct. Depending of the distributional properties of 
the observed variables, model estimation can be done using a number of 
different estimation procedures, although Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(ML) is by far the most common. ML produces estimates based on an iterative 
routine which maximises the probability that the observed covariances are
31 Identification, in non-technical terms, means that there must be enough known parameters 
in the model for the unknown parameters to be estimated (see Kline, 1998, chapters five and 
six).
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drawn from a population assumed to be the same as that reflected in the 
covariance matrix implied by the model.
The difference between these two matrices (estimated and observed) is 
distributed as Chi Square and, to the extent that the two are different, Chi 
Square is larger relative to its degrees of freedom. This means that non­
significant Chi Squares (p > 0.05) are indicative of model fit because the 
predicted and the observed covariance matrices are not significantly different. 
This has two major benefits; first, it is possible to obtain an overall or 'global' 
assessment of the adequacy of a model and second one may test for differences 
in fit between models that are 'nested' within one another. Thus, for example, 
we may want to test whether all the factor loadings from a latent variable to its 
various indicators are the same or different. This can be done by estimating the 
fit of the model in which the factor loadings for a particular construct are fixed 
or constrained to equality and then estimating the fit of the model in which the 
same factor loadings are left free to vary. As the difference between the Chi 
Square values of the two nested models is itself distributed as Chi Square, 
comparing this Chi Square difference to the change in degrees of freedom 
between the two models allows us to test whether the constraint of equal 
factor loadings has significantly reduced the fit of the model (p values of > 0.05 
standardly taken to indicate that the two models are not significantly 
different).
This logic applies equally to testing for differences in model parameters 
between groups -  we can constrain any parameters in a given model to be the 
same across any specified sub-groups and test whether such constraints lead 
to a significant reduction in model fit Due to the fact that Chi Square is 
extremely sensitive to sample size, a number of modified Goodness of Fit 
indices have been developed which attempt to incorporate factors such as 
sample size relative to degrees of freedom and model parsimony (i.e. models 
with fewer parameters to be estimated are, all things equal, preferable) in their 
assessment of model fit These indices are used in conjunction with the
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standard Chi Square relative to degrees of freedom statistic to establish the 
'global' fit of models.The fit indices to be used at various points in this thesis 
are:
• Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1990) This has a range of 0-1; with 1 
indicating perfect fit. Values greater than .90 have traditionally been taken 
to indicate acceptable model fit, although more recently a cut-off of .95 has 
been suggested as more appropriate (Carlson and Mulaik 1993). CFI 
compares the existing model fit with a null model which assumes the latent 
variables in the model are uncorrelated (the "independence model"). That 
is, it compares the covariance matrix predicted by the model to the 
observed covariance matrix, and compares the null model (covariance 
matrix of 0's) with the observed covariance matrix, to gauge the percent 
lack of fit which is accounted for by going from the null model to the 
specified model.
• Expected Cross Validation Index (ECVI) (Cudeck and Browne 1983) - 
estimates the average discrepancy function value you would get in a 
second random sample from the population where you would use the 
estimated and fixed parameters from an initial, calibration sample as fixed 
parameters in computing the discrepancy between the reproduced 
variance-covariance matrix and the second sample's sample variance- 
covariance matrix. It can be thought of as providing an estimate of the 
extent to which a specified model can be expected to replicate on 
independent samples. Smaller values indicate more reliable models and 
can be used to evaluate the relative fit of nested models.
• Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an index of 
approximate rather than exact model fit that takes into account model 
parsimony (fewer parameters being estimated) -  scores below 0.08 
indicating acceptable model fit, scores of around 0.05 or below indicating 
very good fit (Browne and Cudek 1993). RMSEA is less affected by 
differences in sample size than many other measures of global fit.
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The aim of this and the following chapter is to use CFA and SEM to evaluate 
the idea that a superordinate Teft-righf value dimension underlies many of 
the political judgements of the British public. The analysis will proceed from 
an assessment of the validity of this claim in relation to the public as a whole 
to examine whether evidence to support the existence of such belief system 
structure can also be found amongst the least politically aware and involved 
members of society.
3.5.2 Stratifying the Sample
In order to get an indicative idea of how constraint varies across social groups 
by more traditional measures before moving on to the CFA, both the BHPS 
and the BGES samples were first stratified by a range of variables which have 
been found in previous research to discriminate between groups high and low 
in attitude constraint. Cronbach's Alpha was computed and a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was performed on the six 
items of the 'left-right' scale for each stratum. Cronbach's Alpha returns a 
value more or less equivalent to the average Pearson coefficient across items32, 
while the number of factors and the percentage of variance accounted for by 
the first principal components have been taken as indicative of the overall 
strength of association between the individual items -  with more dimensions 
and less variance accounted for taken as indicating lower levels of association 
or constraint (Stimson, 1975). As can be seen from Table 3.1, both measures 
show a near identical pattern of results with, as expected, higher coefficients, 
fewer principal components and more variance explained in the expected 
groups (greater cognitive ability; more politically involved; and higher socio­
economic status) in both surveys.
32 Cronbach's Alpha is also affected by the number of items included in the analysis but as the 
same six items were included across strata the coefficient may be interpreted as equivalent to 
the mean Pearson coefficient.
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The variables which showed the greatest discrimination in levels of association 
between items were those measuring political interest, involvement and 
partisanship while the education and socio-economic variables did not 
discriminate as strongly.
V a r ia b le 33 B H P S  1991 (n = 9912) B G E S  1 9 9 7  (3093)
Alpha PCs34 n Alpha PCs n
E d u c a tio n
Degree or above .76 1 (46%) 694 .75 1 (46%) 339
No qualifications .67 1 (38%) 3619 .58 2(33:17%) 931
P olitical In terest
Very interested in politics .82 1 (52%) 964 .77 1 (47%) 294
Not at all interested in politics .53 2(30:18%) 1421 .36 2(25:21%) 160
P a rty  m em bership
Member of political party .87 1 (61%) 293 na
Not member of political party .67 1 (38%) 8653 na
Social grou p m em bership
Member of one or more .70 1 (40%) 4256 na
Member of no organisations .67 1 (37%) 4687 na
P olitica l know ledge
Political knowledge score 6-10 na .73 1 (43%) 1483
Political knowledge score 0-5 na .58 2 (33:17%) 1492
Social class
Professional occupation .72 1 (41%) 308 .71 2 (41:17%P5 132
Unskilled occupation .59 2(33:18%) 242 .56 2(32:17%) 176
P artisansh ip
Supporter of political party .78 1 (48%) 3884 .68 1 (39%) 2611
Not supporter of any party .47 2(28:20%) 2628 .49 2(29:20%) 186
Tenure
Owns .70 1 (39%)
Rents .60 2(34:17%)
P olitical a c tiv ity
Active iii political party .88 1 (63%) 134 na
Not active in political party .68 1 (38%) 8810 na
Table 3.1 Alpha Coefficients and Principal Components
This preliminary analysis serves two useful purposes -  to show the robustness 
of differences between these groups on less technically sophisticated but more
33 The more politically engaged group are always presented first.
34 Where there is more than one PC, % of variance is presented for each component in 
magnitude order.
35 Eigenvalue of second factor = 1.004.
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traditional measures of constraint - and to inform the derivation of awareness 
groups for the later analyses. Comparison groups for the CFA were therefore 
formed according to the following criteria: for the BHPS the politically 'aware' 
group comprised those respondents who reported being both 'very interested' 
in politics and supporting a named political party (n=698), while the 
'unaware' group comprised those who were 'not at all interested' in politics,, 
did not support a named party and had no educational qualifications (n= 625). 
For the BGES the corresponding groups were made up of those respondents 
who were 'very interested' in politics and who supported a named political 
party (n= 280) and those who were either 'not very' or 'not at all interested' in 
politics, who did not support a political party and who had no educational 
qualifications (n= 195).
Although using this preliminary analysis as the basis for group formation 
criteria may seem to be 'cooking the books' in favour of confirming the 
working hypothesis in the later analyses, the approach, I believe, is justified in 
two respects. First, the aim here is not to derive precise population estimates of 
the proportion^ falling within each of the groups but merely to evaluate the 
hypothesis that there is a wide discrepancy between the most and the least 
politically aware and engaged members of society in the extent to which they 
make use of higher level value dimensions to order individual issue positions. 
Second, because the analysis is based on data from two independent surveys, 
the robustness of any differences between groups must be sufficient to 
replicate between samples -  thereby minimising the likelihood of capitalising 
on chance in any one sample. Ideally, the groups would have been formed on 
the basis of scores on a political knowledge quiz in conjunction, perhaps, with 
some measure of interest or involvement in politics. However, as there is no 
political knowledge quiz included on the BHPS, it was not possible to include 
a direct measure of this construct in the group formation criteria while 
retaining the cross-sample replication. However, for the BGES, on which a six 
point knowledge quiz was included, the mean score on the quiz was 5.3 in the
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politically aware group and 3.1 in the unaware group (p < 0.001). We can 
therefore be confident that these groups do reflect w ide differences in levels of 
political knowledge and engagement.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Measurement Model for the BHPS
Figure 3.2 shows the path diagram and fit statistics for the m easurem ent 
model fit to the whole sample of the 1991 BHPS (n=9912). The six observed 
variables36 (rectangles) measure one latent variable (ellipse) representing the 
'left-right' value dimension.
item5 item6item 2 item3 item4
left-right
Chi 2 = 853; d f = 9; p = 0.000 
CFI = 0.993.
Figure 3.2 -  M easurem ent m odel BHPS w h ole  sam ple
Note that the factor loading from the latent factor to item 1 is fixed to 1. This is 
done in order to set the scale of the latent variable to be the same as this item
3o The question wording for each item is provided on page 80.
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(see section 3.5.1). The key implication of setting the scale of the latent variable 
in this manner is that the unstandardised factor loadings must now be 
interpreted as ratios of the loading that is fixed to 1. Thus, an unstandardised 
factor loading of 0.8 indicates that the loading between that item and the 
common factor is eight tenths the magnitude of the loading of the item whose 
value has been fixed to 1.
The Chi2 value of 853 on 9 degrees of freedom is highly significant (p = 0.000), 
indicating that the exact fit between the predicted and the observed covariance 
matrices is not close. However, with a sample size of nearly 10 000, even a very 
well-specified model would be expected to exhibit such a discrepancy in exact 
fit. The mis-specification results from the fact that no covariance paths are 
fitted between the error terms of the indicators. Given the similarity of the 
content of some of the items and the fact that they all used an identical 
question format, the idea that the covariances between error terms are exactly 
zero in the population is highly implausible. Using modification indices37 to 
add covariance paths massively reduces the Chi2 value to provide significantly 
better model fit. However, because such an approach is not theory driven but 
rather capitalises on chance sampling variation, it is better to stick with the 
theory driven model and look at additional measures of fit that make some 
adjustment for sample size and model parsimony. The CFI value of 0.993 
indicates that the single common factor model fits the data rather well for the 
whole sample on these less restrictive criteria. Additionally, including the 
covariance paths suggested by the modification indices has little impact on the 
magnitude of the factor loadings or on other model parameters, suggesting 
that their exclusion from the model is substantively unimportant.
37 Modification indices uses analysis of residuals to suggest the incorporation of additional 
paths to improve the fit of the model.
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Factor loadings, R2 values and error terms for the one factor model are 
presented in Table 3.2. All loadings are highly significant, in the expected 
directions and close to 1. As these unstandardised loadings are ratios of the 
loading whose value is fixed to 1, this indicates that all item loadings are of 
more or less equal magnitude in the population as a whole38. R2 values show 
that the latent construct accounts for between about 20% and 30% of the 
variance in each of the indicators. Taking these three measures in conjunction, 
the one factor model can be seen to provide a reasonable account of the 
observed data for the whole sample BHPS data39.
Variable Loading S.E. C.R. P R2 Error
Fair share 1 0.27 0.84
One law for rich 1.10 0.03 33.7 0.000 0.32 0.81
Private enterprise 1.00 0.03 32.4 0.000 0.28 0.81
Public services 0.89 0.03 29.7 0.000 0.21 0.97
Government responsibility 1.07 0.03 32.2 0.000 0.26 1.00
Strong unions 1.05 0.03 31.9 0.000 0.26 1.00
Table 3.2 Factor loadings and R2 -  BHPS whole sample
Having established that the one factor model provides a reasonable fit for the 
whole sample, the next step was to determine how the one factor model would 
perform across both political awareness groups described in section 3.6. Table 
3.3 shows parameter estimates for the one factor model for the aware and 
unaware respondents. All the factor loadings in both groups are in the 
hypothesised direction (positive) and statistically significant at the p < 0.001 
level. However, while the coefficients are all statistically significant, two major 
differences in the parameters of the model across groups stand out: the
Indeed, constraining all the factor loadings to 1 actually increases overall model fit on some 
indices.
Although it should he noted that the item R squared are in the lower bound of standard 
reliability criteria (Stevens 1995).
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standard errors are consistently smaller (also reflected in the columns showing 
the critical ratios (C.R. = the ratio of coefficient to standard error)) and the R2 
values are considerably larger in the politically aware group across all six 
items. Furthermore, while neither so clear cut nor consistent, the error terms of 
the indicators do appear, on average, to be slightly higher in the unaware 
group.
aware (n = 698) unaware (n = 625)
Variable Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error
Fair share 1 0.48 0.68 1 0.09 1.10
One law 1.10 0.07 15.9 0.000 0.48 0.83 1.02 0.25 4.00 0.000 0.14 0.73
Priv ent 1.25 0.07 17.4 0.000 0.60 0.66 1.11 0.29 3.86 0.000 0.14 0.90
Pub service 1.17 0.07 16.0 0.000 0.43 0.94 1.33 0.33 4.05 0.000 0.08 1.00
Govmnt. 1.05 0.07 15.2 0.000 0.43 0.91 1.56 0.37 4.25 0.000 0.26 0.79
unions 1.06 0.07 15.1 0.000 0.49 0.91 0.88 0.25 3.46 0.001 0.16 1.08
Table 3.3 Factor Loadings and R2 -  BHPS Awareness Groups Comparison
The standard error of an estimate is a measure of uncertainty and indicates the 
reliability of the estimate under repeated sampling from the same population. 
The size of standard errors is determined primarily by sample size and the 
variance of the estimator but can also be strongly influenced by measurement 
error. As discussed in section 2.3, there are many sources of measurement 
error in survey estimates, the main ones being (i) effects of interviewers on 
respondents (ii) weaknesses in the wording of survey questions (iii) mode of 
data collection and (iv) respondents7 inability or unwillingness to provide 
accurate answers (Groves 1989). As the first three of these should be randomly 
distributed across the sample, the respondent's inability or unwillingness to 
provide reliable responses is the most plausible cause of this clear and 
consistent difference.
R2 can be thought of as indicative of the proportion of variance that one or 
several variables can account for in another variable. In CFA it is often taken as
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indicative of the validity of individual items as measures of a latent construct. 
Valid items should - all things equal -  have more of their variance accounted 
for by the latent factor than less valid items. As the R2 values are three to four 
times higher in all but one variable (which itself is double the magnitude) in 
the politically aware group, it would seem that the strength of the 
relationships between the left-right latent factor and each of the observed 
variables -  or the reliability of the indicators - is considerably greater amongst 
the politically aware respondents. A problem with this interpretation of R2 is 
that differences across groups can be caused as much by differences in the 
variance of the independent and dependent variables as by the actual level of 
association (Achen 1982, King 1986).
Examination of the item variances across groups indicates that the variances of 
the indicators are, on the whole, lower in the unaware group. However, no 
clear pattern emerges in terms of the relationship between item variance and 
magnitude of R2. For example, there is no difference in the variance of the "Fair 
Share of the Nation's wealth' item across groups40 yet the difference in R2 
between groups on this question is the greatest of all six items41. Furthermore, 
while the lower variance of the independent variables in the unaware group 
means they have less explanatory power with which to 'explain' the variance 
of the latent variable (hence, the argument goes, the lower R2), the variance of 
the latent variable is also considerably lower in this group (0.12 compared to
0.64), meaning that the independent variables in this group have less variance 
to 'explain' relative to the politically aware group. Thus, while these R2 values 
should be interpreted with caution, the potential confounding effect of 
differential item variances should not necessarily lead us to reject a causal 
interpretation based on differences in political awareness across groups. A
40 As measured by the Levene test for Homogeneity of variance.
41 This analysis was repeated on the BGES 1992 and the same pattern was found; larger R2s in 
the politically engaged group even on items with no difference in item variance.
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third difference between groups is in the disturbance or error terms of the 
indicators -  the aware group having on average slightly lower values. Given 
the more or less arbitrary metric of the indicators and the difference in the 
variances of the latent variables across groups, however, the absolute 
magnitudes of the error terms are rather meaningless and it is better to refer to 
the overall proportion of item variance that is constituted by error - which is 
simply one minus the R2 value.
As was mentioned earlier, a major benefit of SEM is that it permits statistical 
tests for differences in parameters across groups where other measures, such 
as average correlation and EFA do not. As discussed in section 3.5.1, the 
method of testing for differences in parameter estimates across groups is based 
on the difference in Chi Square between nested models. Table 3.5 shows the 
Chi Square and CFI values and the change in each for a series of nested 
models, starting with model I, in which all parameters are unconstrained 
across the two groups, through to model V where the factor loadings, error 
terms and latent variances are constrained to be the same in each group.
Model Chi 2 df CChi 2 Cdf sig. CFI
I 121.7 18 - - - 0.993
II 129.4 23 7.8 5 0.170 0.993
III 163.8 24 42.1 6 0.000 0.991
IV 173.1 29 51.4 11 0.000 0.990
V 347.3 30 225.6 12 0.000 0.979
I No constraints
II Factor Loadings equal
III Error variances equal
IV Loadings and Error variances equal 
IV Loadings, error and latent variance
Table  3.5 N ested  m easurem ent m odels  BHPS w a v e  1
The change in Chi square relative to the increase in degrees of freedom is not 
significant between the baseline model and model II which imposes the 
constraint of equal factor loadings across groups (p = 0.17). This 'factorial' or
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'metric' invariance implies that the same latent construct is being measured in 
each group; had the pattern of factor loadings been different, it would have 
been difficult to be confident that the same 'qualitative' meaning could be 
attributed to the common factor across groups (McArdle and Nesselroade 
1994). Imposing further between group constraints, however, could not be 
supported as is indicated by the significant Chi2 value (p < 0.001) and the 
reduction in CFI for every other model in Table 3.5. The fit of the models 
becomes progressively worse as more between-group equality constraints are 
imposed, with the poorest fitting model of the five being the last one (model V) 
in which the variances of the latent variables, in addition to the factor loadings 
and error variances are constrained to be equal in both groups. The results of 
the first stage of analysis, then, show that the 'left-right' value dimension -  as 
represented by the latent factor - appears to underlie responses to the six 
observed items for the whole sample of the BHPS. This factor structure is also 
evident in both political awareness groups -  as indicated by the between- 
group invariance in the factor loadings. However, the reliability and strength 
of this constraining effect is considerably greater amongst the politically aware 
respondents, as reflected in the substantial differences in standard errors and 
item R2s between the two groups.
3.6.2 Measurement. Model for the BGES
The analyses described in section 3.7.1 were replicated on the BGES sample in 
order to evaluate the robustness of the results. Table 3.6 (which also includes 
the BHPS estimates for comparative purposes) shows that, as for the BHPS 
sample, the one factor model fitted the data for the whole sample quite well 
given the sample size (X2 = 184; df = 9; p < 0.001; CFI=0.996) with all 
parameters highly significant (p<0.001) and in the expected direction. In 
contrast to the BHPS data, in which all factor loadings were close to 1, the 
factor loadings in table 3.6 are all less than one. This indicates that the factor 
loading for the item used to set the scale of the latent variable is larger than the
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other five and makes a significantly greater contribution to the variance of the 
latent variable. The R2 values and measurement errors of the indicators are of a 
similar magnitude to those observed on the BHPS sample. Having established 
that the one factor model also provides a good fit for the whole sample in the 
BGES, the next stage was again to compare the fit of the model across the two 
political awareness groups.
Variable BH PS (n=9912) BGES 97 (n=3093)
Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error 
Fair share I 0.27 0.84 1 0.40 0.55
One law 1.10 0.03 33.7 0.000 0.32 0.81 0.90 0.04 20.4 0.000 0.29 0.72
Priv. Ent. 1.00 0.03 32.4 0.000 0.28 0.81 0.91 0.04 20.8 0.000 0.31 0.66
Pub. services 0.89 0.03 29.7 0.000 0.21 0.97 0.75 0.04 17.3 0.000 0.18 0.93
Government 1.07 0.03 32.2 0.000 0.26 1.00 0.70 0.04 16.5 0.000 0.16 0.93
Strong unions 1.05 0.03 31.9 0.000 0.26 1.00 0.85 0.05 18.9 0.000 0.23 0.86
Table 3.6 Parameter estimates for whole BHPS and whole BGES sample
Table 3.7 shows the same fit indices as in Table 3.3 for a series of nested 
models to test for invariance in parameters across groups in the BGES. The 
change in Chi2 is significant for every row in the table, indicating that none of 
the parameters are invariant across groups42. In contrast to the results of the 
between group comparison in the BHPS sample, the factor loadings were not 
invariant between groups in the BGES as indicated by the significant change in 
Chi Square between Models I and II. This implies that the nature of the 
construct being measured is qualitatively different in each group43.
42 With these sample sizes the unadjusted Chi Square is an adequate measure of fit by itself, 
although the adjusted measures also support this conclusion.
43 A less strict measure of factorial invariance which requires only that the pattern, rather than 
the actual values of the loadings be the same, also fails to support the idea that the construct is 
the same across groups.
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Model Chi2 df CC hi2 Cdf sig. CFI
I 53.1 18 - - 0.995
11 70.7 23 17.6 5 .002 0.994
III 77.4 24 24.3 6 .003 0.993
IV 84.4 29 31.3 11 .004 0.993
V 139.2 30 86.1 12 .012 0.987
No constraints
t  Factor Loadings equal
III Error variances equal 
[V Loadings and Error variances equal 
V Loadings, error and latent variance
Table 3.7 Nested measurement models BGES 97
The model of best fit then, for which parameter estimates are presented in 
Table 3.8, is Model I which imposes no between-group constraints. The pattern 
of the parameter estimates across groups is, again, very similar to those found 
for the BHPS: the global fit of the model (Model I) is very good (CFI=0.995) 
but, while for the politically aware group the coefficients are all positive and 
highly significant, for the unaware group, although the coefficients are in the 
expected direction, the standard errors are all uniformly low, one of the factor 
loadings fails even to reach statistical significance at the p = 0.05 level and 
another only just attains significance at the p = 0.045 level.
aumre (n=280) unaw are (n = 195)
Variable Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error Load S.E. C.R. P R2 error
Fair share 1 0.40 0.60 1 0.29 0.49
One law 0.98 0.14 7.2 0.000 0.30 0.90 1.23 0.34 3.6 0.000 0.46 0.37
Privent 1.47 0.17 8.9 0.000 0.57 0.65 0.37 0.18 2.0 0.045 0.04 0.67
Pub service 1.22 0.15 8.1 0.000 0.40 0.88 0.64 0.23 2.9 0.004 0.09 0.85
Govmnt. 1.06 0.15 7.2 0.000 0.30 1.05 0.80 0.24 3.3 0.001 0.13 0.86
unions_______ 0.97 0.14 7.2 0.000 0.29 0.90 0.32 0.20 1.6 0.110 0.02 0.88
Table 3.8 Group comparison of Parameter estimates  -  BGES
The R2 values were also considerably higher on all but one of the items in the 
politically aware group with the majority of these values in fhe unaware group 
being of near zero magnitude. Although the reliabilities of some of these 
indicators then are slightly higher in the unaware group than they were for the
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unaware respondents in the BHPS sample, they are still very modest and 
uneven across indicators, particularly in comparison to the values obtained for 
the aware sample which are, on average, four to five times higher. So, overall, 
the pattern of results in the BGES sample is very similar to that found with the 
BHPS; much less reliable estimates and much lower item R squared values in 
the politically unaware group.
3.7 Discussion
In this chapter Confirmatory Factor Analysis was used on two independent 
samples to test whether a one common factor solution would hold, firstly, for 
the whole population and then for groups differing in their level of awareness 
of and engagement in politics. For both the BHPS and the BGES data, the one 
factor model for the deft-right' Value dimension provided a satisfactory fit to 
the whole sample data: a range of Chi Square based measures of global model 
fit were above traditionally accepted cut-offs, parameter estimates were 
significant, in the expected direction and the variance explained by the 
common factor was in the region of 30-40% across the six indicator items. 
However, when a more fine-grained approach was taken and the sample 
stratified by level of political awareness, it was very apparent that, amongst 
the less politically aware, the one factor model provided a much poorer 
characterisation of the observed data.
For the politically unaware respondents in both samples, the standard errors 
of the factor loadings were higher - reflecting an indeterminacy that, it was 
argued, results from a poorer comprehension and an inability to answer these 
questions in a meaningful way amongst this group of respondents. The 
proportion of variance in the observed items accounted for by the common 
factor was also consistently and significantly lower in the politically 
unengaged groups. Although objections may be raised about the exact 
'meaning' or interpretation of each of these individual model parameters as
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measures of the constraint aspect of political sophistication, the overall picture 
seems fairly conclusive; only those respondents who are interested and 
engaged in the political process seem to see these issues as particularly related 
to one another or to order their responses to the individual items in relation to 
a higher order 'left-right7 value dimension in anything other than a weak or 
ephemeral way.
When it is remembered that, due to differential unit and item nonresponse, 
many of the least politically aware and engaged members of society are likely 
to be completely omitted from these estimates, it is apparent that the true 
divergence in belief system organisation between groups at the extremes of 
political awareness is likely to be even greater than these estimates would lead 
us to believe. Furthermore, in comparison to previous investigations of inter­
item association, the 'left-right7 scale items should probably be expected to 
exhibit greater consistency than the types of item traditionally examined. The 
latter have usually been selected ad hoc rather than on the basis of their 
scalability and have therefore been more disparate, covering areas that range 
from racial equality to economic individualism and foreign policy in the same 
analysis. So for this reason too, it would be advisable to consider these 
estimates of belief system structure as representing something of an upper 
bound. Furthermore, repeating these analyses on the same sample groups but 
using the six item 'libertarian-authoritarian7 scale (data not shown), also 
developed by Heath et al (1993), provides a virtually identical pattern of 
results. The findings would not appear, therefore, to be isolated to this 
particular value dimension.
The primary implications of these results, I would argue, are twofold: that only 
a small number of the less politically aware respondents make only slight use 
of a higher order 'left-right7 value dimension to order their positions on these 
six individual items and that the political attitudes (represented by the 
indicators) that this group of respondents do hold are much weaker and more
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labile. Thus we fail to find evidence of a strong Teft-righT value dimension 
amongst this group of respondents both because it is actually present to a 
much lesser extent but also because the individual survey items used to 
measure this directly unobservable construct are disproportionately high in 
random variance due to the weak nature of the attitudes they tap. Having 
focused in this chapter on whether the mass public can be said to possess 
higher order value dimensions at all, the following chapter extends the 
analysis to examine the extent to which such values/beliefs, where apparent, 
can be said to lend coherence to more proximal political attitudes further 
down in the belief system hierarchy.
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As was discussed in the previous chapters, a key element in recent approaches 
toward the study of PBSs has been that superordinate value dimensions serve 
to order and lend coherence to attitudes toward more proximal issues lower 
down in the belief system hierarchy. Kinder (1983) has argued that the focus of 
the 'minimalist' paradigm of belief system research on demonstrating the 
public's lack of political sophistication has meant that we know more about 
how people do not think about politics than about how they do. If, as now 
seems generally accepted, people do not use generalised, uni-dimensional 
ideologies to structure their attitudes toward political issues then what, if 
anything, gives meaning and direction to these cognitions? As Feldman puts it 
"People may not view the world in ideological terms but they do have political 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that need to be explained" (1988, p. 416).
In recent years several authors have proposed the idea that a loosely inter­
connected set of fundamental or 'core' values, akin to Converse's "survival of 
the fittest in the spirit of social Darwinism", are where belief system structure 
amongst the mass public is to be found (Conover and Feldman 1984, Feldman 
1988, Heath, et al. 1996, Heath, et al. 1993, Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, Peffley 
and Hurwitz 1987). The main thrust of these approaches is that (a) constraint 
should more appropriately be viewed as a vertical rather than a horizontal 
phenomenon and (b) that 'ideology' should be conceived as a cluster of 
domain specific values rather than a general monolithic entity. Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987) for example, find that while individual foreign policy items are 
only weakly inter-related amongst the American public, they are nevertheless 
strongly related to foreign policy 'postures' which are, in turn, constrained by 
a set of irreducible or core beliefs about international relations. In many ways
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such formulations are much closer to Converse's original treatment of belief 
system structure and attitude constraint than studies which have tended to 
adopt a static, uni-dimensional conception of ideology, which are perhaps 
more pertinent to discussions of the cold war than the debate over the political 
sophistication of the general public.
In chapter three Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used on a specially 
designed six item scale to assess the extent to which such a higher order 'left- 
right' political value dimension could be said to underlie responses to the 
more proximal attitudes represented in the scale items. Results indicated that, 
while this may be the case for the public as a whole -  and particularly for the 
more politically aware echelons of society -  it could not be said to characterise 
the responses of the least politically aware and involved. Although the 'left- 
right' dimension represents only one of several possible core beliefs and values 
amongst the British public, it is probably the most important and repeating the 
analyses on a similar six item scale representing the 'libertarian-authoritarian' 
value dimension produced essentially identical results. In this short chapter, 
the analysis of chapter three is extended to examine, not just whether the 
measurement model is satisfactory, but also whether the 'left-right7 value 
dimension does in fact lend some sort of 'vertical' coherence to related attitude 
items further down in the belief system hierarchy.
4.1 Data
The data used were again from wave one (1991) of the British Household Panel 
Study (BHPS) and the 1997 British General Election Study (BGES). The designs 
of these surveys are described in detail in section 3.4. The sample size was 3093 
for the BGES and 9912 for the BHPS.
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4.2 Method
In order to evaluate the validity and generality of the core beliefs and values 
perspective, the measurement model fitted in chapter three is extended to 
include regression paths between the deft-right7 value dimension and more 
policy oriented attitude variables -  hypothesised to be related to left-right 
political orientation - which respondents were asked about at a different stage 
in the interview schedules. Figure 4.1 shows the path diagram for the 
structural model fitted to the whole sample BGES 1997 data (see section 3.5.1 
for a discussion of structural equation modeling). The m easurement part of the 
model is the same as that presented in Figure 3.1, the structural com ponent is 
added by incorporating four regression paths such that the deft-right7 latent 
variable predicts positions on four other single item latent variables.
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Figure 4.1 Path  D iagram  fo r  Structural M odel BGES 1997
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The four new dependent variables were measured on 11 point scales and 
address issues which have traditionally divided opinion along partisan left- 
right lines: maximising employment v minimising inflation (item 7); the 
balance between public spending and taxation (item 8); the balance between 
state and private ownership of industry (item 9); and the degree to which 
government should seek to make people's incomes more equal (item 10). Full 
wordings are provided below.
Questions used for Dependent variables in BGES structural model
Item 7 -  Unemploi/ment v Inflation
Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's 
top priority. These people would put themselves in Box 1. Other people feel 
that keeping prices down should be the government's top priority. These 
people would put themselves in Box 11. And other people's views are 
somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own 
view about unemployment and inflation.
Item 8 -  Taxation and Government Spending
Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much 
more on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box
I. Other people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much 
less on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box
II. And other people's views are somewhere in-between. Please tick 
whichever box comes closest to your own view taxes and government 
spending.
Item 9 -  Nationalisation and Privatisation
Some people feel that getting government should nationalise many more 
private companies. These people would put themselves in Box 1. Other people 
feel that government should sell off many more nationalised industries. These
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people would put themselves in Box 11. And other people's views are 
somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own 
view about nationalisation and privatisation.
Item '10 -  Redistribution
Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make 
people's incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box 1. 
Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how 
equal people's incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box 11. 
And other people's views are somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever 
box comes closest to your own view about redistributing income.
Intuitively, we should expect a high degree of predictive validity from 
regressing these items on the left-right value dimension, as the content 
domains have a high degree of overlap and all the individual items are, on the 
face of it, strongly related to one's position on the Teft-righT political value 
dimension. Or, to put it another way, if there is little relation between 
respondents' positions on the 'left-right' value dimension and their expressed 
attitude toward the balance between taxation and public spending, the validity 
and utility of either or both of these measures should be seriously called into 
question.
Before reporting on the results of these structural models, it is necessary to 
point out that, while conventional wisdom holds that latent variables 
measured with only one indicator in structural equation models are generally 
'a bad thing' (Bollen 1989), in this instance - while perhaps not being optimal 
from a purely statistical standpoint - there is an underlying logic and rationale 
for their use, above and beyond simple expediency. For one of the contentions 
made about the role of core beliefs and values is that they can be used to 
explain the apparent fragility and lability of responses to single item measures, 
on which much of the nonattitude research literature is based. For example,
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the study mentioned earlier by Peffley and Hurwitz (1987) used a higher order 
factor to explain how single item measures of attitudes toward aspects of 
foreign policy could be seen to have some genuine and meaningful relation 
with attitudes towards other foreign policy issues. However, while 
aggregation of items into summed scales and the use of latent constructs 
measured by multiple items undoubtedly improves measurement reliability, 
this should not obviate the need to understand the processes underlying 
responses to single item measures. Core beliefs and values have been 
proposed as a means of introducing a level of meaning and internal structure 
to individual issue positions and it is this contention that is put to the test in 
this chapter44.
4.3 Results
Fit statistics for the BGES whole sample structural model (n = 3093) indicate 
that the model fits the observed data quite well. Although a Chi Square value 
of 468 on 29 degrees of freedom (p < 0.000) indicates a lack of exact fit, 
parsimony and sample size adjusted indices were above conventional cut-off 
criteria for acceptable model fit (CFI = 0.992). Fitting covariance paths between 
error terms, as with the analyses reported in chapter three, significantly 
improved the overall fit of the model as assessed by the unadjusted value of 
Chi Square. However, including these paths in the model was again avoided 
on the grounds that it is better to stick with one's theoretically derived model 
than to maximise global fit by capitalising on chance sampling variation. In 
this regard, it is also worth noting that including the covariance paths between 
the error terms suggested by the modification indices had no real impact on
44 However, it should be noted that when a single common factor was derived from these four 
items and used as a single dependent variable, the same general pattern of results was 
obtained as reported for the four single indicators analysis in this chapter.
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the direction and magnitude of the structural paths, which are the primary 
parameters of interest in this analysis.
The unstandardised factor loadings, regression paths (in bold), standard 
errors, critical ratios and R2 values for the whole sample BGES 1997 data are 
presented in Table 4.1. Note also that, while the factor loadings from the scale 
items to the 'left-right7 latent variable have changed slightly due to the 
addition of the new regression paths, the factor pattern is identical and the 
absolute magnitudes are very close to those estimated in the initial 
measurement model (Table 3.6).
Loading S.E. C.R. P R2 Error
fair share 1 0.34 0.60
One law 0.94 0.045 21 0.000 0.27 0.74
Priv. Ent. 1.03 0.045 23 0.000 0.34 0.63
Pub. Services 0.87 0.046 19 0.000 0.21 0.90
Government 0.87 0.045 19 0.000 0.21 0.87
Strong Unions 0.85 0.045 19 0.000 0.20 0.90
unemploy 1.29 0.115 11 0.000 0.39 6.45
nationalise 2.41 0.128 19 0.000 0.69 5.50
taxspen 1.29 0.097 13 0.000 0.39 4.06
redistrib 3.10 0.145 21 0.000 0.79 5.90
Table 4.1 Parameters for whole sample BGES 97 Structural Model
All four regression paths are significant and in the expected direction -  those 
on the left favouring reducing unemployment over minimising inflation, 
higher taxation and public spending, more nationalisation and income 
redistribution. Reservations about the properties of R2 notwithstanding (see 
section 3.7.1), the range of 40-80% for these values indicates that for the public 
as a whole, the 'left-right7 value dimension seems to have a strong predictive 
relationship with these single item policy attitude measures. The results of this 
aggregate population analysis supports the contention that the six items of the 
'left-right7 scale are all constrained by a higher order value dimension, which
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in turn predicts respondent positions on more concrete policy related attitudes 
toward fiscal and macro-economic policy.
A similar structural model was also fitted for the whole sample 1992 BHPS 
data (n = 9912). However, as the BHPS is a multi-purpose survey with only a 
short block of questions on political attitudes, the range of items to choose as 
dependent variables in the model was very limited. After reviewing the 
potential items, only one was thought to be of sufficient relevance to the 'left- 
right' value dimension to be included in a structural model as a dependent 
variable, and this to only a very limited extent. The item was measured on a 
five point agree/disagree Likert scale and tapped the respondent's attitude 
toward whether employers should have to make special arrangements so that 
mothers can combine work and childcare. It was hypothesised that those on 
the left would be more in favour of this policy and those on the right more 
opposed. The wording for this item is provided below.
Question Wording for Dependent variables in BHPS structural model
"Employers should make special arrangements to help mothers combine jobs 
and childcare".
The item was included in the model as a latent variable measured by one 
indicator with zero error. The path diagram for the BHPS structural model is 
shown in Figure 4.2 and the parameter estimates for the model are provided in 
Table 4.2. A Chi Square value of 870 on 9 degrees of freedom again indicates 
that the exact fit of the model is poor, although, as has already been pointed 
out, with such a large sample this is to be expected. Using modification indices 
to select additional covariance paths between error terms of the indicators 
substantially improved the fit of the model but left the structural path 
unaltered and so were not retained in the final model. The adjusted measures
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of overall fit were again, however, well above generally accepted cut-off 
criteria (CFI = 0.993).
childcare
itexn5item4i t e m 2 item 6
itemS
left-right
Figure 4.2 Path Diagram for Structural model BHPS '92 Whole sample
As with the BGES data, the factor loadings between the six items and the left- 
right latent variable are more or less identical to those estimated at the 
measurement stage, so the addition of the structural path has little im pact on 
the scaling properties of the construct. The param eter of greatest interest in 
Table 4.2 is the unstandardised regression coefficient between the 'left-right' 
factor and the attitude toward childcare provision variable ( in bold), which is 
significant and in the expected direction (0.46 (s.e.=0.05), p< 0.001), although of 
a relatively low magnitude. The percentage of variance explained in this 
variable (R2) by the latent factor is extremely meagre at 0.02, indicating that, 
while the 'left-right7 value dimension does have a reliable, systematic effect on 
attitude toward childcare provision by employers, the 'strength' of the effect is
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negligible. However, this should not necessarily be seen as particularly 
damaging to the validity of the left-right latent construct as we would not 
really expect an especially strong effect of left-right political orientation on this 
policy attitude.
Loading S.E. C.R. P R2 Error
fair share 1 0.27 0.85
One law 1.10 0.03 33.7 0.000 0.32 0.82
Priv. Ent. 1.00 0.03 32.4 0.000 0.28 0.81
Pub. Services 0.90 0.03 29.7 0.000 0.21 0.97
Government 1.08 0.03 32.3 0.000 0.27 1.00
Strong Unions 1.06 0.03 32.0 0.000 0.26 1.00
childcare 0.46 0.05 10.4 0.000 0.02 3.12
Table 4.2 P aram eters fo r  w h o le  sam ple  BHPS 92 S tructural M o d el
Having established that the structural model fits the data for the whole sample 
for both the BGES and the BHPS, the next stage of the analysis was to 
determine whether the same models would hold when applied to the less 
politically aware respondents. The same structural model was therefore fitted 
to the two sub-groups differing in level of political awareness and engagement 
derived in chapter three (see section 3.5.2 for a description of the group 
formation criteria). As was mentioned in chapter three, there is a long-standing 
methodological debate concerning the separation of the measurement from the 
structural stage in SEM. One school of thought argues that if the measurement 
model does not hold, one should not progress to the structural stage of 
analysis at all (Anderson and Gerbing, 1992). Others argue that the distinction 
between the measurement and the structural stages is a false one and that 
analysis should proceed directly to modeling causal paths between latent 
constructs without having to first verify the measurement model (Fornell and 
Yi, 1992).
For the purposes of this chapter, it was decided to move on to the structural 
model for the politically unaware group in the BGES '97 despite the poor fit
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obtained at the measurement stage. Thus, when considering the results from 
the structural modeling, the poor fit of the model to the unengaged group of 
respondents at the measurement stage should be borne in mind. Table 4.3 
shows the unstandardised factor loadings, regression paths, critical ratios, 
standard errors and R2 values for the politically aware and unaware groups 
from the 1997 BGES. The overall fit of the model is again high for the adjusted 
fit indices (CFI=0.994; RMSEA=0.042; Chi Square=106, df= 58, p=0.000) and the 
unstandardised factor loadings are nearly identical to those estimated at the 
measurement stage (see Table 3.8 for comparison). As also was the case for the 
measurement model, two of the most obvious between group differences are 
the standard errors and the R2 values -  with the unaware group having 
standard errors around twice the size of the aware group.
A w are  (n=280) U naw are (n = 195)
Variable Load S.E. C.R. P R2 Error Load S.E. C.R. P R2 Error
fairshare 1.00 0.40 0.59 1.00 0.28 0.50
One law 0.97 0.13 7.7 0.000 0.29 0.90 1.22 0.31 3.92 0.000 0.44 0.38
Priv. Ent. 1.45 0.15 9.8 0.000 0.56 0.66 0.41 0.19 2.18 0.029 0.05 0.67
Pub. Services 1.22 0.14 8.7 0.000 0.40 0.88 0.69 0.23 2.98 0.003 0.10 0.85
Government 1.07 0.14 7.8 0.000 0.30 1.04 0.81 0.25 3.29 0.001 0.13 0.86
Unions 0.93 0.13 7.4 0.000 0.27 0.92 0.38 0.21 1.85 0.064 0.03 0.88
unem ploy 1.81 0.33 5.5 0.000 0.62 6.70 -0.46 0.64 -0.73 0.466 0.01 7.94
nationalise 3.40 0.38 9.0 0.000 0.85 4.62 0.51 0.62 0.83 0.406 0.01 6.72
taxspen 1.63 0.27 6.1 0.000 0.57 3.80 0.99 0.56 1.76 0.079 0.04 5.44
redistrib 3.59 0.39 9.1 0.000 0.87 4.80 1.41 0.68 2.08 0.037 0.05 7.82
Table 4.3 Group Comparison Structural Model BGES 97
The differences are particularly marked for the four new regression paths; 
highly significant and with R2 values in the rage .6-.9 for the politically aware 
respondents but only one of the four paths reaching statistical significance (p < 
0.05) in the unaware group and R2s in the range .01-.05. The effects sizes, as 
measured by the unstandardised regression coefficients, are some two to three 
times larger in the politically aware group as well as being considerably more 
reliable (as indicated by the lower standard errors).
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Furthermore, the path to the item which asks about the balance between 
unemployment and inflation even reverses sign in the unaware group such 
that those on the left are more likely to support inflation restraining measures 
over initiatives to reduce unemployment (although this estimate was highly 
non-significant). The difference in parameters across the two groups is further 
illustrated in Table 4.4 which shows the fit indices for a series of nested models 
which progressively constrain parameters to equality across groups. Loss of fit 
due to the imposition of between group equality constraints is assessed by 
comparing the fit of each model to the baseline model (model I).
Model Chi2 df CChi2 Cdf sig. CFI
1 106 58 - - 0.994
11 121 63 15 5 0.010 0.993
III 130 64 24 6 0.001 0.992
IV 114 59 8 1 0.004 0.993
V 107 59 1 1 0.333 0.994
VI 115 59 9 1 0.003 0.993
VII 111 59 5 1 0.027 0.994
I No constraints
II Factor Loadings equal
III Error Variances equal
rV Regression path 1 equal
V Regression path 2 equal
VI Regression path 3 equal
VII Regression path 4 equal
Table 4.4 N ested  S tructural M o d el C om parison  BGES 97
Given the relatively small sample sizes of these two groups, the Chi Square 
difference test is an appropriate measure of loss of fit between nested models. 
As was the case for the measurement model comparison in chapter three, 
neither the factor loadings nor the error variances are equal across groups and, 
of the four regression paths, only one can be argued on these criteria to be the 
same in both groups -  and even this one is non-significant (p < 0.05) in the 
politically unaware group (path 2 which predicts respondent attitude toward 
the balance between taxation and public spending). As probably the most 
emblematic issue of the left-right conceptual domain, this result is particularly
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surprising; if we cannot see any relationship between position on the left-right 
political value dimension and attitude toward taxation and public spending, 
we must seriously consider the validity of the constructs we have attempted to 
measure or, and this is perhaps more to the point, whether this value 
dimension can really be said to exert any organising influence all on more 
proximal political attitudes amongst the less politically aware and unengaged 
members of the sample.
In conjunction with the analyses reported in chapter three then, the results of 
this between-group comparison for the BGES show that, while respondents 
who are interested in and knowledgeable about politics possess a strong, 
underlying 'left-right' value dimension which serves to order their responses 
to individual, policy related attitude items, the same certainly can not be said 
of those respondents who are unaware about and uninterested in the political 
process. For these individuals the evidence suggests that, if they can be said to 
possess a left-right political orientation at all, it is only very weakly felt and 
has virtually no relation whatsoever with their expressed attitudes toward 
issues of great relevance to left-right political discourse.
To check the robustness of these conclusions, the BHPS structural model was 
also tested across political awareness groups. As was the case for the 
measurement model reported in chapter three, the best fitting model was the 
one which had equal factor loadings across groups (Chi2=136, df=33, p = 0.000; 
CFI=0.993; RMSEA=0.049) but unequal error variances of the indicators. The 
imposition across groups of equal regression paths between the 'left-right' 
value dimension and the attitude toward childcare provision was not 
supported by the overall fit statistics -  with these constraints significantly 
reducing the fit of the model. Table 4.5 shows the parameter estimates for both 
groups for the best fitting model.
114
Chapter Four
aware unaware
Variable Load S.E. C.R. P R2 Error Load S.E. C.R. P R2 Error
fair share 1 0.48 0.68 1 0.10 1.08
One law 1.1 0.07 16.5 0.000 0.48 0.83 1.1 0.07 16.5 0.000 0.17 0.71
Priv. Enl. 1.2 0.07 17.9 0.000 0.59 0.67 1.2 0.07 17.9 0.000 0.18 0.87
Pub. Services 1.0 0.07 15.5 0.000 0.42 0.94 1.0 0.07 15.5 0.000 0.12 0.99
Government 1.1 0.07 16.0 0.000 0.45 0.91 1.1 0.07 16.0 0.000 0.14 0.89
Strong Unions 1.2 0.07 16.6 0.000 0.49 0.91 1.2 0.07 16.6 0.000 0.13 1.11
childcare 0.6 0.10 5.9 0.000 0.07 2.96 -0.45 0.41 -1.1 0.27 0.01 5.24
Table  4.5 G roup C om parison  S tructural M o d e l BGES 97
The factor loadings are the same in each group because the model constrained 
these values to equality without significant loss of exact fit. The actual factor 
loadings, R2 values and error variances are very close to those estimated at the 
measurement stage in chapter three, showing that the addition of the 
structural path had little impact on the scaling properties of the latent variable. 
The regression path between the left-right value dimension and the attitude 
toward childcare variable was only significant in the politically aware group 
(p< 0.001) with an R2 higher than that for the whole sample but still very 
meagre at only 0.07. In the unaware group, the sign of the regression 
parameter was negative, the standard error was almost equal to the coefficient 
and was therefore highly non-significant, having no discernible effect on the 
attitude toward childcare variable (R2 = 0.01). So the BHPS analysis supports 
the findings from the BGES; the hypothesis that the Teft-righf value 
dimension serves to order opinions toward more concrete policy issues was 
supported only in analyses conducted on the whole population sample or the 
group of politically aware respondents. For the less politically aware 
respondents, poor fitting models with non-significant regression paths and 
low explanatory power were the norm.
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4.4 Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to build on the results of chapter three to look 
at the extent to which the general public use abstract, higher order value 
dimensions to structure their positions on single item, policy-related attitude 
questions. Chapter three used CFA to focus on the relatively simple issue of 
whether the general public and selected sub-groups thereof actually possess 
abstract, higher order cognitive structures such as the 'left-right7 value 
dimension. In this chapter the analysis was extended to examine the function 
and utility of these core values in addressing the question of whether 
responses to a range of policy related attitude questions are seen as inter­
related or constrained in a 'vertical' manner by higher order values and beliefs 
exerting a cohering influence 'from above'. Crucially, however, the 
investigation extended beyond aggregate analyses of the entire population to 
examine whether this model of belief system structure would hold, not just for 
the whole population but also for groups with low levels of political 
awareness, interest and engagement. When looking at the whole sample in 
each survey, the structural model fitted well -  regression paths from the 'left- 
right' latent construct were highly significant and explained around half the 
variance in the policy related dependent variables (although the R2 was 
significantly lower than this in the BHPS analysis, this was to be expected 
given the marginal relevance of the issue addressed by the dependent variable 
to left-right political debate).
However, this model did not hold when fitted to just the less politically aware 
respondents. For the BGES analysis, only one of the four regression paths from 
the 'left-right' construct to the policy related variables attained statistical 
significance (p < 0.05) amongst this group of respondents and even this path 
had an effect size less than half the magnitude of that found amongst the 
politically aware group. In contrast to this, the politically aware sub-group 
showed large and highly significant regression paths and item R2 values in the 
range 60-90%. The overall picture to emerge from the analyses in chapters
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three and four then, is that the degree to which the six items of the left-right 
scale are internally consistent is far from uniformly distributed within the 
general public. Groups low in political awareness and engagement do not 
really seem to see them as particularly inter-related, or as being derived from 
an over-arching value dimension in the way that more politically aware 
respondents clearly do. This lack of inter-item constraint, I would argue, is not 
just a function of non-ideological belief system organisation but also results 
from nonattitudes -  a large number of respondents who are not interested or 
knowledgeable about politics providing essentially random responses which 
attenuate whatever actual inter-item associations may exist in this group.
These results, then, would appear to offer support for the contention that 
significant proportions of the general public lack basic political competencies 
such as attitude holding and hierarchical belief system structure -  deficiencies 
which seem to derive from a lack of political awareness.. In the next chapter, 
panel data is used in order to add an important time dimension to the analyses 
already conducted. This will allow a consideration and evaluation of how 
political awareness is related to the consistency, not just between responses to 
different items at one point in time, but between responses to the same item at 
different points of measurement.
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In chapters three and four Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural 
Equation Modeling were used to investigate the extent to which the general 
public use higher order value dimensions to structure their attitudes toward 
specific policy issues. It has often been suggested that the reason for the low 
inter-item and longitudinal consistency commonly observed on such political 
attitude items is due, not to a lack of internal consistency or to nonattitudes, 
but to a misconceptualisation of how Political Belief Systems are really 
organised and that to incorporate a vertical dimension would substantially 
enhance the observed structure and consistency of mass political attitudes. 
Results indicated that, while this may be true when talking about the 
population as a whole, when specific sub-groups with low levels of political 
interest, engagement in and knowledge of politics are examined, this picture 
does not hold. Not only do such groups exhibit only very weak relationships 
between underlying value dimensions and specific policy positions, in many 
respects it can be argued that they do not possess such higher order value 
dimensions at all, at least insofar as they lend coherence to individual 
attitudes. Using a specially designed scale to measure the left-right political 
value dimension in two independent, nationally representative surveys, it was 
found that a one factor model was only just supported, or not supported at all, 
in groups low in political knowledge, interest and engagement. Where the 
model did hold, it was only very weakly related, or not related at all to more 
proximal attitudes toward specific areas of economic policy.
This supports the contention, discussed in chapters one and two, that there 
exist within the mass public, sub-groups of individuals who cannot be said to 
hold meaningful or well-thought out attitudes toward the major political 
issues of the day. As we cannot be confident that the distribution of aggregate 
opinion would be unaffected by attitude change amongst these individuals if
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they were to become more politically aware and involved, there is the real 
possibility that this uneven distribution of political sophistication results in an 
imbalance in political efficacy at the individual and group level resulting from 
a failure to derive attitudes consistent with self and group interests. In 
chapters six and seven I take a more causally focused approach to the relation 
between knowledge and attitude which sheds some light on this latter 
question. First, however, I extend the models presented in chapters three and 
four to incorporate a longitudinal dimension to the analysis.
5.1 Incorporating a Longitudinal Dimension
Despite the usefulness of the analyses presented in chapters three and four for 
assessing the nature and extent of cleavages in political sophistication within 
the general public, they do not provide a complete coverage of the sources of 
variation in responses to survey attitude items. In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to introduce a time element to our data, because in cross-sectional 
analyses only the non-random variation between different items is captured. 
With longitudinal data structures, the systematic variation within the same 
item at different points in time can also be isolated, allowing a simultaneous 
estimation for any repeated item, of the variance due to underlying common 
factor(s) (such as the "left-righF value dimension), the variance due to unique 
attributes of the item (such as question format and wording) and the 
unexplained or residual variance.
Longitudinal data, therefore, provide a more complete account of the random 
and systematic sources of variation within any given survey item and, 
following the approach of the previous chapters, the proportions of variance 
falling within each category can be compared across groups differing in their 
level of political awareness and involvement. Thus, while chapters three and 
four were only able to address the issue of constraint between items at one 
point in time, here the addition of a longitudinal dimension to the data will
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enable an examination of both the constraint between items and the 
longitudinal stability in the same attitude over time. Several different models 
are appropriate for this decomposition of variance task (see Judd and Milburn 
1980, Raffalovich and Bohrnstedt 1988, Saris 1982) but here I employ a three 
wave longitudinal factor model with common and unique factors to account 
for item variance at each time point. However, before discussing in detail the 
exact specification of the model to be used, I shall turn to a brief consideration 
of the subject of attitude stability and how this relates to both the validity and 
reliability of survey measures of political (and other) attitudes.
5.2 Causes and Correlates of Longitudinal Instability
When thinking about the causes of longitudinal response instability in survey 
attitude items, at least three possible explanations of the phenomenon exist: (1) 
the person has an attitude but the attitude has changed over time (2) the 
person has an attitude which has not changed but, for some reason, they have 
failed to select the "correct7 (from the researchers point of view) response 
alternative at one or more points of measurement and (3) the person does not 
have an attitude and has randomly selected different response alternatives at 
different waves. The first of these explanations constitutes the primary 
underlying rationale for collecting longitudinal attitudinal data in the first 
place, the second is an inherent defect of all measurements of directly 
unobservable phenomena, while the latter represents the cornerstone of the 
nonattitude thesis. Leaving aside explanation (2) for the moment, it is clear 
that in standard approaches to panel data, attitude change and random 
responding are confounded, rendering the use of response instability 
problematic as an indicator of nonattitudes (Iyengar 1973). The key drawback 
is, of course, that there is no obvious means of determining, at the individual 
level, to which of these two causes response instability should be attributed.
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However, given our standard definitions of the attitude (see section 2.1) and 
their reliance on the relatively enduring nature of the construct, it is clear that if 
someone actually does hold an attitude, we should expect a fairly high degree 
of stability when the same question is asked of the same individuals at 
different points in time. If this is not the case, it makes little sense to talk of 
attitudes (Batista-Fouget and Saris 1997). This expectation, of course, ignores 
the effects of random measurement error (or error deriving from the 
instrument rather than the respondent) but, as was discussed in section 2.1, the 
response instability I am concerned with here is that which is correlated with 
more or less fixed characteristics of the respondent, particularly their level of 
political awareness and involvement. If response instability is not reflective of 
weak or non-existent attitudes but of poor instrument design then we should 
no more expect its prevalence to vary with political awareness than we should 
with hair or eye colour.
Our unease about interpreting longitudinal instability as a function of 
nonattitudes rather than true change is also, no doubt, related to the apparent 
"rationality7 and "responsiveness7 of public opinion (Brody 1991, Ostrom and 
Smith 1992, Page and Shapiro 1992). A growing body of research has emerged 
over the past two decades showing that public opinion on policy related issues 
does not fluctuate wildly over time but is, in fact, rather stable. When it does 
shift, its direction of movement is usually connected with fairly predictable 
macro-social phenomena such as, for example, unemployment rates, economic 
growth and political scandal (Sanders and Price 1994, Sanders, et a l 1991). The 
public is thus ""capable of sensible and sometimes fine-grained distinctions in 
the policies it recommends" (Kinder 1998, p. 798). It would seem perverse to 
suggest that such over-time responsiveness and "rationality7 at the aggregate 
level could be based on an underlying mass of essentially random responses.
Given this stability, rationality and responsiveness at the aggregate level, the 
actual amount of individual switching or "churn7 between repeated
121
Longitudinal A tt i tu de  Stability
administrations of the same attitude question is surprisingly high (Johnson 
and Pattie 2000). On most items only around fifty percent of respondents select 
the same response alternative on two consecutive occasions, while up to a 
quarter actually switch sides (e.g. move from agreeing to disagreeing rather 
than merely adjusting their prior level of agreement or disagreement) (Zaller 
and Feldman 1992, p. 579). The 'churn' figures quoted by Zaller and Feldman 
are reflective of those found in the six items of the left-right scale on the 1997 
BGES, with the proportion of respondents selecting a different response 
alternative between wave one and wave two (excluding those who selected a 
nonsubstantive alternative at either wave) ranging from 47% to 54% and the 
proportion switching between agree and disagree ranging from 9% to 16% 
over a two year period. These figures, of course, exclude those respondents 
who provided no data at all at wave two and are thus probably under­
estimates of the true level of instability for the whole wave one sample. Given 
that the marginal totals on these items changed only slightly between these 
two time points, it is highly unlikely that this individual level movement can 
be attributed entirely to true attitude change. What is most likely is that a 
combination of factors (1), (2) and (3) are at play, the problem is differentiating 
between the relative contributions of each.
Traditional approaches, such as bivariate or multivariate regression models 
which compare 'switchers' with 'non-switchers' across a range of background 
variables, although effective in demonstrating the non-random nature of 
response instability (see Evans and Lalljee 1997,, Feldman 1989), are unable to 
effectively tackle the confounding of random responding45 with true change 
(Iyengar 1973). This is all the more problematic as there is no means of 
assessing the nature of the relationship (if indeed one exists at all) between
45 It is important to remember that random responding does not necessarily assume an equi- 
probability distribution across response alternatives. It could equally well imply a 'biased coin 
flip' distribution.
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true change and random responding: should we expect more or less random 
responding when more true change is occurring or is there actually no fixed 
relationship? This uncertainty further clouds the picture, as any relationship 
between background characteristics and random responding may be heavily 
attenuated (or for that matter, augmented) by the cancelling (or 
complementary) effect of the relationship between the same background 
characteristics and true change working in the opposite direction.
5.3 Using SEM to Model Longitudinal Instability
It is because of these limitations that SEM is a useful methodology for 
modeling longitudinal response stability. While the use of covariance structure 
modeling does not completely overcome the confounding problems faced by 
traditional methods described above, it does provide an alternative framework 
within which the longitudinal and cross-sectional sources of variance in 
attitude items can be identified and compared across groups. The general 
advantages of SEM have already been described in section 3.5.1 but, w ith a 
longitudinal data structure, further benefits accrue. Primary amongst these is 
the fact that, with a time dimension to the data, it is possible to accurately 
estimate the sources of variance in each item in terms of:
(a) that which is shared by the same item across time points.
(b) that which is shared by different items at the same time point.
(c) that which is unexplained or residual.
These sources of variance may be represented as latent variables in a 
longitudinal factor model, as shown in Figure 5.1. The same six items of the 
Heath et a lyleft-right' scale (see section 3.4 for full wordings of these items) are 
administered at three different time points and are represented by rectangles 
in the path diagram (itm ltl = item 1 at time 1 and so on). At each wave the 
variance in any one item is assumed to be caused by a combination of two
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latent factors (represented by ellipses in the path diagram): a common factor (T 
1, 2 & 3) which is constituted by that variance which is shared by the items at 
each wave, a unique factor (Ul-6) which is constituted by that variance which 
is shared by the same item across waves and the residual or unexplained 
variance. Common and unique factors are orthogonal, so any variance 
attributed to one factor cannot also be attributed to the other. The variance of 
the items can therefore be decomposed as follows:
S2xi = 1.0 = a 2iT + (32iu + 'Pi
(5.1)
where a 2iT is the variance accounted for by the common factor (T), Prj is the 
variance accounted for by the unique factor (U) and is the residual variance. 
Taking the standardised estimates of these parameters means that, together, 
they sum to unity.
It would be tempting to draw a simple interpretation here in which the a 2rr is 
taken as a measure of cross-sectional constraint and the Piu as a measure of 
longitudinal stability. The true picture, however, is slightly more complicated 
than this. The (3iu should more appropriately be regarded as the variance in 
each item which is seen consistently over waves as being unique to that item46, 
while the a 2iT should be regarded as the variance in each item which is seen as 
relating to the underlying common factor. In the present case, if the 'left-right7 
value dimension is important in structuring individual positions on these 
items, then the variance accounted for in each item by the common factor
46 This uniqueness may equally well be a function of the question wording or format as the 
actual content of the item.
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should be high -  particularly relative to that which is accounted for by the 
unique factor.
itm2t1
itm3t1
U2
itm6t1
U3itm2t2
T2
itm4t2
itm5t2 U4
itm6t2
itm1t3
itm2t3 U5
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Figure 5.1 Longitudinal Common and Unique Factor Model
A high proportion of the overall item R2 attributable to the unique factor, on 
the other hand would indicate that the item is not strongly related to the 
underlying common factor. The over time stability of the Teft-right' value 
dimension can be assessed by examining the covariances and correlations 
between latent common factors at each wave (represented by double headed 
curved arrows) once the errors in the measurement of the constructs have been 
controlled for.
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5.4 Data
The data to be used in the analyses in this chapter come from the British 
Household Panel Study, waves one, three and five (1991, 1993 and 1995 
respectively). The data is therefore the same as that which was used in 
chapters three and four, except this time two additional waves are 
incorporated into the analysis. Full details for wave one of this data set are 
provided in section 3.4. The sample size was reduced from 9567 at wave 1 to 
6918 at wave 3 due to attrition47. Only the BHPS data was used in this chapter 
as it was the only one of the two data sets for which the one factor 
measurement model fitted in all groups in chapter three. As the one factor 
model did not fit the data for the less politically aware respondents at wave 
one for the BGES data, it was not logical to examine its stability over time. This 
in itself has clear implications concerning the content and structure of the 
belief systems of the less politically aware and should be borne in mind when 
considering the implications of the analyses presented in this chapter for 
evaluating the political competence of the general public.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Whole Sample Model
The longitudinal factor model shown in Figure 5.1 was fitted to the first three 
waves of the BHPS for the whole sample. Table 5.1 shows the Chi Square value 
and degrees of freedom for each of a series of nested models. Model I, which 
places no parameter constraints either within or across waves on the common 
and unique factor loadings and error terms, is the baseline model against 
which increasingly complex or constrained models may be compared. As 
Model I itself fits the observed data well (CFI = 0.994; RMSEA = 0.046), 
successive nested models with more parameters constrained that do not result
47 Attrition here includes all categories of nonresponse -  refusal, non-contact etc.
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in significant loss of fit may be accepted as more parsimonious representations 
of the data (Hayduk 1996). Also included in Table 5.1 are the change in Chi 
Square (CChi2) and change in degrees of freedom (Cdf) for each nested model 
along with three other measures of model fit (CFI; RMSEA; and ECVI48). The 
best fitting model in Table 5.1, taking into account both exact fit, sample size 
and model parsimony, was found to be model VUI which is the model in 
which the common and unique factor loadings are invariant across waves, the 
over-time covariances between the common factor are constrained to equality 
and the latent variances are also equal between waves. Relative to model I, 
which imposed no over-time constraints, this model shows no increase in the 
value of CFI and a reduction in RMSEA.
Model ChP df CChP Cdf P CFI RMSEA ECVI
I 1762 114 - - 0.994 0.046 0.276
II 1803 124 41 10 0.000 0.994 0.044 0.279
III 1791 119 29 5 0.000 0.994 0.045 0.279
IV 2302 126 540 12 0.000 0.992 0.050 0.351
V 1846 130 84 16 0.000 0.994 0.044 0.284
VI 1919 132 157 18 0.000 0.994 0.044 0.294
VII 1884 132 121 18 0.000 0.994 0.044 0.289
VIII 1943 133 180 19 0.000 0.994 0.044 0.297
I = no constraints
II = common factor loadings invariant across waves 
111= unique factor loadings invariant across waves 
IV = error variances invariant across waves
V= common and unique factor loadings invariant across waves
VI = V + invariant latent variances across waves
VII = V + invariant latent covariances
VIII = Invariant loadings, latent variances and latent covariances
Table 5.1 Nested Model Comparison BHPS Whole Sample
Thus, although the loss of fit is quite high as indicated by the Chi Square value 
(180 on 19 degrees of freedom), this more parsimonious model is still 
preferable, given the sample size. Invariance of error terms for the indicator
4ti These take model parsimony and sample size into account when assessing model fit -  see 
section 3.5.1
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variables across waves could not be supported by the model -  Chi Square 
increased by 540 on 12 degrees of freedom for this constraint (note also a large 
reduction in CFI and an increase in RMSEA and ECVI for this constraint). This 
is due to the increase in the proportion of variance explained in the indicator 
items by the latent and unique factors in waves two and three relative to wave 
one. Table 5.2 shows that there was a 10% average increase in the proportion 
of variance explained across the six items between waves one and two. As the 
proportion of variance accounted for in each item by the latent factor increases, 
the proportion of unexplained or residual variance must obviously decrease by 
a concomitant amount. Such an effect -  known as the 'Socratic' effect - has 
been noted before in longitudinal research designs and is thought to result 
primarily from the increased familiarity of respondents with both the format 
and subject matter of the questionnaire items over repeated administrations 
(Batista-Fouget and Saris 1997, Campbell and Cook 1979, Jagodsinski, et al. 
1987, McGuire 1960). Over a shorter time period, for example, Jagodzinski et al 
found an average increase of 20% in proportion of item variance explained 
using a similar factor model. The fact that constraining error variances to 
equality across waves two and three does not result in significant loss of fit 
(Chi2 = 9; df=6; p=0.195), supports this interpretation of the phenomenon as 
being related to knowledge or information gain because such a 'practice effecF 
should be only or predominantly apparent between the first two 
administrations of the questionnaire.
That the factor loadings of the common factor are invariant across waves is 
important, as it indicates that the same underlying value or attitude is being 
measured at each time point (McArdle and Nesselroade 1994). Had the 
factorial structure changed over time, we could not really be confident that the 
same 'thing' was being compared, as the meaning of the indicator items
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relative to the latent construct may have subtly shifted49. With factorial 
invariance, however, any change in the parameters of the latent construct and 
in it's relationship with other constructs over time may be interpreted as 
quantitative changes in the relationship rather than as more fundamental, 
qualitative shifts in the meaning of the construct itself. Table 5.2 shows the 
parameter estimates for model VIII: unstandardized common and unique 
factor loadings (with standard errors and critical ratios), the error terms and 
the R2 values for each item at each of the three waves.
Variable Common
loading
S.E. C.R. Unique
loading
S.E. C.R. error
term
R2
W a v e  1
iteml 1 1 0.64 0.42
item2 1.08 0.03 43.42 1 0.56 0.51
item3 1.03 0.03 41.84 1 0.56 0.49
item4 0.91 0.02 37.94 1 0.73 0.40
item5 1.03 0.03 38.30 1 0.62 0.54
item6 1.06 0.03 39.55 1 0.57 0.57
W a v e  2
item l 1 1.05 0.05 21.32 0.41 0.53
item2 1.08 0.03 43.42 0.92 0.04 24.83 0.39 0.57
item3 1.03 0.03 41.84 1.03 0.04 26.23 0.40 0.57
item4 0.91 0.02 37.94 1.06 0.03 39.85 0.56 0.46
item5 1.03 0.03 38.30 1.03 0.03 33.93 0.43 0.63
itemb 1.06 0.03 39.55 1.00 0.05 22.38 0.39 0.65
W a v e  3
iteml 1 1.05 0.05 21.32 0.38 0.54
item2 1.08 0.03 43.42 0.92 0.04 24.83 0.37 0.58
item3 1.03 0.03 41.84 1.03 0.04 26.23 0.37 0.59
item4 0.91 0.02 37.94 1.06 0.03 39.85 0.52 0.48
item5 1.03 0.03 38.30 1.03 0.03 33.93 0.42 0.63
itemb 1.06 0.03 39.55 0.8850 0.05 22.38 0.42 0.60
Table 5.2 B est F it M odel P aram eters fo r  W hole Sam ple BHPS
44 For example, the issue of nationalisation my have a different meaning in the context of 'left- 
right' political debate now than it did in the 1970s.
50 The parameters for the unique factor for this item were not constrained to be equal as when 
this constraint was applied the model was unidentified.
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The factor loading from the common factor to the item asking the respondent"s 
opinion on whether "ordinary people get a fair share of the nation's wealth' at 
each wave has been fixed to 1 in order to set the scale of the latent variable. 
The same has been done for the loading from each unique factor to the item 
that the factor represents at wave 1. All of the factor loadings in Table 5.2 are 
very close to 1, indicating that each item has a more or less equal effect on the 
underlying attitude51. This supports the use of these items as an additive scale, 
in which each item contributes an equal amount to the overall scale score, as 
advocated by Heath et al (1996,1993).
All coefficients are highly significant (p < 0.001) and in the expected direction. 
Also of note in Table 5.2 are the error terms and R2 values for each of the 
indicators. As was mentioned earlier, there is a clear increase in the amount of 
variance explained and a decrease in the residual variance on every item 
between wave one and waves two and three. Around 40-60% of the variance in 
each item is accounted for jointly by the two latent factors. It can also be seen 
that, for the majority of items, the common factor has the greatest explanatory 
power, although for a number of items -  notably item 4 -  the opposite is the 
case.
As was pointed out earlier, an advantage of the longitudinal dimension of the 
data is that it enables us to decompose the variance accounted for in each 
observed variable into its component parts -  that which is accounted for by the 
common factor, the unique factor and the remaining variance which is 
unexplained or residual. In addition to the total R2, Table 5.3 shows the 
proportion of variance accounted for by the common and the unique factors
51 Indeed, constraining all these loadings to 1 did not significantly reduce the fit of the model.
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for each item at each wave and the difference between these two proportions52. 
The general picture, however, is one in which an almost equal contribution is 
made by the common and unique factors. In terms of the construct validity of 
the 'left-right' scale then, these estimates are not particularly encouraging. In 
order for a scale to have strong construct validity, the common factor should 
explain most of the variance in each of the indicator items and certainly should 
have greater explanatory power than the unique factor (Stevens 1995).
variable common
factor
unique
factor
Difference R2
w ave  1
iteml 0.26 0.16 0.10 0.42
item2 0.30 0.21 0.09 0.51
item3 0.28 0.21 0.07 0.49
item4 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.40
item5 0.23 0.30 -0.07 0.54
item6 0.25 0.32 -0.07 0.57
wave 2
iteml 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.53
item2 0.31 0.23 0.11 0.57
item3 0.30 0.27 0.04 0.57
item l 0.21 0.25 -0.05 0.46
item5 0.21 0.38 -0.14 0.62
item6 0.26 0.39 -0.12 0.65
w ave 3
iteml 0.31 0.23 0.08 0.54
item2 0.31 0.23 0.11 0.58
item3 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.58
item l 0.22 0.26 -0.05 0.48
item5 0.25 0.38 -0.14 0.63
item6 0.28 0.32 -0.04 0.60
Table 5.3 Decomposition of variance BHPS whole sample waves 1-3-5
Considering the methodological rigour with which this scale was developed, it 
is unlikely that this effect is being caused by poor item selection/construction. 
A more plausible explanation is that many respondents in the sample as a
52 The proportion of variance accounted for in each item by each latent variable can be 
calculated by taking the square of the standardised factor loading from each indicator to the
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whole simply do not use an abstract 'left-right7 value dimension to structure 
their political attitudes and that these respondents are attenuating the effect 
sizes between the common factor and each item for those that do. This 
hypothesis is evaluated empirically later in this chapter when the 
decomposition of item variance is compared across political awareness groups. 
The final parameters of interest in this model are the covariance paths between 
the latent construct at each wave as these speak to the issue of the stability of 
the latent 'left-right' value over time. Table 5.4 shows the variance of the 
common latent factor as well as the covariances and correlations between the 
common factor at each wave. All the correlation coefficients are close to .9, 
indicating near perfect stability of the latent attitude across the five years 
between the first measurement in 1991 and the last in 1995. This corroborates 
the findings of Heath et al (1993) who also found high stability estimates (.7) 
for the summated version of this scale over successive administrations53.
Parameter Estimate S.E. C.R.
Variance L'l 0.26 0.01 27.3
Variance L2 0.26 0.01 27.3
Variance L3 0.26 0.01 27.3
Covariance LI - L2 0.24 0.01 26.7
Covariance LI - L3 0.24 0.01 26.7
Covariance L2 - L3 0.24 0.01 26.7
Correlation LI - L2 0.89 - -
Correlation L'l - L3 0.89 - -
Correlation L2 - L3 0.89 - -
Table 5.4 Variance and Covariance Parameters Whole Sample BHPS
latent variable.
53 The higher correlations found in this study, despite the longer inter-wave lag are a result of 
the disattenuation effect caused by the correction for measurement error in the indicator items 
in SEM.
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5.5.2 Model for Politicalhj Unaware Respondents
The next step in the analysis was to fit the three wave stability model to just 
the less politically aware group of respondents. However, sample attrition 
reduced the sample size from 596 to 360 over waves one to three in this group 
(a 40% loss). The net effect of this was that the measurement model no longer 
fitted the data -  two of the common factor loadings became non-significant as 
well as a number of the unique factor loadings, meaning that the one common 
factor model was no longer supported in this group. The most probable 
explanation for this is the loss of sample size per se as the sample members lost 
through attrition would most likely have been the less politically interested 
and aware, meaning that the effect of attrition would have been in the 
direction of producing a better fit for the one factor model.
It should be remembered that many of the parameters of the cross-sectional 
one factor model fitted to this group in chapter three only just reached 
statistical significance at the a  = 0.05 level. The subsequent loss of sample size 
over successive waves of the panel was therefore probably sufficient in itself to 
reduce these unstable estimates below conventional significance levels. 
Therefore, because of the lack of fit of the common factor model to the less 
politically aware group, a less restrictive definition was applied to produce a 
new group in order that a longitudinal comparison could still be made 
between groups differing in level of political awareness. This new group was 
formed by selecting all those respondents who reported being "not at all 
interested' in politics at wave l 54 (n = 1147). Although not ideal as a 'stand­
alone' measure of political awareness, this same self-reported interest item 
correlated 0.45 (p < 0.001) with the knowledge quiz in the 1997 BGES.
54 A slightly more restrictive definition in which respondents who reported being 'not at all 
interested' across all three waves (n = 452) also did not fit the one factor model as there were 
several non-significant common and unique factor loadings.
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Table 5.5 shows fit statistics for each of a series of nested models for this group 
of politically uninterested respondents. As with the model fitted to the whole 
sample, the baseline model, model I, has no constraints placed on the 
parameters of the model either within or across waves. The best fitting model 
when applied to this group was found to be the same as that for the whole 
sample, with common and unique factor loadings, variances and covariances 
between common factors invariant over time (model VIII). The error terms of 
the indicator variables were again not invariant across waves (note the 
substantial loss of fit across all indices for Model IV). Model VIE fitted the data 
well with a CFI of 0.993 and RMSEA of 0.046. This model then forms the basis 
for comparisons with the more politically aware respondents in later analyses.
Model Chi2 df CChi2 Cdf P CFI RMSEA ECVI
1 262 111 0.997 0.034 0.365
II 280 121 17 10 0.067 0.996 0.034 0.363
III 273 117 10 6 0.119 0.997 0.034 0.363
IV 366 123 103 12 0.000 0.995 0.042 0.434
V 286 126 24 15 0.073 0.996 0.033 0.359
VI 295 129 33 18 0.018 0.996 0.034 0.362
VII 290 129 28 18 0.070 0.996 0.033 0.358
VIII 301 131 38 20 0.008 0.996 0.034 0.364
I = no constraints
II = common factor loadings invariant across waves 
111= unique factor loadings invariant across waves 
IV = error variances invariant across waves
V= common & unique factor loadings invariant across waves
VI = common & unique loadings and latent variances invariant across waves
VII = common & unique loadings and latent covariances invariant across waves
VIII = common <& unique loadings, latent variances & covariances invariant across waves
Table  5.5 N ested  M o d el C om parison  BHPS U nin terested R espon den ts
5.5.3 Model for Politically Aware Respondents
The same set of nested models was then fitted to data from the politically 
aware group of respondents. While this group also had a reduced sample size 
due to attrition over waves (509 from 698), the effect was less pronounced than 
in the less aware group (27% compared to 40% of the sample lost) and the fit of
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the measurement model at wave one was unaffected. Table 5.6 shows the 
corresponding fit indices for the models fitted to this group of politically 
aware respondents. The best fitting model for this group was also exactly the 
same as that for the whole sample (model VIII): the common and unique factor 
loadings were invariant across waves, the covariance terms between common 
factors were set to equality and the latent variances were equal over waves. 
Error terms for the indicator variables were again not invariant across waves 
one and two, suggesting that the 'Socratic' effect from familiarity with the 
questions and the issues they address, is also evident amongst this more 
knowledgeable group of respondents.
Model Chi2 df CChi2 Cdf CFI RMSEA ECV
I 286 114 - - .992 .055 .858
11 302 124 16 10 .992 .053 .851
III 299 120 13 6 .992 .054 .861
IV 380 126 94 12 .988 .063 .996
V 314 130 28 16 .991 .053 .852
VI 351 132 65 18 .990 .057 .915
VII 339 132 52 18 .990 .056 .891
VIII 357 134 71 20 .990 .057 .920
I = no constraints
II = common factor loadings invariant across waves
111= unique factor loadings invariant across waves
[V = error variances invariant across waves
V= common & unique factor loadings invariant across waves
VI = common & unique loadings and latent variances invariant across waves
VII = common & unique loadings and latent covariances invariant across waves
VIII = common & unique loadings, latent variances & covariances invariant across waves
Table 5.6 Nested Model Comparison BHPS Politically Engaged Group
So, the results from this first stage of analysis show that the best fitting model 
is more or less the same in each group - with the factor loadings for both the 
common and unique latent variables invariant across waves. In both groups 
the covariances between the common factors at each time of measurement are 
equal but the error terms of the indicator variables are different between 
waves one and two. This parity of the best fitting models across groups allows
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us to move on to a closer examination of between group differences in both the 
strength and the stability of the 'left-righT value dimension.
5.5.4 Model Comparison across Awareness Groups
Table 5.7 shows measures of fit for a series of nested models which test the 
equality of model parameters across the two political awareness groups. 
Model I, the baseline model, fits the same model to both groups but places no 
between group equality constraints. The ensuing models impose a successively 
more restrictive set of constraints, culminating in model DC in which all 
parameters are fixed to equality across groups. The baseline model then, for 
each group, fixes the common and unique factor loadings, the variances of the 
common factors and covariance paths between common factors to be equal 
across waves. The error terms of the indicators are unconstrained across waves 
and no between group constraints are imposed.
As can be seen from Table 5.7, the first between group constraint, inter-group 
common factor loading invariance (model II), reduces the fit of the model 
relative to the baseline on every criterion. However, in each instance the loss of 
fit is very small and, given the greater parsimony of the factorial invariance 
model and the fact that the model fits the data well on adjusted fit criteria (CFI 
= 0.991; RMSEA = 0.036), this model can be accepted as a good representation 
of the observed data. The same is true of the next nested model (model III), in 
which the unique factor loadings are constrained to be the same across groups, 
although the fit relative to the baseline is somewhat better for this model, with 
the CFI and RMSEA remaining unchanged. Model IV combines these 
constraints on the common and unique factor loadings and still fits the data 
quite well (CFI = 0.991; RMSEA = 0.037).
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Model ChP df CChP Cdf p CFI RMSEA ECVI
I* 835 266 .992 .035 .627
II 877 271 42 5 0.000 .991 .036 .647
III 854 272 19 6 0.004 .992 .035 .632
IV 898 277 62 11 0.000 .991 .037 .692
V 926 284 90 18 0.000 .987 .044 .832
VI 1204 278 369 12 0.000 .990 .038 .721
VII 1198 278 363 12 0.000 .991 .036 .652
VIII 1206 279 371 13 0.000 .986 .044 .838
IX 994 295 159 29 0.000 .986 .044 .837
* Baseline model (each group) = invariant common & unique factor loadings across waves; 
invariant latent variance across waves; invariant inter-latent covariance paths.
I = baseline model -  no between group constraints
II = common factor loadings invariant across groups 
111= unique factor loadings invariant across groups
1V= common & unique factor loadings invariant across groups 
V = error terms invariant across groups
VI= common, unique factor loadings and latent common variance invariant across groups 
VII = common and unique factor loadings and inter-latent covariances invariant across groups 
VIII= VI + invariant latent variances across groups 
IX = All parameters equal across groups
T able  5.7 N ested  M o d el C om parison  BHPS B o th  G roups
This shows that, not only can this set of six items be said to measure the same 
'thing' at each time of measurement but also that the meaning of the 
underlying construct is more or less the same in each group. Beyond this, 
however, imposing further between-group constraints, could not really be 
supported. Model V fixes the error terms of the indicators, Model VI the 
variances of the common factors and model VII imposes the constraint of 
equality across the covariance paths between common factors across groups. 
For all three sets of constraints, the fit indices show a substantial loss of fit 
relative to the baseline model. For example, constraining the covariance paths 
between latent common factors to equality across groups results in an increase 
in Chi Square of 301 for a gain of only one degree of freedom. Model IV was 
therefore selected as the model of best fit. Table 5.8 shows the variances of the 
latent factors and the covariances and correlations between each common 
factor for each group at each wave from model IV (equal common and unique 
factor loadings across waves and groups).
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Parameter Aware S.E. C.R. Uninterested S.E. C.R.
Covariance LI -  L2 
Covariance L'l -  L3 
Covariance L2 -  L3 
Correlation LI -  L2 
Correlation L'l -  L3 
Correlation L2 -  L3
0.62
0.62
0.62
.95
.95
.95
0.06 11.2 0.12 0.01 11.2
0.06 11.2 0.12 0.01 11.2
0.06 11.2 0.12 0.01 11.2
.82
.82
.82
Table 5.8 Variance and Covariances Sophisticated v Uninterested
The large between group differences in Table 5.8 are clear. Not only are the 
covariances between the latent common factors some five times greater for the 
more politically aware respondents but the correlations are also much larger in 
this group. There is, therefore, considerably greater longitudinal stability of 
this underlying value orientation in the politically aware group whether we 
use the standardised or unstandardised stability parameters. This is even the 
case, remember, when we have adopted weakened criteria for forming 
political awareness groups and corrected our stability estimates for 
measurement error. Over-time correlations of .95 between latent constructs 
indicate near perfect stability of the Teft-righT value dimension in the 
politically aware group over a period of five years. The corresponding figure 
of .82 for the uninterested respondents, while still of quite a high magnitude, is 
significantly lower (p < 0.001).
Table 5.9 shows the parameter estimates for each group from model IV. Again, 
all the factor loadings are close to 1, indicating that each item makes more or 
less the same contribution to the latent factor that it measures. The R2 values of 
the observed items are significantly higher and the error terms significantly 
lower in the politically aware group - again implying that the left-right value 
dimension has a stronger effect in structuring responses to these items in this 
group. A more detailed and revealing analysis of the relative influence of the 
'left-right' value across groups, however, can by obtained by decomposing the 
variance of each item as was done earlier in Table 5.3 for the whole sample.
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Variable C om m on
loading
S.E. C.R. Unique
loading
S.E. C.R. error
aw are
error
unaw are
R2
aware
R2
unaw ai
Wave 7
a 1 1 0.41 0.78 0.67 0.28
b 1.05 0.04 23.7 1 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.39
c 1.08 0.05 23.2 1 0.48 0.58 0.67 0.37
d 0.92 0.04 20.9 1 0.64 0.73 0.55 0.31
e 0.96 0.05 19.4 1 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.42
I' 1.02 0.05 21.0 1 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.52
Wave 2
1 1.08 0.10 10.9 0.39 0.47 0.70 0.43
1.05 0.04 23.7 0.96 0.08 12.3 0.32 0.40 0.75 0.49
1.08 0.05 23.2 1.09 0.10 11.4 0.36 0.42 0.75 0.48
0.92 0.04 20.9 1.04 0.11 9.5 0.66 0.54 0.56 0.40
0.96 0.05 19.4 1.10 0.06 19.0 0.38 0.46 0.75 0.55
i 1.02 0.05 21.0 1.06 0.06 17.4 0.30 0.36 0.78 0.65
Wave 3
a 1 1.08 0.10 10.9 0.29 0.39 0.76 0.47
b 1.05 0.04 23.7 0.96 0.08 12.3 0.37 0.35 0.73 0.52
c. 1.08 0.05 23.2 1.09 0.10 11.4 0.46 0.34 0.70 0.53
d 0.92 0.04 20.9 1.04 0.11 9.5 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.40
e 0.96 0.05 19.4 1.10 0.06 19.0 0.49 0.44 0.70 0.56
1 1.02 0.05 21.0 0.8955 0.06 15.4 0.31 0.50 0.79 0.51
Table 5.9 Model Parameters -  Between Group Comparison
Table 5.10 provides just such a breakdown. In addition to the consistently 
greater overall proportion of variance accounted for in each item by the two 
latent factors in the politically aware group (mean difference = 23%), two other 
interesting trends are also apparent in Table 5.10. First, the proportion of 
variance accounted for by the common factor is around three to four times 
greater in the politically aware group than in the uninterested group. Second, 
while the proportion of variance in each item attributable to the common 
factor is around three times the size of that attributable to the unique factor in 
the politically aware group, the proportions are almost equal in the 
uninterested group. Indeed, for the majority of items, the unique factor 
accounts for more variance in each item than the common factor does in this 
group of respondents. This would seem to confirm the hypothesis that the 
small amount of variance in each item accounted for by the common factor for 
the whole BHPS sample is due to the attenuating effect of less politically aware
55 The parameters for the unique factor for this item were not constrained to be equal as when  
this constraint was applied the model was unidentified.
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respondents, who possess neither strongly held political attitudes nor a 
discernible 'left-right7 value dimension.
variable aware 
com mon factor
unaware 
com m on factor
aware  
unique factor
unaw are  
unique factor
R*
aw are
R2
unaw ar
Wave 1 
a 0.52 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.67 0.28
b 0.50 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.64 0.39
c 0.52 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.67 0.37
d 0.40 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.55 0.31
e 0.37 0.11 0.26 0.30 0.63 0.42
f 0.41 0.13 0.20 0.39 0.61 0.52
1 Vnve2 
a 0.52 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.70 0.43
b 0.59 0.21 0.16 0.28 0.75 0.49
L 0.56 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.75 0.48
d 0.40 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.56 0.40
e 0.41 0.13 0.34 0.43 0.75 0.55
f 0.51 0.15 0.28 0.51 0.78 0.65
Wiive 3 
a 0.56 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.76 0.47
b 0.57 0.22 0.16 0.30 0.73 0.52
c 0.52 0.24 0.18 0.29 0.70 0.53
d 0.42 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.59 0.40
e 0.38 0.13 0.32 0.43 0.70 0.56
f 0.48 0.15 0.31 0.36 0.79 0.51
Table 5.10 Decomposition of Item Variance -  Group Comparison
The results of this between group analysis then indicate that, not only do more 
politically aware respondents structure their responses to these six items in 
relation to a strongly held underlying value dimension but they are also 
extremely consistent and stable in the position they take on this dimension 
over time. The less politically aware respondents, on the other hand, are much 
less reliant on an overarching political value dimension but rather see each 
individual issue 'on its own merits' and as largely unrelated to the other five 
items. They are also significantly less consistent in their position on this 
dimension over time in comparison with the politically aware group, as is 
evinced by the lower covariances and correlations between latent common 
factors at each wave.
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5.6 Discussion
The initial aim of this chapter was to extend the cross-sectional analyses 
presented in chapters three and four to incorporate a longitudinal dimension 
in the assessment of belief system structure in the general public. This, 
however, proved impractical as, for the BGES data, the one factor model did 
not fit for the less politically aware respondents at wave one, while for the 
BHPS, although the one factor model held at wave one, sample attrition over 
subsequent waves led to a loss of fit for the one factor model over the three 
waves in this group too. This, in itself, is informative about the distribution of 
political sophistication within the general public as, even those individuals 
who are willing and able to participate in social surveys appear, in large 
numbers, to be characterised by weak, labile attitudes and a lack of 
hierarchical organisation in fragmented PBSs. As was stated earlier, due to 
differential unit and item nonresponse, we should interpret even these rather 
pessimistic estimates of the political sophistication of the general public as 
representing something of an upper bound.
This is not to say that the politically uninterested respondents were completely 
inconsistent in their responses to these items over time - the significant factor 
loadings, R2 values and covariance paths indicate that there is a degree of 
stability in the responses of this group. However, this stability and consistency 
is still considerably less than that found amongst the more politically aware 
sample members and what stability there is, appears only weakly related to an 
underlying 'left-right' value dimension, being based more on the 'unique' 
characteristics of the items rather than those which are shared between them. 
This uniqueness is as likely to represent 'peripheral' aspects such as question 
wording and format as it is the actual subject matter of the item.
In addition to the insights this analysis has provided into the varying levels of 
attitudinal stability and constraint across levels of political awareness, an 
unexpected finding is worth considering at greater length. This is the
141
Longitudinal A tt i tu d e  Stability
consistent and quite substantial reduction in the error variances of the 
indicator variables and the consequent increase in the R2 values for each item 
between wave one and waves two and three. For the whole sample, an 
average increase of 10% across items was observed between waves one and 
two but no further increase was apparent between waves two and three. This 
effect is argued to derive from the growing familiarity of respondents with the 
subject matter and format of questionnaire items over successive 
administrations and is akin to the 'Socratic effect7 discussed by Jagodzinski et 
al (1987). While this effect has been noted in panels covering short time 
periods (e.g. two to three weeks), I am unaware of it having been reported 
when the lag between waves is as large as two years.
An interesting outcome of stratifying the analysis across levels of political 
awareness was that this effect appeared to be predominantly concentrated 
amongst those respondents who reported being uninterested in politics. For 
these respondents the average increase in R2 across items between wave one 
and wave two was 12% (representing 31% growth) while for the politically 
aware respondents the corresponding figure was just 7% (representing an 11% 
growth). It is not unreasonable to extrapolate from this that a good deal of 
w hat little consistency we do observe amongst the less politically aware 
respondents is a function of participating in the survey per se. For the most 
politically aware respondents we are probably uncovering their pre-existing 
level of attitudinal consistency and belief system structure, while for the less 
politically aware, we are perhaps participating in its temporary construction.
In conjunction with the results of chapters three and four, a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the political sophistication of sections of the British 
public is beginning to emerge -  a picture which is characterised by little or no 
attitude constraint and random switching between response alternatives over 
time. What primarily characterises this section of the electorate is their lack of 
interest, engagement in and knowledge of politics, which would seem to imply
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that the root of the problem is some sort of information or knowledge deficit. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that familiarisation with the issues 
and survey procedures per se seems to improve people's performance on these 
criteria and that this effect is strongest amongst those who were less politically 
aware at the outset.
True, an actual score on a political knowledge measure was not one of the 
group formation criteria. However, as was pointed out in chapter three, this 
was because a knowledge score was not included on the BHPS and it was felt 
more important to replicate the analyses on independent samples than to have 
a knowledge score as the central stratification variable. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that the variables which were used to form the political awareness groups are 
very good proxies for political knowledge, as the mean score on the six item 
knowledge quiz that was included on the 1997 BGES was 5.2 in the politically 
aware group but only 3.1 in the uninterested group of respondents. As the 
knowledge quiz itself is unlikely to be a completely 'pure ' measure of the 
underlying awareness construct, we can probably feel safe in assuming that 
the key characteristics differentiating these groups are their 
knowledge/awareness of and interest and engagement in politics. W hat the 
analyses presented so far all have in common, though, is that they rely on 
some pre-existing (and often self-reported) measure of political awareness as 
the basis for group comparisons. Apart from the tentative evidence relating to 
the 'Socratic' effect, there is nothing really causal or 'experimental' in the 
research design to enable us to have greater confidence that it really is 
knowledge or information per se that is the causal factor underlying the 
between group differences observed. In the next three chapters, different types 
of data and analytical techniques are used in an attempt to overcome these 
limitations and to look more causally at the relationship between political 
information and belief system structure.
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6 THE PROPERTIES OF ATTITUDES UNDER INCREASING 
INFORMATION
In chapters three, four and five a range of measures were used to examine the 
difference between those engaged and those not engaged in politics in terms of 
the qualities and characteristics of their political attitudes. The findings, 
consistent with previous research in this area, established clear and consistent 
differences between political engagement groups in the extent to which 
attitudes are consistent with each other and stable over time. It was argued 
that the key factor underlying these differences was political knowledge or 
information; lack of information about political attitude objects gives rise to 
labile and ephemeral attitudes amongst the politically disengaged which, in 
turn, lead to low-level statistical associations between related items and 
between the same item over time.
The implicit assumption behind comparing groups low in political knowledge, 
interest and involvement therefore is that it is these factors that cause the 
observed differences in the quality and structure of attitudes and the systems 
they inhabit. In the remaining empirical chapters of the thesis, I turn to a more 
explicit consideration of the role of knowledge/information in determining 
these attitudinal properties. Two very different methodologies are used to 
assess the impact of information on the quality and direction of political 
attitudes and the findings of each method compared. It is hoped that by using 
two different methods to answer the same basic questions, more robust and 
general conclusions may be reached. In this chapter Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis is used on quasi-experimental data from a deliberative poll to 
investigate the impact of increases in information on the inter-relatedness or 
constraint of political attitudes.
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6.1 Information and Attitude Constraint
The common thread uniting the critiques of the nonattitude or 'minimalist' 
position reviewed in chapter two is that they all aim to rescue the 
contemporary public from charges of political ignorance by denying 
Converse's causal interpretation of the differences in correlation coefficients 
between attitude items across groups. For Converse, lower inter-item 
correlations amongst the less politically aware are essentially a result of the 
combined influence of two main characteristics of the belief systems of this 
group; the weak, uncognized 'nonattitudes' that underpin their responses to 
individual survey items and the lack of internal coherence in relation to higher 
order organising principle(s) in the belief system as a whole. But to take a 
further step back in the causal chain, if it is nonattitudes that lead to lower 
correlations, what is it that leads to nonattitudes?
A recent integration of theoretical perspectives on both attitudes and the 
survey response process provides a useful framework for understanding the 
ontology of the nonattitude construct and how it relates to statistical measures 
of constraint Zaller and Feldman (1992,1992) have proposed a 'Simple theory 
of the Survey Response' which sees attitudes, not as pre-formed cognitive 
entities waiting to be recovered from some mental filing cabinet and faithfully 
reported to the interviewer but as temporary constructions which are both 
time and context dependent. Their approach then is very similar to the 
'measurement error' perspectives of Achen and Rose et al, although in 
important respects it differs, affording a neat integration of the nonattitude 
and measurement error camps (Bartle 2000).
For Zaller and Feldman the fundamental building blocks in the construction of 
'revealed preferences' (as they term survey attitude responses) are 
'considerations' and 'predispositions'. While the latter are in many respects 
akin to the notion of core beliefs and values, determining the favourability an 
individual will accord to a particular proposition or idea, the former are bits of
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information that, depending on their predispositions, will incline the 
individual to "decide a political issue one way or another" (Zaller 1992, p. 21). 
Zaller and Feldman delineate their theoretical framework with a set of axioms 
concerning the acquisition, retention and weighting of considerations to enable 
the derivation of testable hypotheses about survey responses:
The reception axiom: the more involved and engaged an individual is with 
politics, the more likely they are to acquire new considerations.
The resistance axiom: people resist incoming information that is inconsistent 
with their predispositions but only to the extent that they possess sufficient 
considerations to perceive such inconsistencies.
The accessibility axiom: the more accessible a consideration is in memory, the 
more easily it and related considerations will be retrieved. Accessibility itself 
depends on contextual factors and the recency with which considerations were 
in conscious memory.
The response axiom: survey responses are derived by averaging over 
accessible considerations.
These axioms allow certain clear deductions about how different people will 
respond to survey questions: people who are more interested and involved in 
politics will have a deeper pool of considerations on which to base their 
revealed preferences or attitudes. They will also, according to the resistance 
axiom, have less contradictory considerations because they will be better able 
to recognise information that conflicts with their predispositions and resist i t  
Finally, when they are called upon to provide an attitude response in a survey, 
they will be averaging over a larger pool of more consistent considerations 
than the less politically aware, which results in the same response alternative 
being selected more consistently over time. Thus, the attitudes of the more
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politically aumre are wore stable over time. Their attitudes are also more consistent 
with one another at any one point in time due to the combined influence of the 
reception and resistance axioms; they are more likely to seek out and obtain 
new information and, as their stock of relevant considerations grows, to resist 
information that conflicts with their predispositions. The net effect is a larger 
pool of consistent considerations, or in other words, more constrained attitude 
systems. Therefore, while constraint is usually considered as a sub-component 
of the broader concept of political sophistication, related to but distinct from 
the more straightforward and easily measurable aspect of sophistication -  
knowledge or "information holding" (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) when 
considered from the Zaller and Feldman perspective, it can also be seen as 
their bi-product. Low levels of knowledge produces labile, situationally 
dependent responses which, in turn, produce lower correlations with other 
attitude items.
To further pursue this line of reasoning, how might we speculate on the effect 
of increases in (attitude relevant) information on correlational measures of 
constraint? To the extent that 'nonattitudes' are 'top-of-the-head' responses to 
uncognized stimulus objects, we might reasonably expect that increases in 
information about the stimulus object would lead to more considered, stable 
attitudes that have been arrived at through averaging over a deeper pool of 
more internally consistent considerations. In the aggregate, this should reduce 
the random variance in the respective survey item, disattenuating the level of 
statistical association with other attitude measures. We might also expect that, 
as knowledge of the political landscape grows, individuals obtain a better 
understanding of 'w hat goes with what" (and why) and that this too would 
feed through into stronger inter-item associations at the aggregate level.
While this is clearly the basic logic that underlies the many studies 
demonstrating strong association between measures of political knowledge or 
involvement and the magnitude of correlational measures of attitude
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constraint, as an explicit hypothesis, it has rarely been put to the test 
experimentally. This, of course, is largely due to the high cost that collecting 
the data necessary to test the hypothesis would entail. The recent innovation 
of deliberative polling (Fishkin 1991, Fishkin 1995b) -  while not explicitly 
designed for the purpose -  does, however, provide an excellent research 
design for examining this question: what are the effects of increases in 
information on the internal consistency or constraint of Political Belief 
Systems?
6.2 Deliberative Polling
The concept of the Deliberative Poll has been developed in a series of books 
and papers by James Fishkin in collaboration with Robert Luskin, Norman 
Bradburn and other eminent political scientists and social researchers in the 
USA, Britain and Australia (Fishkin 1991, Fishkin 1988, Fishkin 1995b). 
Drawing on the nonattitude, fictitious issues and 'D on't know' literatures, in 
conjunction with the widespread prevalence of political ignorance revealed 
through surveys, Fishkin argues that there are many reasons to question the 
validity and usefulness of the findings from traditional opinion polls. Because 
of the ill-thought out and unstable nature of responses to attitude surveys, he 
suggests that we should see the results of such exercises as merely 'echoes' -  
and weak ones at that - of elite discourse. The challenge for the deliberative 
poll, he argues, is to move beyond the provision of an echo-chamber to 
discover the real "voice of the people" (Fishkin 1995b, p. 16).
The basic design of a deliberative poll involves interviewing a randomly 
selected sample of the population on their views on a particular issue or range 
of issues before a representative sub-sample is asked to participate in a 
weekend of 'balanced' briefings by experts, discussion amongst poll 
participants and an opportunity to put questions to both academics and 
politicians. The sub-sample is then re-interviewed at the end of the weekend.
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Because a probability sample forms the basis of the study design, Fishkin has 
argued that this method of polling produces meaningful opinions which are 
representative of what the broader electorate would think were they better 
informed and motivated to think about political issues. In collaboration with 
Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR)56 and Channel 4 Television, 
Fishkin has now conducted five deliberative polls in Britain on: crime (1994); 
European integration (1995); the monarchy (1996); political attitudes and party 
support (1997); and the National Health Service (1998).
Fishkin has argued that, in addition to being an interesting gauge of public 
opinion and a useful social scientific tool - deliberative polling could also be 
integrated into the political system to improve the quality of debate and to act 
as a locus of independent opinion leadership for the broader public.
Specifically, he proposes that a deliberative poll would be a better way to
launch presidential candidacies in the U.S. than the current primaries system 
and that it7s implementation would also be beneficial in a number of other 
electoral systems including general elections in the UK (Fishkin 1991, p. 6). 
This has caused some degree of controversy, with criticism centring on both 
the democratic implications of such a system and on the methodology of
deliberative polling with particular emphasis on its claims to
representativeness (Merkle 1996, Mitofsky 1996, Traugott 1992, Tringali 1996). 
Although there is some evidence that, due to unequal response propensities, 
certain groups are systematically under-represented in the post-survey results 
(Merkle 1996), generally the samples show a high degree of correspondence to 
the broader population from which they are drawn (Fishkin 1995a, Fishkin 
1995b, Fishkin and Luskin 1996)
Given his emphasis on the utility of the deliberative poll as a component of the 
democratic process, the focus of Fishkin's own work has been primarily on
56 Now the National Centre for Social Research.
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substantive results -  in which direction opinion changes, by how much and for 
whom. A number of researchers have, however, questioned the wisdom of this 
emphasis, arguing that given the high degree of validity the method would 
need to obtain in order to achieve consensus for integration into the political 
system, it would be better, initially at least, to concentrate on the more social- 
scientific questions of how attitudes form and change. Meyer, for example, has 
suggested that, if the deliberative poll is having the effect on opinion that 
Fishkin argues it to, then in the 'after' measure of opinion, "there should be 
more internal consistency, less mushiness, more ideological constraint, and 
more ability to connect one issue with another" (Meyer 1996). It is this focus 
that is adopted in the present analysis.
6.3 Data
In collaboration with James Fishkin and Channel 4 Television, Social and 
Community Planning Research conducted a deliberative poll on political 
attitudes and party support on the weekend immediately prior to the 1997 UK 
General Election (April 26-28 1997). In January 1997, a nationally 
representative, stratified, multi-stage probability sample of 1210 individuals 
(response rate = 64%) was administered a short questionnaire covering 
political preferences, attitudes and demographic characteristics. All 
respondents were then invited to participate in a weekend of discussion and 
debate amongst the participants themselves as well as with politicians57 and 
academic experts. Those attending the weekend were re-interviewed with the 
political attitude questionnaire at the end of the weekend of deliberation. This 
resulted in a 'weekend sample' of 276 individuals, 23% of the original 
interviewed sample. Comparisons between this sub-sample and the original
57 Speakers included Kenneth Clarke (Conservative), Gordon Brown (Labour) and Malcom 
Bruce (Liberal Democrat).
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sample revealed no significant differences across a range of attitude, 
demographic and census variables (Fishkin 1995b).
6.4 Method
In chapter five a longitudinal factor model with six indicators over three waves 
was used to examine the differences in both the stability and constraint of the 
attitudes of the more and the less politically aware. It was argued that the 
observed differences in model parameters were a result of differences in the 
level of political awareness in the two groups. The aim of this chapter is to test 
this interpretation in a more experimental manner by fitting the same factor 
model to the before and after waves of a deliberative poll on political issues. 
Ideally the same six item left-right scale would be used but this was not 
possible as it was not included in both waves of data collection. Therefore a 
new scale, still measuring the same basic 'left-right' construct, was derived ad 
hoc. Four items covering attitudes toward: the balance between taxation and 
public spending; the introduction of a minimum wage; the level of taxation for 
the well off; and the importance of equalising incomes were used to measure 
position on the Teft-right' value dimension. Full wordings are presented 
below:
Wordings f o r ' Left-Right' Scale Items
Item 1 "How much do you agree or disagree that people earning around £50,000 a year or 
more should pay higher income tax than now?" response scale = 5 point Likert.
Item 2 "Where do you stand on making people's incomes more equal? Are you in the top 
box, agreeing completely with the statement alongside it (Government should try much 
harder to make incomes in Britain more equal)? Or in the bottom box, agreeing completely 
with that statement (Government should do nothing to make incomes in Britain more equal)? 
Or in one of the other boxes somewhere in between ? response scale = 7 point Likert.
Item 3 "Where do you stand on taxes and spending? Are you in the top box, agreeing 
completely with the statement alongside it (Government should spend a lot more on services 
like education, health, even if it means putting up taxes a lot)? Or in the bottom box, agreeing
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completely with that statement (Government should spend much less on services like 
education and health in order to cut taxes)? Or in one of the other boxes somewhere in 
between? response scale = 7 point Likert.
Item 4 "Where do you stand on the minimum wage? Are you in the tog box, agreeing 
completely with the statement alongside it (Government should definitely introduce a 
minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little)? Or in the bottom box, 
agreeing completely with that statement (Government should definitely not introduce a 
minimum wage because too many low paid workers would then lose their jobs)? Or in one of 
the other boxes somewhere in between? response scale = 7 point Likert.
The four items had an Alpha value of 0.69, significantly predicted support for 
the Labour and Conservative parties (p < 0.001) with coefficients in the
expected directions and correlated 0.6 with a shortened five item version of the 
Heath et al 'left-right' scale which was asked at wave one only. By these 
criteria then, and in conjunction with the subject matter of the items, the scale 
would appear to function quite well as a measure of 'left-right' leanings, 
despite the conceptual coverage being somewhat skewed towards taxation and 
spending. Figure 6.1 shows the path diagram for the factor model. Four 
indicator items (rectangles) tapping the 'left-right' political value dimension 
(ellipses) were administered prior to and immediately after the polling 
weekend. The decomposition of item variance is again achieved according to 
equation 5.1 in chapter five. What we should expect to see if the 'information 
intervention' of the weekend of deliberation affects the inter-relatedness or 
constraint of these items is an increase in the total R squared of the items in 
wave two with this increase deriving predominantly from a growth in the 
explanatory power of the common factor.
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Figure 6.1 Pa th Diagram for Factor Model
6.5 Results
6.5.2 Model Selection for Whole Sample Analysis
The first step in the analysis was to evaluate the fit of the model shown in 
Figure 1 to the whole "weekend sample' (n= 276). Table 6.1 shows a range of 
Goodness of Fit statistics for a series of nested models fitted to the whole 
sample data. The base model, which applies no constraints between 
parameters across waves, fits the data extremely well with a Chi Square value 
of 11.6 on 16 degrees of freedom (p = 0.773). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Expected Cross 
Validation Index (ECVI) also support the close fit of this theoretical model to 
the observed data.
Apart from the variance of the common factor, applying equality constraints 
between parameters across waves causes a significant loss of fit across all 
measures; the factor loadings between the common factor and the error terms
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of the indicator items are significantly different at each measurement wave. 
That the unstandardised factor loadings are not invariant over such a short 
time period is unusual and implies that there has been a 'qualitative' shift in 
the meaning of the latent construct (McArdle and Nesselroade 1994). In 
chapter five we saw that a similar six item Teft-right' scale was factorially 
invariant over a five year period which is not at all uncommon for this type of 
latent attitude, suggesting that the way these items are perceived and 
understood to relate to one another has altered considerably over the polling 
weekend. The loss of fit caused by constraining the disturbance terms to 
equality across waves is due to the fact that in three of the four items the error 
variance is significantly lower in wave two.
Model chr- df P CChP Cdf P CFI RMSEA ECVI
I 12 15 0.773 - - - 1.000 0.000 0.248
II 29 18 0.061 18 3 0.000 0.997 0.045 0.292
111 32 19 0.034 21 4 0.000 0.996 0.049 0.298
rv 12 16 0.760 0 1 0.651 1.000 0.000 0.249
I = no constraints
II = common factor loadings invariant across waves58
III = error variances invariant across waves
IV = latent variances invariant across waves
Table 6.1 Nested Model Comparison for Whole Sample
6.5.2 Decomposition of Item Variance for Whole Sample
Table 6.2 shows the decomposition of item variance for the whole sample for 
the model of best fit - model V - which constrains only the variances of the 
common factors across waves. On average, the common factor accounts for 
about twice as much of the variance in the indicator items as the unique factor 
at both waves, although this average figure masks a good deal of variation
58 Unique factor loadings are already constrained to equality as both are fixed at unity in 
order to scale of the latent variable. This is necessary when there are less than three indicators.
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across items; the unique factor having a stronger effect than the common factor 
on item 3 and the common factor explaining five times as much variance in 
item 2 than the unique factor. Together, the two latent factors account for 
around sixty percent of the variance in the observed items at each wave. The 
effect of the increase in information on the consistency between responses to 
these items appears to be negligible. There is an increase over the weekend of 
about five percent in the joint proportion of variance accounted for by the two 
latent factors which derives entirely from the increase in variance accounted 
for by the common factor.
before an- PiU P~iU Total
item 1 0.64 0.41 0.38 0.14 0.55
item 2 0.71 0.50 0.33 0.11 0.61
item 3 0.49 0.24 0.60 0.36 0.60
item 4 0.60 0.36 0.41 0.17 0.53
mean 0.37 0.20 0.57
after
item 1 0.71 0.50 0.40 0.16 0.66
item 2 0.66 0.43 0.41 0.17 0.60
item 3 0.36 0.13 0.56 0.32 0.45
item 4 0.77 0.59 0.41 0.17 0.76
mean 0.42 0.20 0.62
Table  6.2 D ecom position  o f  Item  Variance fo r  W hole Sam ple
This increase in the explanatory power of the latent factors is especially small 
when compared to findings from similar models fitted to panels with no 
specific 'information intervention' between waves. Jagodzinski et al (1987), for 
example, find an average increase in total R2 of 19%59 between waves one and 
two on a four item scale measuring attitude toward guest workers in West 
Germany. In chapter five a 10% average increase was observed on the six items 
of the Heath et al Teft-right7 scale between waves one and two of the British
59 My own calculation from Table 3, page 292 (Jagodzinski et al. 1987).
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Household Panel Study -  a gap of two years. Thus, while the results for the 
whole sample analysis indicate, very tentatively, that there may have been a 
slight increase in the degree of internal consistency of these items as a result of 
the information and deliberation, this average increase is very modest, even in 
comparison with increases commonly observed between the first waves of 
standard panel survey designs. There was, however, evidence from the change 
in the factor structure of the items, of a fundamental shift in the way that 
respondents saw these four items as relating to one another as a result of the 
increase in information over the weekend.
The next stage in the analysis involved splitting the sample by a measure of 
self-reported interest in politics to investigate the extent to which the findings 
from the model fitted to the whole sample are generalisable across levels of 
political awareness and involvement. It is not unreasonable to expect that 
growth in attitude constraint amongst the less politically informed is being 
masked at the aggregate level by the attenuating effect of the better informed 
who already exhibit considerable internal consistency of PBSs. Due to the 
small size of the total sample, however, the sensitivity with which awareness 
groups could be defined was rather limited.
Ideally, in order to maximise any effect of information on attitude constraint, it 
would not be necessary to use the whole sample but only those respondents at 
the extremes of the political awareness measures. Due to the sample size 
limitations, however, this was not possible and the whole sample was split 
into just two groups: those who reported having 'a  great deal' or 'quite a lot7 of 
interest in politics (n=143); and those who reported having 'some', 'no t very 
much' or no interest 'at all' (n=127)60. The effect of this limitation in 
stratification criteria is to underestimate the true heterogeneity in belief system 
constraint in the population. Employing a short knowledge measure (see
n0 Three respondents provided no response to this item and were omitted from the analysis.
156
Chapter Six
section 7.4.1 for a description of this scale) as the stratification variable 
provided essentially the same results as reported below, however, the interest 
measure was preferred for presentational purposes as the cut-off criteria for 
group formation made more intuitive sense.
6.5.3 Decomposition of Item Variance Across Groups
Table 6.3 shows the decomposition of item variance for the before and after 
waves of the deliberative poll for the two political interest groups. The model 
from which these estimates are taken constrains common and unique factor 
loadings to equality across groups but leaves the error terms of the indicators 
and variances of the latent variables free to vary. The error terms and latent 
variances were left unconstrained despite the fact that testing of nested models 
revealed no significant loss of fit (as assessed by the Chi Square difference test) 
when these latter constraints were imposed. The logic behind this decision was 
that, with relatively small Ns in each group, only very large discrepancies in fit 
would be detectable with this test. Furthermore, previous analyses in chapter 
five, using the same basic model on larger datasets had shown significant loss 
of fit when constraining these parameters to equality across political 
awareness groups (see section 5.5). Given the unlikelihood of finding 
significant loss of fit with such a small sample and the lack of discrimination in 
the political involvement measure employed, it was thought better to fall back 
on both theory and findings from previous analyses to select the model of best 
fit for this analysis.
The first thing to notice about Table 6.3 is the greater total R2 amongst the 
politically interested at both waves. The difference is not as large as was 
observed in the analyses in chapter five, although this is probably reflective of 
the use of the entire sample rather than just those respondents with the most 
and least stated interest in politics. The second clear difference between groups 
in Table 6.3 is the greater contribution of the common factor toward the total
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R2 amongst the politically interested group. While, on average, both latent 
factors make a roughly equal contribution to the total item variance amongst 
the less politically interested, for the politically interested group the common 
factor has about twice the effect of the unique factor.
interested common factor common factor Unique Factor Unique Factor Total Rsq
before
item 1
Loading
0.71
R sq. 
0.50
Loading
0.40
R sq. 
0.16 0.65
item 2 0.75 0.57 0.33 0.11 0.68
item 3 0.53 0.28 0.61 0.37 0.65
item 4 0.64 0.41 0.37 0.14 0.54
mean 0.44 0.19 0.63
after
item 1 0.74 0.55 0.38 0.14 0.69
item 2 0.71 0.51 0.38 0.15 0.66
item 3 0.45 0.20 0.54 0.29 0.49
item 4 0.87 0.76 0.34 0.12 0.88
mean 0.50 0.17 0.68
uninterest
before
item 1 0.56 0.31 0.31 0.10 0.41
item 2 0.65 0.42 0.34 0.12 0.53
item 3 0.40 0.16 0.62 0.39 0.55
item 4 0.53 0.28 0.47 0.22 0.50
mean 0.29 0.21 0.50
after
item 1 0.73 0.54 0.39 0.15 0.69
item 2 0.49 0.24 0.49 0.24 0.48
item 3 0.09** 0.01 0.64 0.41 0.41
item 4 0.53 0.28 0.51 0.26 0.54
mean 0.27 0.26 0.53
** = non-significant (p < 0.05)
Table  6.3 Item  Variance A cross P o lit ic a l In vo lvem en t G roups
In terms of the effect of the increase in information over the polling weekend, 
the results of this analysis again indicate that the effect was negligible. The 
average increase in total R2 was 5% amongst the politically interested and only 
3% amongst the less interested. Counter to prior expectations, w hat little
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increase there was in R2 caused by the common factor was confined entirely to 
the politically interested group of respondents for whom the common factor R2 
increased by 6%; the small average increase in total R2 amongst the politically 
uninterested group actually masked a 2% decline in the common factor R2 and 
an increase of 5% in the unique factor R2 Nonetheless, there does seem to have 
been one important difference across these groups in terms of the impact of the 
increase in information on the way that these issues are seen to group together. 
While both groups before the deliberative weekend saw each item as making a 
significant and roughly equal contribution to the variance of the latent 
common factor, this only remained the case after the information intervention 
for the politically interested respondents. For those in the uninterested group, 
item three -  which concerns the balance between tax and spending -  became 
non-significant, contributing next to nothing to the shared variance between 
items. This suggests that this group might have experienced a more 
fundamental reappraisal of these issues and how they relate to one another. As 
the main focus of the other three items is on equalising incomes, it may be the 
case that these items were seen more as a separate issue from the notion of the 
balance between taxation and public spending after they had deliberated on 
the issues.
From the perspective of the working hypothesis of this chapter, this result is 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand it supports the idea that the effect of 
increases in information on the content and structure of belief systems will be 
greatest amongst the least well informed. On the other, however, it does not 
support the hypothesis that the actual effect of information will be to increase 
the extent to which issues are seen as inter-related. Rather than increasing the 
tendency to see all of these issues as relating to one, higher order value 
dimension such as Teft-right' or 'socialist-laissez-faire', the effect, if anything, 
appears to have been to compartmentalise them more narrowly.
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6.5 A Stability Coefficients Across Political Awareness Groups
Finally, it is worth considering the correlations between latent common factors 
at each wave for the two political interest groups, as these are often taken as 
estimates of the longitudinal stability of the latent attitude. Amongst the 
politically interested respondents, the Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.95, 
while for the uninterested respondents, the coefficient was 0.7561. This 
indicates near perfect stability for the former group but a relatively high 
degree of instability for the latter (remembering the short time period over 
which measurements were taken and the correction for measurement error in 
the estimates). The interpretation of these stability coefficients, however, is 
complicated by the 'information intervention' between measurements. 
Normally, we could interpret lower correlations in a particular group as 
indicative of temporal instability due to random error in the items at each 
wave resulting from the greater prevalence of 'nonattitudes'. This was the 
basis of Converse's original 'Black-and-White' model. However, given the 
intervening increase in information from the deliberative poll, it may well be 
the case that there is merely more true change between time one and time two 
in the less interested group. Without additional waves of measurement, 
however, it is impossible to tell.
6.5.5 Sample Composition Effects
Before turning to a more general discussion of these results, it is worth 
conducting a couple of additional analyses to seek to explain empirically why 
the effect of a weekend's discussion and deliberation on political matters had 
such a minor effect on the reliability of these items as measures of the 
underlying construct. Figure 6.2 shows the self-reported level of interest in
61 Constraining these parameters to equality resulted in a significant loss of model fit (p < 
0.001).
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politics for the weekend sample (n = 276); the non-weekend sample62 (n = 934); 
and the 1997 British General Election Study (n = 3093). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the sample of people who made the trip to Manchester from 
all over Great Britain to spend the weekend deliberating about politics were 
significantly more interested in politics than those respondents who declined 
the invitation (p < 0.001). They are also significantly more interested in politics 
than the BGES sample which mirrors quite closely the 'non-w eekend' 
deliberative poll sample. Comparisons of a short policy knowledge measure 
between these groups revealed that the 'w eekend' sample were also more 
knowledgeable about politics (p = 0.003).
quite a lot
□ weekend sample 
S non-weekend sample 
0  BGES '97
not very much none at all
0
a great deal
Figure 6.2 Interest in Politics Across Samples
Thus, as with quota sampling, that a deliberative poll sample matches the 
target population across a range of key demographic variables does not 
necessarily guarantee the representativeness of the sample across all survey
02 The non-weekend sample refers to those respondents who were interviewed in the first 
wave but did not come to the polling weekend and were not interviewed in the second wave.
161
The Properties of A ttitudes
variables (Jowell, et al. 1993). However, although the weekend sample was 
considerably more interested in and knowledgeable about politics than the 
general population in the aggregate, there were still sufficient num bers of 
respondents reporting little or no interest, to enable an assessment of the effect 
of increases in information on this group. W hat additional explanation might 
there be then, for this lack of effect?
Figure 6.3 plots Cronbach's Alpha for each level of political interest for the 
'w eekend' sample, the 'non-weekend' sample and the 1997 BGES. Alpha 
essentially provides the equivalent of the Pearson correlation coefficient 
averaged across items, although it is affected in an upw ard direction with 
increasing number of items. As the same four items were not included on the 
BGES, the six item 'left-right' scale developed by Heath et al. (1993) was used 
instead.
0 90
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0 30 1 
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a great deal quite a lot some not very much none at all
Figure 6.3 Cronbach's A lpha by P o litica l In terest
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While the strong downward trend of coefficients with decreasing level of 
political interest is almost identical for the BGES and the "non-weekend7 
sample63, for the weekend sample the pattern is very different. For those 
respondents with 'a great deal7 and "quite a lot7 of interest, the coefficients are 
very similar to those observed in the other two samples. After that though, the 
pattern diverges substantially; with those expressing "some" interest having a 
considerably lower and those with "not very much" and "no interest at all" 
having much higher coefficients than the non-weekend and BGES samples. 
What this suggests is that, in addition to having a much greater interest in 
politics than the general population as a whole, those expressing little or no 
interest in politics amongst the weekend sample seem to be significantly 
different from those who express little or no interest in politics in the general 
population -  at least in the extent to which their PBSs are constrained. Given 
the already high level of political interest and PBS constraint amongst the 
deliberative poll sample then, it is perhaps not quite so surprising that the 
observed increase in the reliabilities of these four political attitude items was 
so slight over the course of the weekend.
It should be pointed out that this analysis seems to somewhat contradict the 
results of Table 6.3, where the more interested respondents had higher mean 
R2 values across the four items at wave one than the less interested 
respondents. This difference between the two analyses is due to the fact that 
the models for combining the items are different in each case -  with scores 
weighted by factor loadings and correction made for measurement error in the 
CFA and a simple sum used in the coefficient Alpha analysis. Of the two, the 
Alpha should be considered the 'quicker and dirtier" with more confidence 
placed in the CFA results. The contradiction, however, should not be 
overstated because, by both measures, the difference between the two interest
03 The slightly higher coefficient at every level of political interest on the BGES can be 
accounted for by the fact that the scale used six rather than four items.
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groups is considerably less than has been reported in similar studies and the 
actual discrepancy in these findings is negligible in comparison64.
6.6 Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to exploit the unusual features of the 
deliberative polling methodology to explicitly test the hypothesis that the low 
internal cohesion commonly observed amongst the politically uninformed and 
uninvolved members of society are caused by a lack of information about the 
objects of their attitudes. This has been the implicit rationale underlying the 
many studies that have demonstrated a steep upward gradient in the 
magnitude of inter-item correlations with increasing political interest, 
involvement and knowledge. If this rationale is correct, we should expect to 
see increases in the magnitude of statistical associations between attitude items 
following a weekend in which political issues and preferences have been at the 
centre of debate. Additionally, any such increases should be 
disproportionately concentrated amongst those respondents with the lowest 
pre-existing levels of knowledge and awareness.
This hypothesis builds on both the body of cross-sectional work linking 
unconstrained political belief systems with low levels of political knowledge 
and involvement and previous research on the 'Socratic effect7 which 
concluded that the statistical associations between related survey attitude 
items increase over the early waves of panel studies because "related or 
logically interdependent issues appear to stimulate respondents to reflect on 
the relations between their attitudes, opinions and behaviour" (Jagodsinski, et 
al. 1987, p.260). If this is the effect of simply being administered a
04 Using the same factor model, Table 5.9 shows an average difference of over 50% on the items 
of the Heath et al Teft-right' scale at wave 1 of the BGES 1997.
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questionnaire, then the effects of attending a deliberative poll weekend should 
logically be at least as large if not substantially greater.
The results of the present analysis do not support this expectation; an average 
increase of only around 5% in the total R2 of the four indicator items of a latent 
Teft-right' political attitude suggests a minimal growth in the internal 
consistency of these measures over the course of the weekend. The hypothesis 
that the effect of information would be greatest amongst the less politically 
informed members of the sample was only partially supported by the data - 
there was a more substantial shift in the relative contributions made by each 
item to the variance of the latent attitude amongst the less informed 
respondents, with one of the item factor loadings becoming non-significant in 
the 'post' survey. However, although the information effect was greatest 
amongst the less politically involved, the actual effect resulted in an overall 
reduction in the extent to which all of the scale items were seen to be inter­
related. If anything then, the evidence suggested that the less informed 
respondents tended to view the issues more narrowly after the deliberative 
weekend rather than increasing their tendency to see all the items as 
pertaining to one, over-arching value dimension.
To be sure, the design of the study was not optimal and could be improved 
upon in a number of ways; larger sample size and more waves of data 
collection for a start. It would also have been desirable to test the robustness of 
these results on different attitude scales. However, this was not possible due to 
the content of the rather small pool of questions that were repeated at both 
waves and the findings are therefore open to the criticism that they may just be 
an artefact of the specific items considered. While addressing this question 
definitively would probably require additional data collection, we can perhaps 
have greater confidence in the generality of these findings by considering them 
in the context of the analyses presented in chapter five and the work on the 
Socratic effect by Jagodzinski et al (1987) which found average increases of
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10% and 19% respectively on similar scale items between waves one and two 
of standard panel studies that incorporated no 'information intervention'. 
While acknowledging the tentative nature of the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the results of this analysis then, it is nonetheless surprising that 
the effect was so minimal.
Two primary explanations were suggested for these largely 'null' findings, one 
mainly substantive and one more methodological in nature. In comparing 
nested models which imposed increasing numbers of constraints between 
parameters, it was found that the common factor loadings were not invariant 
across waves65. This would normally be considered unusual for an attitude 
measured over such a brief interval, as one of the defining qualities of an 
attitude is its relatively stable or enduring nature (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
When the same basic factor model has been fitted to other political attitude 
panel studies, factorial invariance is often observed over much longer time 
periods. When longitudinal factorial invariance cannot be established, it 
suggests that the construct being measured has undergone a 'qualitative' 
change in meaning rather than just a quantitative shift in the direction or 
magnitude of preferences (McArdle and Nesselroade 1994). This qualitative 
change in the meaning of the latent factor seems to have been greatest amongst 
the less politically interested group of respondents, whose responses after the 
weekend of deliberation indicated that they had moved to a position in which 
they saw the issue of balancing taxation and spending and the issue of 
equalising incomes as less related than they had previously.
05 Less strict tests, which only constrained some of the factor loadings to equality, also revealed 
significant loss of model fit.
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When such a qualitative change occurs, we can be far from certain that the 
'thing' being measured at each wave is the same and comparisons between 
parameters across waves become much more difficult to make sense of. This 
then forms the basis of the substantive explanation; the effect of the increase in 
information was so great that, rather than reinforcing and 'firming up' the 
already existing attitude, a more fundamental change was engendered, 
rendering comparisons between the attitudes at each time point more or less 
meaningless. This is the same basic rationale that prevents the interpretation of 
the correlation between latent common factors as a simple measure of 
longitudinal stability. The issue can only be resolved by including further 
waves of measurement.
The methodological explanation is concerned with sample composition. 
Perhaps the main feature of deliberative polling which sets it apart from other 
deliberative methodologies such as 'citizens' juries', 'consensus conferences' 
and 'planning cells' is its probabilistic survey design and the consequent 
representativeness of the achieved sample. This allows conclusions drawn 
concerning the direction and magnitude of attitude change to be generalised to 
the broader public -  'this is what the public would think, were they better 
informed'. Claims about the representativeness of deliberative poll samples 
have, thus far, been based on the impressive closeness with which they match 
the general population across key demographic characteristics such as age, 
sex, education and social class. As with quota sampling, however, such 
equivalence does not guarantee representativeness across all survey variables.
In the current example, the level of self-rated interest in politics was 
significantly higher in the 'weekend' than in the 'non-weekend' sample, 
suggesting that the deliberative poll was biased in an upward direction in the 
extent of interest in and knowledge of politics. Furthermore, there was 
evidence that amongst those expressing little or no interest in politics in the 
'weekend' sample, the level of belief system constraint -  as assessed by
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Cronbach's Alpha -  was already substantially higher before the deliberative 
poll than in equivalent groups in the 'non-weekend' sample and the 1997 
BGES. Given these apparent biases in the composition of the 'weekend' poll 
sample, it is perhaps not so surprising that little evidence of an increase in 
attitude constraint was observed. As the baseline level of statistical association 
between the survey items under investigation was already so high, there was 
perhaps something of a 'ceiling effect' operating on the level of association that 
could be attained. Again, further research would be required to address this 
question definitively.
The results of this analysis then appear, perhaps, to provide more questions 
than answers in assessing the effect of increases in information on attitude 
stability and constraint. Certainly, there was no discernible growth in inter­
item consistency after the weekend of deliberation, as simple extrapolations 
from previous research on attitude constraint and the 'Socratic effect7 might 
lead us to expect. Given the question marks raised over both the 
representativeness and design of the deliberative poll sample for making this 
assessment, however, the lack of a strong information effect should be more 
appropriately viewed as an incentive to improve upon the research design 
than as evidence of the independence of information and attitude constraint.
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7 SIMULATING THE ATTITUDES OF A BETTER INFORMED 
PUBLIC
In chapter six the effects of increases in political information on the internal 
consistency of PBSs was examined using data from a deliberative poll. It was 
hypothesised that the increase in information over the polling weekend w ould 
serve to augment inter-item associations through the dual processes of (a) 
reducing the attenuating effects of random measurement error by increasing 
the pool of considerations upon which preference judgements are based and 
(b) providing participants with a clearer and more explicit exposition of how 
different issues are seen to relate to one another. Results from the analyses in 
chapter six provided only very tentative support for these hypotheses, 
although it was argued that the failure to observe a significant increase in 
consistency between attitudes may have been due to non-representativeness of 
the sample; those attending the deliberative polling weekend were 
significantly more interested and knowledgeable about politics and exhibited 
much greater attitude constraint before the weekend of deliberation than 
commonly found on similar items amongst the general public.
In this chapter a different technique is used to address essentially the same 
question but with a slightly different emphasis and focus. While the analyses 
in chapter six were concerned with the direct effect of information on attitude 
constraint, in this chapter the focus switches to how increases in information 
affect positions taken on individual issues. Logistic regression models are used 
to simulate the opinions of a 'better informed' public in order to evaluate the 
effect of increases in information on the direction of expressed preferences at 
the aggregate level. Subsequently, I take an exploratory look at how changes in 
issue preference direction, engendered by increases in information, impact on 
statistical measures of attitude constraint. Through replicating models on
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independent samples and using different measures of political knowledge to 
simulate a better informed public, evidence is also presented to support the 
general robustness and validity of the simulation methodology developed by 
Bartels (1996) and Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996).
7.1 Information and Preference Direction
According to Zaller and Feldman's 'simple theory of the survey response', the 
better informed should provide more stable attitudinal responses and be less 
susceptible to persuasive communications (Zaller and Feldman 1992). At any 
point in time, with larger pools of relevant considerations, these individuals 
are more likely to derive an opinion which closely approximates the true 
'average' of their considerations and less likely to encounter novel information 
that will actually make a difference to their expressed preference on a 
particular issue (see section 6.2 for a fuller account of the Zaller and Feldman 
model). The expressed opinions of the less informed, on the other hand, being 
based on a shallower pool of relevant, but often conflicting considerations, are 
more labile because sampling across a smaller number of considerations is less 
likely to produce an estimate close to the true average and because the weight 
of each new piece of information encountered is proportionately greater on the 
expressed attitude. This is why the opinions of the less politically aware are 
affected to a large degree by contextual cues and other factors seemingly 
unrelated to the issues addressed in survey questions (Schuman and Presser 
1980, Schuman and Presser 1981). Given these two deductions from the Zaller 
and Feldman model, we might expect a better informed public to exhibit a 
significantly different distribution of opinion than that which is currently 
observed.
The lability in the attitudinal responses of the less well informed, however, 
relates only to attitude change at the level of the individual. The key 
conditions required for individual level change to translate into shifts in
170
Chapter Seven
aggregate public opinion and vote choice are that (a) the background 
characteristics of the better informed be different from those of the less well- 
informed and (b) these same background characteristics be related to the 
position taken on the particular issue in question. So long as the social 
positions or demographic characteristics of the less informed are significantly 
different from those of the better informed then, to the extent that social 
position is related to issue preference direction, increases in information will 
lead to shifts in the direction of public opinion at both the individual and 
aggregate levels'56.
This rationale is exactly analogous to the notion of nonresponse bias in survey 
estimates; when particular population sub-groups are under-represented in 
the achieved sample and when these sub-groups also differ significantly from 
the overall population on variables of interest, survey estimates of population 
parameters will be biased as a result (Groves and Couper 1998). Given both the 
strong empirical relationship historically accorded to an individual's social 
position and their political orientation and the fact that political awareness is 
strongly related to demographic characteristics such as sex, age, education and 
social class (Bartle 2000, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), we should expect that 
increases in information will sometimes lead to quite substantial shifts in the 
direction of aggregate public opinion. Were this shown to be the case, it would 
pose a strong challenge to those theorists who have sought to downplay the 
importance of an informed electorate, or who have argued that Tow- 
information rationality7 and cognitive heuristics can achieve for the rationally 
ignorant voter what knowledge and rational choice does for the politically 
informed (Lupia et al 2000). Additionally, in this chapter, I examine how 
changes in preference direction predicted from these models impact on the
00 Although, it should be noted, in certain cases perfect self-cancelling within the attitude 
change amongst the less well-informed could result in no aggregate level change; for bias to 
exist, the direction of change must be predominantly in one direction.
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associations between attitude items. Through first simulating the opinions that 
the public would hold were they better informed and comparing the inter-item 
correlations of these simulated opinions with those between the actually 
observed opinions, it will be possible to gain a further perspective on the 
relationship between political awareness, preference direction and belief 
system constraint.
7.3 Simulating a Better Informed Public
A number of authors have, in recent years, developed the use of regression 
based models to simulate the opinions of a 'better informed' public. The 
technique is essentially the same as that developed and still widely used 
within the field of labour market economics, by Mincer (1974) and Becker 
(1993). In the classic example, wage levels are regressed on to a broad range of 
theoretically related demographic characteristics (such as age, social class, 
qualifications, years in employment etc.) separately for men and women. The 
female data is then plugged back through the model estimated for men, 
allowing a comparison to be made at both the individual and the aggregate 
level between the score predicted in each model -  the residual being 
equivalent to the discriminatory effect of being female in the labour market. 
The model has been extended to include other areas of employment 
discrimination as well as other dependent variables (Harkness 1996).
While this debt to econometricians is not explicitly acknowledged, the same 
basic technique has been adapted to the area of attitude research within the 
field of political science. Both Bartels (1996) and Delli-Carpini and Keeter 
(1996) simultaneously but independently developed variations on the 
technique in order to investigate the effect of knowledge/inform ation on 
political attitudes and vote choice in presidential elections. While regression 
models have long been used to assess which factors are associated with 
opinion holding and political orientation, the key difference with this type of
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model is that it uses the estimated parameters to extrapolate an actual 
prediction of what opinions people would hold were they better informed. 
Thus for example, we can say not only that more political knowledge is 
associated with a tendency to endorse fiscal conservatism but that X% of the 
public would support conservative fiscal policies were they as well-informed 
politically as the currently best informed members of society. While this is, of 
course, only a simple extension of the basic logic of regression modeling, it is 
one that is rarely made in the field of political attitude research and it lends a 
readier and more immediately intelligible interpretation than reference to a 
whole set of metric or standardised regression weights, often with opposite 
signs.
Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996) use OLS regression and a specially designed 
political knowledge scale to look at the effects of political information on 
attitudes toward domestic issues; abortion; race; homosexual rights; and 
general social issues. Multi-item scales for each attitude were factor analysed 
and the factor scores used as the dependent variables in regression models 
employing a range of background characteristics such as age, class, education, 
marital status, religiosity etc. as the independent variables. Political 
knowledge, measured on a 28-item scale, was also included as an independent 
variable as well as the interaction of this knowledge score with all the other 
independent variables. Using the estimates from this model, they plugged the 
entire sample back through the equation, changing their scores first to the 
highest score on the knowledge scale (28) and then to the lowest score on the 
scale (0). Taking the mean predicted score for each model yielded the 
estimated attitudinal position for fully and completely uninformed publics 
respectively. This, they argue answers the question "Given how various 
personal characteristics influence opinions, what opinion would this person 
have if he or she had scored zero (or 28) on political knowledge?" (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996, p. 396).
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They contend that their results generally support the notion that knowledge 
serves to facilitate a stronger linkage between individual and group interests 
and political attitudes. For example, within the group of people who had never 
had any financial troubles, they found that the effect of greater knowledge 
(controlling for all other variables in the model) was to reduce support for 
government social welfare, while for those who had experienced six or more 
financial problems, the effect of greater knowledge was to increase support for 
this type of programme. Likewise, full knowledge increased support for 
'positive discrimination' policies amongst both blacks and non-blacks, 
although the effect was more pronounced in the former group.
These analyses provide a useful insight into the dynamics of political 
information and opinionation and lend strong support to the contention that 
people's attitudes -  as expressed in surveys -  cannot be considered as 
equivalent to those they would hold were they better informed about politics. 
However, the use of OLS regression and standardised factor scores limits their 
usefulness in several ways. First, the assumption of linearity in the model is an 
over-simplifying one that is probably unjustified in this instance (Zaller 1992). 
Second, the predicted scores from linear regression models have unusual 
distributional properties which can often result in 'ou t of range', or 'nonsense' 
predictions (say, a predicted value of 8.2 when the actual scale ranges between 
1 and 7). Finally the use of standardised factor scores as the dependent 
variables means that it is hard to meaningfully interpret the change scores 
because the metric is standard deviation units of a standardised factor score.
Bartels (1996) and Althaus (1998) overcome some of these problems by using 
non-linear regression on individual items rather than scale scores. Bartels uses 
a probit model and an interviewer rating of respondent political knowledge to 
estimate what the percentage vote distribution would have been in the last six 
U.S. presidential elections, had the public been better informed. He found that, 
on average, individual's actual vote probabilities were around ten percent
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different from those predicted in the fully informed model, although the size 
of this effect was somewhat diminished at the aggregate level through self­
cancelling. While the effect of full information was never so large as to reverse 
an actual election result, it was nevertheless found that, on average, incumbent 
presidents did almost five percentage points better, in terms of share of the 
vote, than the fully informed model predicted they would and that Democrat 
candidates did around two percent better than they would have done were the 
electorate better informed.
Althaus (1998) uses binary logistic regression across a broad range of political 
attitude items from the 1988 and 1992 National Election Studies and the 
knowledge scale developed by Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996, 1993). He too 
found significant information effects across the majority of items surveyed, 
with the general pattern of results fitting quite closely with previous findings 
from research into the impact of knowledge on political attitudes. Generally, 
he found that attitudes tended to become more progressive on social issues, 
more 'leftist' on fiscal policy and more conservative on the 'size and role of 
government' (i.e. favouring smaller role for government).
7.4 M ethod
The analytic approach adopted in this chapter follows that taken by the 
authors reviewed in the section above. First, a base model is fitted with just 
demographic variables as main effects, then a second model is fitted which 
adds 'information level' as an additional main effect and the interaction of this 
variable with all other main effects. The difference between the -2  Log 
Likelihood ratios for these two nested models can then be used to test for the 
significance of the effect of information in predicting the attitudinal dependent 
variable over and above the combined effects of the demographic covariates 
(Althaus 1998). Once the 'baseline' information effects model has been 
estimated, two additional models are fitted by (1) changing all respondents'
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scores to the highest possible value on the information index and (2) changing 
all respondents' scores to the lowest possible value on the information index 
and running these new modified data sets back through the initial model67.
P(Y=1) = a  + Pi h + I  P* Dik + Z 5k (h * D ik) + ei
(7.1)
Equation 7.1 shows the logistic regression equation for the simulation model 
used in the current analysis, where Y is a binary dichotomous variable 
indicating respondent endorsement of an attitudinal proposition; I is 
respondent7s level of political information; Dik is respondent z's score on the 
demographic variable; Ii * Dik is the interaction of respondent z's level of 
political information with their score on the kth demographic variable; and ei is 
the error of prediction, pi, p^ , and 5k are the regression coefficients for the 
information and demographic main effects and the interaction terms 
respectively.
The demographic covariates used in these analyses are very similar, although 
slightly less numerous than those used in the Bartels, Delli-Carpini and Keeter 
and Althaus papers. These were: whether respondent pays attention to 
political news; member of trade union or staff association; has no
67 Technically, this can be easily achieved in SPSS by 'stitching' the same file on top of itself so 
that each case is represented three times in the same 'stacked' data set. Each case will be 
identical apart from the information score which will be the actual score for the first case, the 
highest score for the second case and the lowest score for the third case. Using the 'select' sub­
command within binary logistic regression allows the model to be estimated using just those 
cases containing the actual knowledge scores, although predicted scores are calculated for all 
cases from the estimated baseline model parameters.
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qualifications; Church of England; owns own home; on low income; age; and 
sex. All variables, apart from age, were coded to binary dichotomies, with '1' 
indicating category membership68. The reason only these more or less fixed 
characteristics of respondents were selected as covariates was because (a) they 
reflect social stratifications which have traditionally differentiated political 
opinion (b) attitudinal or partisanship indicators, while improving the overall 
fit of the model, are themselves at least partially determined by information 
level so including them would serve to underestimate the true knowledge 
effect (Althaus 1998, Bartels 1996) and (c) it enabled models to be replicated on 
two independent samples in order to test the robustness of the estimates.
This latter point is particularly important, for, as Bartels notes, if the use of this 
type of 'information effects' model is to be successfully developed, "much 
additional work will be required to ascertain how robust the results are to 
different specifications of information effects, and how they compare to 
parallel results generated in other political settings" (Bartels 1996, p. 220). For 
this reason, as well as extending this type of modeling to the British public for 
the first time, I also replicate all models fitted on two independent samples -  
the 1992 and 1997 British General Election Studies (BGES). This meant that the 
choice of main effects covariates (and dependent variables) was limited to 
those that appeared in both surveys. The effect of this is likely to be a less 
powerful base model than could be achieved if only one sample were being 
analysed and a possible over-estimation of information effects. However, 
despite these caveats, the two sample approach to assessing reliability is 
nevertheless warranted in this instance. This is because the interaction terms in 
the model are highly co-linear with their corresponding main effects which, in 
conjunction with the non-zero correlations between main effects, means the 
standard errors of the metric coefficients are biased in an upward direction -  
making the standard significance tests of individual parameters such as t ratios
68 i.e. code 1 for church of England indicates respondent is of that denomination.
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and the Wald test too conservative. Replicating the same model on two 
independent samples therefore provides a more realistic idea of the robustness 
of the simulated estimates than simple tests of the 'nil hypothesis' with 
inflated standard errors (Cohen 1994).
7.4.1 Information Measures
In addition to testing the same models on independent samples, I use two 
rather different measures of political knowledge to assess the robustness of 
conclusions drawn about the relationship between political knowledge and 
attitudes. It is important to know, for example, whether different types of 
political knowledge have differential effects on different areas of political 
opinion. It may be the case, say, that knowledge about party policy stances has 
a significant impact on the individual's own policy preferences while 
knowledge about government institutions and constitutional debates has little 
impact. Section 2.7.4 discussed work on the different dimensions of political 
knowledge and how such schema have been operationalised into standardised 
survey instruments. In the following analyses two measures of knowledge are 
used which speak to the major dimensions of 'w hat government is' and 'w hat 
government does' (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). The third dimension that 
Dellli-Carpini and Keeter discuss - 'who government is' is, unfortunately, not 
covered by any of the questions included in the BGES.
For the 'w hat government is' dimension, the knowledge scale developed by 
Martin et al (1993) which uses responses to six 'true/false ' items to assess 
knowledge about the British electoral and government systems was used69. 
Full wordings for these items are shown below.
69 A ten item version of this scale was used in the 1997 survey but because only six items were 
used in 1992, only this subset was used in both analyses for the sake of comparability.
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Item Wordings for the Political Knowledge Scale
1. The number of MPs in Parliament is about 100.
2. The longest time allowed between elections is four years.
3. Britain's electoral system is based on proportional representation.
4. MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees.
5. Britain has separate elections for the European and the British Parliament.
6. No one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit.
For the second dimension, 'w hat government does', a scale was created ad hoc. 
This involved scoring responses to policy placement items such that a 'correct' 
response was recorded when the Conservatives were placed to the right of 
both the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats on the five issues employed. 
The placement task involved asking respondents where, on a 12 point agree- 
disagree scale, they would place themselves and the three major parties. For 
example, a correct score of 1 would only be coded if a respondent gave the 
Conservatives a higher score than both the Labour party and the Liberal 
Democrats on a scale indicating support for the minimum wage, with higher 
scores indicating opposition and lower scores support for the policy. Five 
policy areas were covered by these scale questions: keeping prices down v 
keeping people in work; the balance between taxation and spending; 
favouring privatised or nationalised industry; importance placed on equalising 
incomes; and attitude toward European integration. Scores on the placement 
score therefore ranged between zero and five.
There is clearly some degree of ambiguity concerning the idea of 'correct' 
placement of parties along an abstract representation of a policy dimension. 
However, in addition to the idea of taking the 'elite' consensus70 on where
70 I am here relying on my own knowledge of elite opinion rather than directly sampling from 
some specified group such as MPs or political scientists.
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parties stand as the criterion for determining a 'correct7 response (i.e. the 
Conservatives are to the right of Labour and the Liberal Democrats on the 
minimum wage), it is also possible to use the consensus within the general 
public. This means taking the population mean placements of the parties as the 
'correct* placement. Either way, the ordering of parties along the policy 
dimensions is the same. Full wordings and scoring details for this scale are 
included in Appendix A. While the first scale, then, speaks to respondent 
knowledge about the institutional structures and constitutional arrangements 
of British political life, the second addresses the extent to which respondents 
are aware of where different parties stand, relative to one another, on some of 
the major issues of the day.
7.4.2 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables used in the analyses were also limited by the 
requirement that each model be replicated in both the 1992 and 1997 election 
studies. A trawl through both questionnaires identified seventeen items that 
were included in both surveys and had some policy relevance. These were the 
six items of the 'left-right* scale, the six items of the 'libertarian-authoritarian* 
scale, plus three additional items on: attitude toward defence spending; 
attitude toward schools competing for pupils; and attitude toward 
maintaining order in the nation. Additionally, the summed scales for the 'left- 
right* and 'libertarian-authoritarian' items were used. All dependent variables 
were recoded to 'O' and '1', with '1* indicating either agreement or 
disagreement with the proposition stated in the item. For the summed scales, a 
median split was performed such that all those scoring higher than the median 
were coded '1' and all those scoring lower than the median 'O'. Wordings for 
all seventeen items are provided in Appendix A.
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7.5 Data
The data for these analyses come from the 1992 (nn=3534) and 1997 (n=3615) 
British General Election Studies (BGES). The surveys were conducted by the 
National Centre for Social Research and use a multistage stratified cluster 
design covering all of Great Britain. There is a face-to-face interview followed 
by a short self-completion questionnaire with one randomly selected adult 
aged 18+ in each selected household. Interview topics include: media 
exposure; party preference; party and leader images; political trust; class 
identity/constitutional issues; and political attitudes and values (see Heath 
(1993) and Evans (1999) for Technical Details).
7.6 Results
7.6.1 Distributions of Knowledge Scores 1992 and 1997
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the whole sample distributions for the two 
knowledge scores in both 1992 and 1997. The 'w hat government is' scale is 
referred to throughout the rest of this chapter as the 'quiz' score, while the 
'w hat government does' scale is referred to as the 'placem ent score. While 
there is a very small increase in the means of both knowledge scores between 
1992 and 1997, the two measures are both very stable across the two surveys in 
terms of their univariate distributions, despite a five year gap in data 
collection. This supports previous research in the U.S. showing very high 
levels of longitudinal stability in political knowledge (Delli-Carpini, 1986; 
Bennett, 1988).
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Figure 7.1 Percent Correct - Q uiz Score
The 'placement7 score seems to be slightly more difficult than the quiz score, to 
the extent that the percentage of people scoring zero or one is higher and the 
percentage scoring full or next-to-full marks is lower. The Pearson correlations 
of 0.43 (p < 0.001) between measures are identical in both years, the mid-range 
correlation suggesting that they both relate to the same underlying concept of 
general political knowledge but are, nonetheless, independent.
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Table 7.1 shows, for the models fitted using the placement score, the -2  Log 
likelihood for the 'base' model (just demographic main effects), the -2  Log 
likelihood for the 'information effects' model (demographic main effects plus 
information main effect and interactions of information with other main 
effects), the difference between these two and the p value on 9 degrees of 
freedom71. Also presented in Table 7.1 is Nagalkerke's pseudo R square which 
gives a rough estimate of the fit of the 'information effects' model72. Models in 
which a significant information effect was observed are highlighted by bold 
and italics. Across the seventeen attitude items examined in Table 7.1 eleven 
models showed that information level had a significant impact on position 
taken on the item. Testing models that included more covariates (and hence 
were not comparable across samples), led to greater explanatory pow er of the
71 Degrees of Freedom for -2 Log Likelihood difference test = df model 1 -  df model 2.
72 Nagelkerke's pseudo R square ranges between 0 and 1 and is argued to approximate R 
square in linear regression -  1 indicating 100% of variation in probability of being in category 1 
of the dependent variable explained.
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models but essentially the same pattern of results was found in terms of 
information effects (data not shown).
Dependent73 start L-R end L-R L-Rdiff. df P Pseudo R2
defence 2317 2286 31 9 .0003 .07
left unng 2170 2149 21 9 .0114 .10
authoritarian 1984 1961 23 9 .0072 .19
order 2168 2151 17 9 .0512 .06
schools compete 1795 1791 4 9 .9068 .04
fa ir share 2158 2131 26 9 .0020 .08
one law for rich 2113 2104 9 9 .4866 .08
trade unions 2161 2132 29 9 .0008 .10
private enterprise 1916 1901 15 9 .0996 .10
public sei'vices 2161 2096 65 9 .0000 .09
gov. responsibility 2126 2105 21 9 .0130 .11
young people 1456 1442 15 9 .3179 .08
censorship 1329 1298 30 9 .0001 .17
public meetings 2095 2049 45 9 .0000 .09
homosexuals 1989 1935 53 9 .0010 .13
totalitarian 2232 2210 22 9 .0790 .03
democracy 1570 1550 19 9 .3715 .04
bold, italics = significant (p < 0.05)
Table 7.1 Significance of Information Effects, Placement score 1992
For the quiz score in 1992, thirteen of the seventeen models showed significant 
information effects (Table A.l, Appendix A), while in 1997 the figure was 
sixteen for both the placement score (Table A.2, Appendix A) and the quiz 
score (Table A.3, Appendix A). Comparing these tables shows that the overall 
pattern in terms of information effects was more or less the same across years 
and knowledge measures, with the item 'one law for the rich' being non­
significant across all four variants of the model, and 'young people' and 
'schools compete' across three. In total, of the 68 models fitted, 54 (80%) 
revealed a significant effect of information on the direction of opinion (p<0.05).
73 See Table A.4 in Appendix A for a fuller explanation of the meaning and coding of these 
variables.
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7.6.3 Comparing Model Estimates across Independent Samples 
Table 7.2 shows parameter estimates for identical models fitted to the 1992 and 
1997 data. These are the models predicting the importance of maintaining 
order in the nation. It is interesting to note the similarity of the estimates in 
each model, despite the five year gap between surveys. Of the 18 parameter 
estimates in the 1997 model, 14 fall within the standard errors of the 1992 
estimate and for the 1992 model, all parameter estimates fall within the 1997 
standard errors. This lends support to the reliability of these estimates, despite 
the relative paucity reaching traditional statistical significance (P<0.05).
1992 authoritarian (n=1774) 1997 authoritarian 
(n=3498)
Variable logit s.e. logit s.e.
place2a -0.1778 0.1180 -0.0891 0.0902
polnews -0.2094 0.3341 -0.1340 0.2562
union -0.3062 0.2633 0.1370 0.2150
noquals 0.2574 0.2475 -0.0592 0.2007
cofe 0.1602 0.2327 0.1971 0.1898
ownhme 0.0736 0.2385 0.0721 0.1992
lowinc -0.6713 0.3017 -0.6320 0.2145
age 0.0432 0.0072 0.0488 0.0059
female -0.1035 0.2234 -0.1150 0.1765
intpolnews 0.1285 0.1110 0.0493 0.0982
intuition 0.0267 0.0758 -0.0777 0.0595
intnoquals 0.0420 0.0804 0.1570 0.0628
intcofe 0.0637 0.0703 0.0317 0.0548
intownhme 0.0128 0.0771 0.0484 0.0614
intlowinc 0.1818 0.1003 0.1361 0.0658
ingage -0.0012 0.0022 -0.0037 0.0017
intfemale 0.0156 0.0665 0.0015 0.0503
constant -1.2962 0.3777 -1.4728 0.3016
bold, italics = significant (p < 0.05)
T able  7.2 P aram eter  E stim a tes P la cem en t Score 1992 an d  1997
As was argued earlier, the multicollinearity between predictors is likely to 
inflate standard errors, making traditional test criteria too conservative. This
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comparison then allows us to have greater confidence in the predictions of 
opinion change presented in the following tables74.
7.6.4 Predicted Information Effects 1992
Table 7.3 shows the predicted scores using both information measures on the 
1992 data, for each of the seventeen dependent variables as well as the 
difference between the predicted score in a public with no information and a 
public with full information.
Placement score Quiz score
Variable Baseline None Full Diff Baseline None Full Diff
defence 41 31 48 17 41 31 46 15
left zving 47 43 53 10 47 54 46 -8
libertarian 55 63 49 14 55 65 52 14
order 41 36 47 11 41 29 48 19
schools compete 25 23 26 3 25 18 28 10
fa ir  share 56 51 61 9 56 57 57 1
one law  for rich 61 59 63 4 61 64 59 -6
trade unions 52 43 60 17 52 42 58 16
private ent 31 27 36 8 31 31 33 2
public services 40 28 53 25 40 31 47 16
gov. respons. 55 61 53 -8 55 78 46 -32
young people 18 14 20 6 18 12 21 8
censorship 16 11 21 10 16 11 20 9
public meetings 62 48 71 23 62 43 69 25
homosexuals 35 28 42 14 35 21 44 23
tolerance 51 48 54 6 51 45 55 11
democracy 19 17 20 4 19 12 23 11
bold, italics = significant (p < 0.05)
Table 7.3 Knowledge Effects 1992
74 Not all models are as similar across years as these two. However, this is as much a function 
of changing marginals as it is unreliability of estimates. Because the logit coefficients are 
meaningful relative to the base odds, if the marginal frequencies of the dependent variables 
changes over years, the coefficients will no longer mean the same thing. For this reason, a 
m odel was selected for presentation in which the marginal frequency had not changed.
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The scores are the mean of the predicted probabilities for each model and so, 
because the predicted probability of the baseline model is the same as the 
actual marginal frequency, can be interpreted simply as representing w hat the 
public actually thinks on the issue and what it would think with both full and 
no information (Althaus, 1998). Looking across items, the general direction of 
information effects was for opinion to become more leftist7 on economic issues 
and more libertarian on areas of social policy. For example, simulating a better 
informed public with the placement score increased support for the 
proposition that 'major public services and industries ought to be in state 
ownership" from 40% to 53% and from 62% to 71% for the proposition that 
'people should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the 
government'.
This trend is also demonstrated by the fact that, when the summed scales were 
used as dependent variables, people were more likely to be on the left and 
more likely to take a libertarian perspective on social issues w ith full 
knowledge. The only item to reverse this trend was that pertaining to the 
government's responsibility to provide 'jobs for all' which, on both measures, 
obtained less support with full information. The effect was more uniform for 
the 'libertarian-authoritarian' scale items with both information measures 
showing opinion becoming more libertarian across all six items, although 
some of these effects did not reach statistical significance (p < 0.05). Of the 
'non-scale' items, the one relating to foreign policy moved in a 'dovish' 
direction -  support for reducing defence spending increased w ith more 
information, while support for schools competing for pupils and prioritising 
'order in the nation' as a key policy aim, both increased with full information.
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The two different measures of knowledge gave generally the same pattern of 
results, with the Spearman Rank correlations75 between predicted change 
scores across the seventeen models being 0.72 (p < 0.01) for the two 
information measures76. However, on particular items, the choice of 
knowledge measure led to different magnitudes and even directions of effect. 
For example, with the summed 'left-right' scale as a dependent variable, using 
the placement score predicted increased support for leftist policies while using 
the quiz score actually led to a decline in left-wing support77. These aggregate 
changes mask a good deal of variability at the individual and sub-group levels. 
This is because the inclusion of interaction terms means that, within different 
sub-groups defined by the model, it is possible for the direction of information 
effects on the dependent variable to go in different directions. For example, in 
the model with "working people in this country get a fair share of the nation's 
wealth' as the dependent variable the effect of full information was to increase 
support for this proposition by 14% amongst those people who belong to trade 
unions or staff associations but to reduce support for it by 5% amongst those 
people with no interest in political news on tv. Therefore, the effect of 
increased information on attitude direction is not uniform but depends on 
one's pre-existing reasons for either supporting or opposing a particular 
policy. There is, then, a good deal of self-cancelling occurring at the population 
aggregate level, which masks the true extent of individual level change with 
differing information levels. Despite this, however, the mean aggregate
75 This non-parametric statistic was used due to the small number of observations. However, 
using the Pearson correlation coefficient yielded almost identical results.
76 The difference scores presented in Table 6.3 represent the difference between the 'no 
information' and 'full information' publics. Using the difference between actual opinion and 
full opinion gives exactly the same pattern but smaller magnitudes. Correlations between  
difference scores over years and between measures are also largely unaffected by this choice.
77 The effect for the quiz score did not reach statistical significance, although the same 'cross­
over' effect was observed with the 1997 data where both effects were significant.
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difference across items between a better informed and a less informed public 
was 11% for the placement score and 12% for the knowledge quiz in 1992.
7.6.5 Predicted Information Effects 1997
Table 7.4 shows the predicted change scores for exactly the same models fitted 
to the 1997 BGES data. The pattern of results is very similar to that reported for 
the 1992 data, with opinion becoming more left wing on economic issues and 
more libertarian on social issues on both the placement score and the 
knowledge quiz. The estimates of change for the same items across years 
correlate at 0.74 (p < 0.01). For both the placement and quiz scores, the 
direction of effects is the same across years for all but one item ("private 
enterprise" for the placement score and "schools compete' for the quiz) and in 
both instances one of these models has non-significant information effects. The 
average aggregate shift in opinion was 11% for both knowledge measures in 
1997.
Placement score Quiz score
Variable Baseline None Full Diff Baseline None FuU Diff
defence 56 51 60 9 56 55 58 3
left wing 54 47 61 14 54 58 54 -4
authoritarian 55 65 50 -15 55 66 52 -14
order 40 37 44 6 40 31 45 14
schools compete 28 31 26 -5 28 28 29 1
fa ir share 62 51 69 18 62 56 66 10
one law for rich 73 70 76 5 73 74 72 -2
trade unions 54 44 61 17 54 41 59 18
private enterprise 33 30 35 5 33 42 30 -12
public services 42 32 50 18 42 39 46 7
gov. responsibility 61 64 60 -4 61 74 56 -18
young people 9 5 12 7 9 6 10 4
censorship 16 9 22 14 16 7 21 14
public meetings 67 56 74 18 67 48 75 27
homosexuals 38 29 45 16 38 27 44 17
tolerance 48 40 55 15 48 38 55 17
democracy 18 15 20 6 18 11 22 11
bold, italics = significant (p < 0.05)
Table 7.4 Knowledge Effects 1997
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The similarity of results across years is also interesting from the perspective of 
the actual political context at each time point. As the government was 
Conservative in 1992 and Labour in 1997, the idea that information effects 
reflect some sort of ' anti-incumbent' sentiment would appear not to be borne 
out.
7.6.6 Comparing Estimates of Change Across Years
Figure 7.3 shows the scatterplot for predicted scores from all 34 models in 1992 
(i.e. placement and quiz score models) against all 34 models in 1997. There is 
clearly a strong linear relationship between the two sets of predicted scores, 
with the observations clustering quite tightly around a line of best fit.
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Figure 7.3 Scatterplot of Predicted Change 1992 v 1997
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This observation is confirmed by the Spearman rank correlation of 0.78 (p < 
0.01). which is particularly high given that we should probably expect some 
degree of change in the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables in the intervening five years between surveys. Looking at each 
knowledge score separately shows that neither really predicts the score on the 
same model across years better than the other, with the placement score 
having an inter-year coefficient of 0.80 and the quiz score 0.83.
Remembering that the correlation between the two different knowledge 
quizzes within each year was 0.72 (1992) and 0.74 (1997) it would seem that the 
reliability of models using the same information measure over years is slightly 
higher than the reliability between models using different information 
measures within the,same survey (particularly given the natural degree of 
change we should expect over a five year period). This should probably be 
expected if both measures really do tap different aspects of the same 
underlying knowledge dimension, as was argued earlier and suggests that the 
effect of knowledge on attitudes is partially determined by the type of 
knowledge measure used.
7.6.7 Effect of Information on Inter-relatedness of Items
Finally, it is possible to take a tentative look at the extent to which this 
imputation of different information levels affects the inter-relatedness, or 
constraint, of belief systems. In chapter six very little evidence was found for 
any such effect; over the course of a deliberative poll there was only very slight 
evidence of an increase in the level of statistical association between related 
attitude items. Table 7.5 shows the mean Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the predicted values of the six 'left-right7 scale items for each of the 
three information levels in the 1997 BGES.
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quiz placement
info level all no quals quals all no quals quals
actual 0.51 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.65
none 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.46 0.38 0.42
full 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.73 0.75
Table 7.5 Mean correlation of left-right items by info group 1997
While the average correlation as a measure of constraint is certainly not ideal 
(see section 3.3), it was chosen due to the fact that some of the signs of the 
correlations between predicted scores go in opposite directions which leads to 
zero order Alpha coefficients. Using the mean of the individual correlation 
coefficients allows the signs to be cancelled so that we can look only at the 
absolute magnitude of associations. It should be noted, however, that the 
frequency with which opposite signs appeared in the correlation matrix was 
substantially higher for the 'no information' predicted scores, this itself 
indicating lower levels of inter-item association in this group78.
Nonetheless, despite the distance from the original data that the figures in 
Table 7.5 have come, we can see an interesting pattern for both information 
scores. The effect of full information, for the whole sample, is to increase the 
average magnitude of the correlation between predicted scores and the effect 
of no information is to reduce the magnitude by about the same amount, 
although the effect seems to be more pronounced with the quiz measure than 
the placement score. This suggests that the positions on these attitude items 
predicted by the full-knowledge simulation models are more consistent with
78 The distributional properties of the predicted scores also meant that using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation to estimate a six item common factor model (equivalent to that used in 
chapter two), resulted in non-admissible solutions, with values of R square greater than one 
and negative error variances.
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one another79 than those predicted by either the 'no information' model or the 
'actual information' models.
Splitting the analysis by educational level reveals that, while those w ith no 
qualifications had lower average correlations than those with qualifications in 
the baseline and 'no information' models, when 'full information' predicted 
scores were used, there was virtually no difference. This suggests that, once 
differences in level of political awareness are controlled for, the level of belief 
system constraint is equivalent across educational level. Table 7.6 shows the 
same mean correlation coefficients for the six items of the 'libertarian- 
authoritarian' scale for both the placement and quiz score models in 1997. For 
the whole sample the pattern is almost exactly the same as that found for the 
'left-right' scale items, with full information increasing the level of inter-item 
association and no information reducing it by a similar amount, relative to the 
actual information predicted scores.
info level quiz placement
all no quals quals ah no quals quals
actual 0.59 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.35 0.59
none 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.12 0.25
full 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.53 0.54
Table 7.6 Mean correlation oflib-auth scale items by info group 1997
Looking across educational levels, the pattern is identical to that observed for 
the left-right scale items -  with what might be termed an 'equalising' effect of 
'full information' relative to actual and 'no information' models. For the 1992 
data, the pattern was very similar for both the 'left-right' and 'libertarian- 
authoritarian' scales, although the 'equalising' effect of full information across
79 Consistency here meaning the strength of statistical association between ordinal rating 
scales.
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educational levels was apparent only in the placement score model for the 
'libertarian-authoritarian' scale items (Tables A.5 and A. 6 in Appendix A)
7.7 Discussion
In this chapter I have used binary logistic regression models in conjunction 
with two different measures of political knowledge to simulate w hat 
hypothetically 'better informed' and 'less informed' publics would think 
across a range of political issues. On a substantive level, the results were 
conclusive in indicating that we cannot assume that low-information 
rationality and other strategies of the 'cognitive miser' result in attitudes 
equivalent to those people would hold were they better informed about 
politics. Generally, respondents became more favourable to left-wing, 
interventionist policies on economic issues and more libertarian on matters of 
social policy with greater levels of political awareness. On the one issue 
examined that related to international affairs, opinion moved in a 'dovish' 
direction, with support increasing for cuts in defence spending. These results 
largely corroborate previous research examining the relationship between 
political knowledge and opinion (Althaus 1998, Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, Fishkin 1991, Fishkin 1995).
The analysis incorporated two separate validation strategies in order to test the 
reliability of the results; the same models were fitted to two independent 
samples and two rather different measures of political knowledge were used 
in otherwise identical models. With small numbers of observations and no real 
prior expectation as to the scale properties and distribution of predicted 
change scores, assessments of the closeness of the predictions of different 
models was not easy. Scanning by eye showed that on most items predictions 
across years and with different knowledge scores tended to go in the same 
direction and be of similar magnitudes. Taking a more empirical approach 
confirmed this general impression, with Spearman rank correlation coefficients
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between predicted change scores in the range 0.7-0.8 across years and 
knowledge measures. The direction and magnitude of opinion change 
predicted by these models would appear then to be quite robust.
As a final part of the analysis, differences in the magnitudes of statistical 
relationships between predicted scores of the individual items of the Teft-righT 
and 'libertarian-authoritarian' scales were examined. It has always been 
difficult to link the notion of constraint with individual level attitudes because 
constraint is traditionally operationalised as a group level phenomenon. This 
makes it difficult to say -  in the absence of objective criteria - that a particular 
individual's attitudes are more consistent than another's but we can say with 
some certainty that the level of statistical association between the attitudes of a 
particular population sub-group is lower or higher than in other groups.
Previous research in this area has therefore tended to rely on cross-sectional 
analyses -  stratifying survey samples by some measure of political awareness 
and comparing magnitudes of coefficients. Such approaches, however, tend to 
beg the question of whether it is political information per se that causes these 
differences or some other, unobserved, characteristic(s) of the less politically 
aware. The analysis presented in this chapter, while still relying on cross- 
sectional data, was able to move beyond the basic stratification approach to 
look at how predicted change in attitudes, engendered by increases in political 
information, impacted on the internal consistency of belief systems. Results 
indicated that -  controlling for a number of important background 
characteristics - the consistency between attitudes tended to increase with 
greater levels of political awareness, with noticeably higher average 
correlations between the items of both scales in the 'full information' models.
The scores being correlated here, of course, were not actually the predicted 
position on the five point Likert scales but the predicted probability of being in 
categories 1 or 2 of the questionnaire item -  i.e. agreeing with the proposition
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stated in the question. What this means for the "left-right7 scale items is that the 
probability of always taking a left, or a right wing position on economic issues, 
increases with higher levels of political awareness, while the probability of 
taking a left wing position on some issues and a right wing position on others 
decreases with greater political awareness. Interestingly, it was also found that 
the effect of full information on preference direction served to nullify any 
residual difference in the average correlation between groups differing in 
educational level; while the better educated showed higher average 
correlations on both sets of scale items in the actual and "no information' 
models, for the full information models no such differential was apparent 
These results then would appear to support the hypothesised link between 
political awareness and belief system constraint; all things being equal, the 
more people know about politics, the more consistent their positions across 
related issues become. This effect is likely to be the result of a combination of 
two factors: the greater information levels providing a deeper pool of 
considerations from which stronger, more stable attitudes are derived; and the 
increase in knowledge about the political landscape engendering a better 
understanding of which issues "group together' and why.
Although the current analysis does not justify an extrapolation to individual 
and group interests, similar previous analyses indicate that the general 
direction of these information effects seems to result in individuals being 
better able to ""connect their individual and group conditions in a meaningful 
way with government action" (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, p. 250). In terms 
of political efficacy then, a better understanding of politics may well lead us to 
adopt attitudes that are in greater accord with our political interests and to 
support and vote for political actors who most closely resemble our own 
orientation. And although for a large proportion of the public, issues may be 
relatively unimportant in determining vote choice, there is a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that the importance of issues in determining vote is itself 
mediated by political awareness; with the importance of issue positions in
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determining vote choice growing with higher levels of political knowledge 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Heath and McDonald 1988). Taken together, 
this suggests that a better informed public would hold significantly different 
policy attitudes and that these would, in turn, be more im portant in 
determining the party or candidate they choose to support.
Would these average shifts in opinion of around 10-15% at the individual level 
lead to significant changes in the share of the vote or even a reversal in the 
party winning an electoral majority? This is a moot point and a useful area for 
future research, although Bartel's (1996) analysis of the direct influence of 
political awareness on share of the vote in US Presidential elections suggests 
that such an effect is not at all beyond the realms of possibility80. And even if 
the effect were not substantial enough to affect which party forms the 
government in a general election, the growing importance of public opinion 
(as measured through polls and focus groups) on policy making would surely 
mean that greater political knowledge amongst the general public would have 
a significant impact on the direction of government policy, if not directly on 
the party of government. And if we can assume that the direction of attitude 
change with greater political awareness serves to make our expressed opinions 
more congruent with our objective interests, then a better informed public is a 
public with greater and more evenly distributed political efficacy.
80 The narrowness of the 2000 Presidential election suggests that in close contests, information 
effects could prove a decisive factor in themselves.
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8 A COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS FOR ESTIMATING
INFORMATION EFFECTS
This chapter represents the final piece of empirical work in this thesis, its 
primary aim being to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodologies used in the previous two chapters and, from this, to gain a 
fuller understanding of the ways in which political attitudes are related to 
level of information or awareness. In chapters three to seven a range of 
quantitative methods were used to examine how the content and structure of 
Political Belief Systems are affected by level of political knowledge or 
awareness. In both the stratification approaches of chapters three through five 
and in the more causally focused analyses of chapters six and seven, a strong 
case was built supporting the contention that the strength and direction of 
political attitudes are affected, often substantially, by the individual's level of 
political knowledge or awareness.
Through the combined influence of opinion polls and issue based voting, it 
was argued that a better informed electorate could significantly alter the 
current direction of government policy and even tip the balance in 
determining the party of government. These findings contribute to the 
growing body of work which questions the ability of 'low  information 
rationality' and 'cognitive rules of thumb' to make up for genuine political 
awareness in deriving attitudes that are consistent with the individual's 
political interests (Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
In order to have greater confidence in this interpretation of the empirical 
findings, this short chapter looks more closely at some key methodological 
issues arising from the analyses presented in the preceding chapters: the 
measurement of political knowledge and how opinion change is related to
198
Chapter Eight
existing levels of political awareness; and the similarity/difference between 
predictions made about opinion change under the simulation and deliberative 
polling methods. The first issue is concerned both with how the political 
knowledge construct is operationalised and the nature of its relationship with 
attitude preference direction. The second serves as a kind of mutual construct 
or 'concurrent7 validation -  two different methods purporting to reveal the 
opinions that a better informed public would hold should come up with the 
same, or at least similar results. Where differences do arise, it will be 
informative to examine any systematic patterns and how these might be 
related to the way in which the information effects were estimated. Given the 
substantial difference in the cost of conducting a deliberative poll81 and of 
fitting simulation models to existing survey data, the degree to which the two 
approaches concur may well be of practical as well as theoretical and 
methodological interest.
8.1 Similarities and Differences
In discussing the rationale underlying the development of the deliberative 
poll, Fishkin argues that "the resulting survey offers a representation of the 
considered judgement of the public -  the views the entire public would come 
to if it had the same experience of behaving more like ideal citizens immersed 
in the issues for an extended period" (Fishkin 1995b, p. 162). This is clearly 
very similar to claims made for what the simulation approach can achieve. For 
Bartels this method can tell us "how the preferences of this hypothetically 
"fully-informed" electorate might differ from the preferences of the actual 
electorate" (Bartels 1996, p. 204), while Althaus contends that it allows us to
81 Although no actual cost estimates are available, it can be safely assumed that a deliberative 
poll w ould cost at least twice as much, if not more, than a standard political attitude survey. 
The issued sample for the first wave is usually in the region of 1500-2000 and the cost of 
collecting around 300 people together and accommodating and feeding them etc. over a whole 
weekend must be substantial.
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"estimate how the opinions people express in surveys might change if 
respondents were more completely informed about the issues" (Althaus 1998, 
p. 547). However, while the two approaches are clearly seeking the same ends, 
the means of getting there are very different indeed.
8.1.1 Artificialihj and Realism
While the situational context of the deliberative poll has been criticised for 
being unrealistic and stylised in relation to how political opinions are actually 
formed and change in the real world (Ladd 1996, Mitofsky 1996b, Newport 
1996), in many respects it is this method that could be argued to have the 
higher claim to what we might term Naturalism' or 'realism' -  these are real 
people discussing real issues and the opinions they express at each stage of the 
exercise are their actual, stated positions at each level of awareness82.
The simulation approach, on the other hand, uses quite sophisticated statistical 
modeling techniques to impute opinions that cannot be said to ever have 
actually existed. There is always going to be something inherently 
unsatisfactory about a technique that involves 'putting words in people's 
mouths' rather than eliciting some form of verbatim response. Bartels concedes 
that the simulation approach to estimating information effects does not take 
into account the factors that differentially motivate people to acquire political 
information, nor does it "distinguish between the specific effects of factual 
information about politics and the broader effects of cognitive styles and 
information processing behaviour that may differentiate well informed from 
uninformed citizens" (Bartels 1996, p. 204).
82 Notwithstanding, of course, errors in the measurement of these latent attitudes.
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Such factors are likely to revolve around the idea that the better informed not 
only have access to a deeper pool of relevant considerations from which to 
derive their opinions but that they are also better equipped to efficiently 
evaluate and integrate novel incoming information as well. This implies that 
information processing capacity is positively related to political awareness 
such that as our ability to digest, evaluate and integrate new information 
improves, our knowledge levels grow at an ever increasing rate - resulting in a 
widening knowledge gap between the information rich and poor.
While, on the face of it, this may seem like a serious flaw in the simulation 
approach, Althaus actually sees it as a positive advantage relative to quasi- 
experimental methods such as deliberative polling. For, he argues, the 
simulation approach imputes not only information levels to the less informed 
but also the "cognitive styles, information processing strategies...the 
knowledge stored in short-term memory that affects how new information is 
perceived and used to update attitudes...and the confidence, developed 
through experience, that one is able to understand complicated political issues 
and events" (Althaus 1998, p. 547). The deliberative poll, he contends, is 
simply too short a time period and too artificial an environment for the less 
informed to genuinely make up the ground on their better informed 
counterparts.
8.1.2 Sample Composition and Claims to Generality
Likewise, another characteristic of the deliberative polling method that is often 
cited as on of its greatest strengths, could also be argued to be a weakness 
relative to the simulation approach. Fishkin has repeatedly pointed to the fact 
that the deliberative poll is based on a random probability sample to justify his 
claims that the method can operate as a "recommending force' in m odern 
democracies (Fishkin 1995a, see p. 169-171, Fishkin 1995b). A properly 
conducted probability sample allows such statements to be made, because we
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can feel confident that the estimated distribution of opinion may be 
generalised to the population as a whole and not dismissed as an artefact of 
self-selection.
However, if there are significant biases in the composition of the deliberative 
sample, the confidence with which we can generalise to the broader populace 
is seriously diminished. This is all the more problematic when opinion change 
is related to demographic characteristics of the respondents. For example, if 
the less politically aware are more likely to experience attitude change and are 
under-represented in the sample, then the error in our posterior estimates of 
opinion will be compounded (Mitofsky 1996a). In chapter seven evidence was 
presented to show that there is cause for concern over the representativeness 
of the sample for the 1997 UK deliberative poll on election issues. This 
corroborates findings of sample bias in similar polls conducted in the US, 
which found evidence of under-representation amongst older people, the less 
educated and the less politically interested (Merkle 1996).
Thus, while deliberative polling may have better claims to representativeness 
than other 'deliberative' methods such as citizens juries, in comparison with 
simulation modeling approaches, it would appear to again be at a 
disadvantage. For while we might reasonably expect the 'pre' survey to attain 
estimates as free from bias as would be obtained in standard political attitude 
surveys (of the sort on which simulation models are used), the same cannot be 
said of the 'post7 survey estimates. By inviting a subset of the initial sample to 
the deliberative session, a further opportunity for selection bias is introduced 
into the sampling procedure. Given the taxing nature of the task, the high 
investment required in terms of time and effort and the general lack of interest 
in the subject matter, it is highly likely that the sorts of biases discussed above 
are commonplace in deliberative poll samples.
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8.1.3 Knowledge Measures and the Omitted Variable Problem 
The key problems for the simulation approach, on the other hand, are the 
measure of knowledge used and the covariates included in the model. The 
analyses of chapter seven go some way to addressing the issue of how the 
choice of measure of knowledge or awareness is related to our estimates of 
attitude change. Using two rather different measures of political knowledge, 
very similar estimates of opinion change were obtained on two independent 
samples. In conjunction with the broad similarity of these results to previous 
simulation models conducted in the United States (see sections 7.2 and 7.6), it 
would appear to be the case that, while political knowledge may be a multi­
dimensional construct, people tend to be 'generalists' and so whichever 
measure of knowledge we use, we will obtain broadly similar results.
The problem of which covariates to include in the model is also a barrier to 
accepting the validity of the simulation approach, because we might always 
question the estimates of information effects on the grounds that important 
variables have been omitted from the baseline model. These may be variables 
contained in the data set that we have not included by choice, or individual 
characteristics on which no measures were obtained. Either way, it is possible 
that w hat we construe as an information effect may in fact only be the direct 
effect of an omitted variable mediated by our measure of political knowledge. 
This, however, is an inherent problem of virtually all statistical techniques 
which seek to simplify reality to a set of linear and non-linear relationships 
between measured constructs. It is always likely that, no matter how well 
specified the model, there are exogenous factors exerting some influence on 
the endogenous relationships. The important thing, therefore, is to build 
models on the basis of theory so that, even if we cannot say with certainty that 
this is the definitive and exhaustive list of factors which affect a particular 
political attitude, we can say that having controlled for a broad range of 
theoretically related factors, knowledge still has a significant effect on the 
distribution of opinion. This approach is known as 'reduced form' modeling
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because it does not seek to accurately represent reality but merely a simplified 
version thereof. It is important to raise this as an additional differentiating 
characteristics between the simulation and deliberative polling approaches to 
estimating information effects before proceeding to an empirical comparison 
in the following sections.
8.2 Method
This analysis compares the estimates of information effects on political 
attitudes obtained through the simulation modeling and deliberative polling 
methods. Simulation models are fitted to the first wave data from the 1997 UK 
political issues deliberative poll. The estimates of opinion change obtained 
from these models are then compared with estimates from the 'post7 survey of 
the deliberative poll (n=274). The simulation modeling method is described in 
detail in section 7.3 and the same approach is adopted here. To recap briefly, in 
order to create the dependent variables for the analysis, Likert scale items are 
dichotomised such that those agreeing with each statement are coded '1' and 
those not agreeing are coded 'O'. The dependent variable is then regressed on 
to the set of covariates described in section 8.2.1 in addition to the interaction 
of all demographic covariates with the knowledge score variable. Knowledge 
scores are then changed to the maximum on the scale and the models re- 
estimated using the parameter estimates from the first model. Taking the 
difference between the mean of the predicted probabilities from each of these 
models gives an estimate of opinion change with full information.
One complicating factor in fitting these models concerned which sample of 
respondents from the deliberative poll should be used for the simulation 
analysis. On the one hand, it would seem sensible to use the entire 'pre' 
sample of 1210 respondents, as the larger sample size would provide more 
reliable estimates and be generally more representative of the target 
population. However, adopting this approach complicated comparisons with
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the estimates of opinion change from the deliberative poll as the proportion of 
people in category '1' of each dependent variable in the full sample was 
different than in the 'weekend only' sample (and change scores for the 
deliberative poll were, of course, only available for the weekend sample of 
respondents). While this was primarily just a natural result of sampling 
variation83, it complicated comparisons between the two methods because the 
estimate of change in each instance was being taken from a different base. It 
was therefore decided to fit the simulation models to the 'weekend only7 
sample of 275 respondents84. One outcome of this decision was a loss of power 
for statistical tests, resulting in a relatively high proportion of non-significant 
models and individual parameters. However, this should not cause too much 
concern as when exactly the same models were fitted to the whole sample of 
1210 respondents, all but five of the forty two models showed significant 
information effects at the p < 0.05 level or less and the number of significant 
parameters also increased significantly.
8.2.1 Covariates and Dependent Variables in the Models
The covariates included in these models were chosen, as far as possible, to 
resemble those used by Bartels and Althaus. These included age (and age 
squared), educational level (age finished formal education), income (in 
thousands of pounds) ethnic group, sex, housewife (yes/no), retired (yes/no), 
married (yes/no), union member (yes/no), on state benefits (yes/no), self- 
employed (yes/no), professional (yes/no), manual worker (yes/no), reads 
tabloid newspaper (yes/no), children in household (yes/no). These cover all 
the covariates used by Bartels, excluding religion and region of residence -
83 Although it should be noted that some of these between-sample differences were quite large, 
raising further questions about the representativeness of the 'microcosm' sample.
84 This corresponds with how Fishkin himself presents the headline results from this 
deliberative poll in his own publications (Fishkin, 1997 p. 218-220).
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neither of which are as important determinants of political orientation in the 
UK as in the US.
There were forty two items on both the 'pre' and 'posf questionnaires that 
were considered suitable for estimating information effects. These covered: 
general attitude toward each of the three main parties; retrospective 
evaluations of the economy and public services; prospective evaluations of the 
economy and public services under (a) the Labour Party and (b) the 
Conservative party; attitude toward the correct levels of taxation and spending 
in Great Britain; attitude toward the minimum wage, equality of income and 
the European Union; and voting intentions. Full wordings for these items are 
provided in Appendix B. Some of these items are perhaps more suitable than 
others for estimating the effects of information on the direction of political 
attitudes. The questions on retrospective evaluations of the economy, for 
instance, could be argued to be more factual than opinion based. However, it 
was decided to include all forty two items in the analysis because (a) these 
were considered important areas of political debate at the time this 
deliberative poll was designed and (b) all of them could be argued to affect 
evaluations of the main parties and, therefore ultimately, voting intentions. On 
the original questionnaires these items were in five point Likert scale format. 
As the simulation models were logit models, these were recoded to zero and 
one to indicate whether the respondent agreed with the statement in the item 
or not.
Vi-*
8.2.2 The Measure of Knowledge Employed
The choice of knowledge measure to use in the models was, unfortunately, 
somewhat limited. As, Merkle has pointed out, given the emphasis Fishkin 
places on knowledge as a determinant of attitude, it is surprising how few 
measures of political awareness or knowledge have been included in these 
polls (Merkle 1996, p. 594). In the current instance a three item (true/false)
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quiz was administered toward the end of both the 'pre' and 'post7 deliberation 
questionnaires. These items addressed respondents' factual knowledge about 
recent trends in interest rates and unemployment. Full wordings are shown 
below.
Wordings for Three Item Knowledge Score
1. Prices have been rising by less than 5% a year over the past few years.
2. Interest rates are decided by the Bank of England.
3. Unemployment in Britain is higher than in Germany.
Due to the brief nature and lack of conceptual coverage of this quiz, a further 
measure was derived to tap respondents' knowledge of the policy stances of 
the three major parties. This measure was very similar to that used in the 
models fitted in chapter seven and described in section 7.4.1. On each of four 
policy issues, respondents were coded '1' if they placed the Conservatives to 
the right of the Labour party and the Lib Dems and '0' otherwise. This 
produced a score ranging from zero to four. The policy issues addressed were: 
w hat priority should be given to making incomes more equal?; the balance 
between taxation and public spending; the introduction of the minimum wage; 
and European integration (Full wordings in Appendix B). This policy 
knowledge measure was then summed with the three item scale to form a 
normally distributed scale ranging from zero to seven which correlated 0.42 (p 
< 0.001) with self-reported interest in politics. A histogram of this scale is 
shown in Figure B.l in Appendix B.
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8.3 Results
8.3.1 Estimates of Information Effects Under both Methods
Table 8.1 shows the proportion of people agreeing with the statement 
presented in each item at wave one of the deliberative poll (column 1) along 
with the estimated proportion under full information for both wave two of the 
deliberative poll (column 2) and the simulation models (column 3). Columns 4 
and 5 show the estimated aggregate change from the deliberative poll and 
simulation models respectively. Perhaps the first thing to note from Table 8.1 
is the relatively small size of the effects.
Table 8.1 Comparison of Estimates Across Methods
Del. Poll Del. Poll Simulated Del. Poll Simulated
Item tl t2 full info. difference difference
In favour of Tories 26 23 29 -3 3
In Favour of Labour 51 52 54 1 3
In favour of Lib Dems 24 58 52 34 28
Economy has got stronger since '92 40 42 51 2 11
Inflation has gone up since ‘92 37 25 35 -12 -2
unemployment has gone up since ‘92 42 40 34 -2 -8
taxes gone up since ‘92 65 61 73 -4 8
Quality of NHS gone up since '92 7 8 24 1 17
Education service improved since ‘92 10 6 15 -4 5
Economy would be stronger < Tories 32 29 38 -3 6
Economy would be stronger < Labour 35 43 41 8 6
Inflation would go up < Tories 58 51 55 -7 -3
Unemployment would go up < Tories 48 45 42 -3 -6
Taxes would to up < Tories 68 64 58 -4 -10
NHS service would improve < Tories 12 13 30 1 18
Education would improve < Tories 18 17 24 -1 6
Inflation would go up < Labour 60 59 74 -1 14
Unemployment would go up < Labour 22 26 20 4 -2
Taxes would go up < Labour 58 47 67 -11 9
NHS service would improve < Labour 50 63 54 13 4
Education would improve < Labour 48 57 55 9 7
I w ould be better off under the Tories 26 28 34 2 8
British tax system is fair/very fair 33 28 29 -5 -4
People on £50 000 should pay more tax 66 81 70 15 4
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Table 8.1 Contd. Comparison of Estimates Across Methods
Item
Del. Poll Del. Poll Simulated 
tl t2 full info.
Del. Poll 
difference
Simulated
difference
Gov. should equalise incomes 63 73 55 10 -9
Gov. should spend > on public services 87 87 85 0 -3
Gov. should introduce minimum wage 78 69 77 -10 -1
Britain should unite with Europe 37 49 44 12 7
GB is over-taxed compared to others 45 35 47 -10 2
GB spends too little on public services 72 64 67 -8 -5
GB will lose sovereignty without £ 68 47 58 -21 -10
People on high incomes better < Tories 81 82 82 1 1
People on low incomes better < Tories 12 11 18 -1 6
People on benefits better off < Tories 6 7 8 1 2
Pensioners better off < Tories 9 8 22 -1 13
People on high incomes better < 
Labour
13 15 14 2 1
People on low incomes better of < 
Labour
66 68 69 2 3
People on benefits better off < Tories 55 51 63 -4 8
Pensioners better off < Labour 60 56 64 -4 4
Would vote Tory in a General Election 26 19 27 -7 1
Would vote Labour in a General 
Election
50 39 51 -11 1
Would vote Lib Dem in a General 
Election
12 33 25 21 13
The majority of items show less than a ten percent shift in opinion on both the 
simulation and deliberative methods and a great many show shifts of only one 
or two percentage points. The average absolute magnitude of change across 
items is only 7% for both the deliberative poll and the simulation models. 
Across both methods, only six items show a reversal in the majority position 
with more political information (favourability of attitude toward the Lib 
Dems; Economy got stronger since '92; Taxes will go up under Labour; 
Education would improve under Labour; GB will lose control of economy with 
the pound; and intention to vote Labour). Despite this general pattern, 
however, there are a number of issues which show a quite substantial shift in 
aggregate opinion with more information. Interestingly, both the deliberative 
poll and the simulation method show very large increases -  34% and 28% 
respectively - in favourability ratings for the Liberal Democrats. This effect, 
though somewhat attenuated, still comes through on the voting intention
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question with support for this party increasing by around 20% in the 
deliberative poll and by 13% in the simulation model. Were such an effect 
translated to an actual General Election, while not removing Labour's 
parliamentary majority, it would nevertheless effect a large increase in the 
number of seats held by the Liberal Democrats, perhaps even leading to their 
displacing the Conservatives as the official party of opposition.
The item showing the second largest information effect is that relating to 
Britain's relations with Europe. Across both methods, more information led to 
a significant reduction in opposition to European Monetary Union and to 
people being much less likely to believe that keeping the pound is crucial to 
maintaining Britain's economic independence. Other items showed quite 
substantial information effects, although not so consistently across methods. 
For example, the simulation models showed quite large increases in the 
proportion of people believing that the NHS would improve under the 
Conservatives, that inflation would go up under Labour and that pensioners 
would be better off under the Conservatives85.
The deliberative poll showed that, with more information, less people were 
likely to think taxes would go up under Labour; more were likely to think the 
NHS would improve under Labour; and more were likely to think that high 
earners should be paying more tax. While clearly not uniform across issues 
then, information can nevertheless be said to have a significant impact on both 
the direction of aggregate public opinion and voting intentions. In terms of the 
general direction of effects, the pattern is less clear than was found in chapter 
seven and in previous research into the effect of knowledge on attitudes 
toward social and economic policy. This is partly a result of disagreement 
across methods and partly because the pool of items considered is more
85 Note that this does not mean better off rela tive  to what their standard of living w ould be 
under Labour or the Liberal Democrats but compared to what it is now.
210
Chapter Eight
focused on party evaluation and support and has less coverage of social issues 
and no coverage of foreign policy (apart from the item concerning EMU).
Nonetheless, the increased support for the Liberal Democrats suggests a 
tendency toward favouring left/ centrist economic policies -  a trend which is 
supported by some of the more specific items concerning fiscal policy. For 
example, there was increased support for raising tax on higher earners, more 
spending on public services and a general growth in the proportion of people 
believing in the economic competence of a prospective Labour government. 
Elsewhere, however, there were a number of items on which increased 
support for the Conservatives and their economic policies undermined the 
general trend toward a more economically left-wing public with greater levels 
of political awareness. For example, the deliberative poll showed a ten percent 
reduction in support for the introduction of a minimum wage, while the 
simulation models showed a similar reduction in support for equalising 
people's incomes.
As was noted above, on several items, the two methods disagreed not only on 
the m agnitude but also on the direction of information effects. How then 
should we evaluate the extent to which these two methods agree or disagree 
with one another? If we are particularly interested in how aggregate opinion 
might change on a specific issue as the public becomes more knowledgeable, 
then it is highly likely that the two methods will produce conflicting results. 
While, on several items there is a high degree of consensus, there is no real 
way of determining a priori which issues these might be86 and, given the large 
number of items under consideration, there are bound to be some close
86 Although an interesting p o st hoc hypothesis is that agreement is higher and information 
effects more substantial on issues that are not of great public interest or controversy. In areas 
such as the European Union and Lib Dem economic policy -  neither of which are of particular 
prominence in the minds of the British public nor in the media -  both methods show similar, 
large estimates of change.
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agreements due to chance alone. The average absolute magnitude of difference 
between the estimates produced by the two methods was eight percentage 
points -  greater than the average estimate of aggregate change under either 
method. If we are looking for precise estimates on individual issues, then, the 
two methods would appear to provide quite conflicting results and, of course, 
there is no real way of determining which is closer to the 'truth'.
If we are more interested in the broader picture, however, the two methods 
can be argued to show a very similar pattern of results. To the general 
question, 'w hat is the effect of increases in information on attitudes toward 
these political issues?' both methods provide essentially the same answer -  
'not that much on the whole, but with some notable exceptions'. Indeed, 
Figure 8.1 which shows the scatterplot of deliberative poll estimates against 
simulation model estimates across the forty eight items, bears out the 
convergence of results provided by the two methods when looking at the 
general pattern rather than expecting exact replication of estimates.
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All the points in Figure 8.1 cluster tightly around the line of best fit, w ith a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of .92 (p < 0.001). While there is perhaps 
something somewhat tautological about this spread of points -  if both models 
are estimating change from the same base and neither predicts much change, 
the covariance between estimates must be high -  the generally low level of 
estimated change could not be predicted a priori and the fact that some change 
estimates are as large as 34% shows there is nothing inherent in the models 
which predisposes change estimates to be small. Perhaps in other areas, say 
attitude toward new scientific technologies, estimates of the effect of 
information on attitudes might be far larger. As it is though, both methods 
agree on the basic fact that information effects tend to be rather modest on 
these issues. This interpretation should not be taken, however, as downplaying 
either the importance of information in determining both individual and 
aggregate public opinion nor the level of agreement between these two very 
different approaches to measuring information effects.
8.3.2 Aggregate v  Individual Change across Methods
Table 8.2 shows the aggregate and individual level change across all forty two 
items for both estimation methods. Individual level change corrects for self­
cancelling to reveal the absolute proportion of people changing sides on each 
item. What Table 8.2 clearly shows is that estimates at the aggregate level mask 
a great deal of individual level volatility. Another way of thinking about this is 
that, if everyone who changed their position between time one and time two 
had moved in the same direction, the estimate of information effects would 
have been four times higher for the deliberative poll (an average of 25%) and 
three times as high for the simulation models (an average of 20%). For the 
deliberative poll this interpretation is, of course, clouded by the issue of 
measurement error and natural true change (i.e. we would expect some degree 
of 'churn' between time one and time two without any specific 'information 
intervention'). However, for the simulation models all change estimates
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should be free from such considerations, because the estimates of attitude 
change are purely a function of the parameters of the baseline model. This, 
then, shows that information can interact in complex ways with existing 
background characteristics to produce opinion change in either direction, 
depending both on one's initial position and on one's reasons for adopting it.
Table 8.2 Aggregate and Individual Change
Aggregate Individual
Item Del Poll Simulation Del Poll Simulation
In favour of Tories 3 3 14 17
In Favour of Labour 1 3 18 22
In favour of Lib Dems 34 28 40 31
Economy has got stronger since '92 2 11 26 23
Inflation has gone up since '92 12 2 36 26
unemployment has gone up since '92 2 8 33 28
taxes gone up since '92 4 8 34 21
Quality of NHS gone up since '92 1 17 9 22
Education service improved since '92 4 5 10 13
Economy would be stronger < Tories 3 6 24 19
Economy would be stronger < Labour 8 6 25 23
Inflation would go up < Tories 7 3 33 12
Unemployment would go up < Tories 3 6 31 18
Taxes would to up < Tories 4 10 27 24
NHS service would improve < Tories 1 18 12 24
Education service would improve < Tories 1 6 15 15
Inflation would go up < Labour 1 14 32 28
Unemployment would go up < Labour 4 2 25 13
Taxes would go up < Labour 11 9 34 18
NHS service would improve < Labour 13 4 34 23
Education service would improve < Labour 9 7 35 27
I w ould be better off under the Tories 2 8 15 19
British tax system is fair/ very fair 5 4 27 21
Gov. should try harder to equalise incomes 10 9 29 18
Gov. should spend > on public services 0 3 17 22
Gov. should introduce minimum wage 10 1 24 23
Britain should do more to unite with Europe 12 7 33 13
People earning £50 000 should pay more tax 15 4 25 16
GB is over-taxed compared to others 10 2 34 18
GB spends too little on public services 8 5 28 16
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Table 8.2 Contd.
Aggregate Individual
Item Del Poll Simulation Del Poll Simulation
GB will lose control of economy without £ 21 10 29 19
People on high incomes better off < Tories 1 1 22 10
People on low incomes better of < Tories 1 6 16 15
People on benefits better off < Tories 1 2 10 7
Pensioners better off < Tories 1 13 9 20
People on high incomes better off < Labour 2 1 17 15
People on low incomes better of < Labour 2 3 28 23
People on benefits better off < Tories 4 8 35 27
Pensioners better off < Labour 4 4 32 20
Would vote Tory in a General Election 7 1 12 14
Would vote Labour in a General Election 11 1 20 23
Would vote Lib Dem in a General Election 21 13 23 19
Mean 6 7 24 20
On issues where attitudes are less strongly held and based on a shallower pool 
of relevant considerations, we might expect change to occur in a more uniform 
direction resulting in larger aggregate shifts in opinion. Examples of this in the 
present context might be the items relating to British integration into Europe 
and evaluations of the Liberal Democrats which showed quite large aggregate 
effects on the basis of more uni-directional individual level change.
8.3.3 Estimates of Opinion Change Across Methods
Earlier I suggested that measures of association between estimates produced 
by the two methods might be biased in an upward direction, artificially 
enhancing the apparent agreement between methods, because they both 
predicted rather small amounts of aggregate change from the same base. 
Figure 8.2 goes some way to countering this interpretation. Rather than 
plotting the estimates of the actual proportions supporting or opposing a 
particular position against one another, Figure 8.2 plots only the estimates of 
change. A s  can be seen, this results in a broader spread of points around the 
line of best fit, although there is clearly still a high degree of association
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between the estimates produced by the two methods (Pearson's r = 0.52; p < 
0.01). The similarity of these estimates across two very different methods lends 
some support to the validity of the findings of each approach.
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Figure 8.2 Estimates of Opinion Change Simulation v Deliberative Poll
8.4 The Relation between Information and Attitude Change 
As a final adjunct to this chapter, I take a brief look at the extent to which 
knowledge increases can really be said to underlie changes in attitude and 
how the amount of attitude change is related to existing levels of political 
awareness. The rationale of the preceding chapters -  and that of Fishkin, 
Bartels, Zaller and Feldman et al. - would suggest that opinion change should 
(a) result from increases in political information and (b) be greatest amongst 
the less well informed. This is implicit in the minimalist, nonattitude
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perspective which sees the attitudinal responses of the uninformed as 
essentially random and unrelated to any real, underlying cognitive entity. 
Compared to the labile nonattitudes of this group, the attitudes of the better 
informed are actually derived from considered, preference based judgements 
and are, therefore, 'stronger' and more resilient to change.
The same rationale can be deduced more explicitly from the averaging and 
availability axioms of Zaller & Feldman's 'simple theory of the survey 
response' (Zaller and Feldman 1992). As the pool of relevant considerations 
about a particular issue grows in size (i.e. the amount of information the 
individual possesses increases), people are more likely to select the same 
response alternative over repeated administrations and their responses 
become less susceptible to contextual variations. Another way of putting this is 
that more politically aware individuals should possess attitudes that are more 
stable and resilient against persuasive communications. If, over the course of a 
deliberative poll, we were to find no empirical evidence of a genuine increase 
in political awareness, or that the amount of opinion change is just as high (or 
higher) amongst the initially best informed as amongst the least informed 
members of society, then our conclusions concerning the relationship between 
political knowledge and attitude would be called into question.
Figure 8.3 shows the distribution of scores on the knowledge scale at waves 
one and two of the deliberative poll. By this measure, then, there has been a 
clear and significant increase in the political awareness of the sample over the 
course of the deliberative weekend (p < 0.001)87. Given the fact that the 
'weekend sample' was already significantly more interested in and 
knowledgeable about politics than the general population before participating 
in the deliberative poll, Figure 8.3 probably underestimates the true level of 
knowledge gain that would be found in a more representative sample. The
87 Paired samples t-test.
217
Conceptual and M ethodological Considerations
increase in knowledge over the deliberative weekend shown in Figure 8.3 also 
lends support to the validity of the knowledge measure used in the simulation 
models in this chapter.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number Correct
Figure 8.3 D istr ib u tio n  o f  K now ledge Scores Before and A fter  D elibera tion
Although this does not prove any causal link between knowledge gain and 
opinion change, we can at least be more confident that the sample members 
have, on the whole, actually experienced increases in political knowledge 
following the 'information intervention'. The next matter of interest concerns 
whether opinion change was greatest amongst those who were least informed 
at the start of the deliberations. Table 8.3 shows, for each level of the 
knowledge score88 at time 1, the sum of the absolute differences in item scores 
before and after the deliberative weekend89. The absolute am ount of change
88 For the sake of simplicity, table 8.3 uses the four point policy knowledge scale. The pattern, 
however, is the same using the longer 7 point combined measure.
89 Only Likert scale items were included in this analysis.
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across items decreases with every additional correct answer on the knowledge 
scale (although there is very little to discriminate the amount of change for 
those scoring between zero and three). This effect is still apparent despite the 
strong tendency, amongst those with low scores on this measure, to provide 
nonsubstantive responses to the attitude items at both waves of the 
deliberative poll. The effect of this is to underestimate the extent of attitude 
change when over-time differences across items are summed because a 
nonsubstantive response at either wave results in the difference score for that 
item being zero, despite the fact that the same response was not given at both 
waves.
Knowledge score time 1 Sum of change in 
item scores
N Std. Deviation
0 29.5 90 10.7
1 29.3 49 7.6
2 29.2 44 9.1
3 28.3 49 7.9
4 24.0 41 7.1
Total 28.4 273 9.1
Table 8.3 Mean Opinion Change by Initial Knowledge Score
As we have only two points of measurement, it is not possible to determine 
w hat proportion of this response instability is actually due to attitude change. 
Remember from section 5.2 that, on similar items, typically around 10-20% of 
respondents switch sides from one time to the next on standard panel surveys. 
However, given the 'strong' nature of the information intervention (Fishkin 
and Luskin 1996) and the evidence from Figure 8.3 showing a genuine increase 
in political knowledge over the course of the weekend, it would seem 
unreasonable to argue that the attitudes reported at time two are uncognized 
'top-of-the-head' responses derived from a shallow or non-existent pool of 
considerations. A far more likely explanation is that, as expected on the basis 
of theory, we see attitude change across the range of political awareness but
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particularly concentrated amongst the least politically knowledgeable. In order 
to test this properly, additional waves of measurement would be needed, in 
which we would expect to see an evening out in both political awareness and, 
consequently, response stability. Testing this hypothesis in the current 
instance, however, by correlating change in the knowledge score with level 
opinion change at the individual level showed no significant association 
(Pearson's r = 0.04).
8.5 Discussion
In this chapter I have looked more closely at some of the key constructs, 
operationalisations and methodologies employed in the earlier chapters of this 
thesis. Fitting simulation models to the first wave of a deliberative poll on 
political issues showed quite a high level of agreement between the two 
methods in their estimates of opinion change with increased levels of 
information. Generally, both methods showed that the effect of information on 
aggregate opinion was quite modest, although with some notable exceptions. 
Self-cancelling across respondents masked individual change some three to 
four times greater than was apparent at the aggregate level on both methods. It 
was hypothesised that, in less controversial areas in which the public is less 
well informed, information effects might be both more substantial and uni­
directional and, hence, of greater magnitude in the aggregate.
If called upon to make precise estimates of information effects on single issues, 
the convergence of the two methods is less impressive, although still much 
better than chance alone would predict. There was some evidence to support 
the general direction of effects found in the simulation models fitted in chapter 
seven and in previous investigations of information effects -  a tendency to 
favour more left wing and liberal economic and social policies w ith increasing 
political awareness -  although the evidence from the analyses presented in this 
chapter was much more patchy. The general similarity of the estimates
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produced by these two very different methods was argued to lend 
simultaneous support to the validity of both approaches. However, given the 
broad similarity of the estimates, the absence of any 'gold standard' for 
determining what 'enlightened opinion' really would be, the lack of any real 
precision in the estimates of either model90, and the vastly greater expense 
involved in conducting a deliberative poll, the evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that it would be sensible to use the simulation modeling 
approach as a first recourse when attempting to estimate information effects 
on public opinion.
Additional analyses examined the empirical evidence for an increase in 
political awareness over the course of the weekend of deliberation and how 
initial level of awareness was related to subsequent attitude change. Results 
showed that opinion change was underpinned by a growth in political 
awareness and that this attitude change was greatest amongst those 
respondents who initially scored lowest on the political knowledge measure. 
This supports the contention made in earlier chapters that as people become 
better informed they develop political attitudes that are more considered, 
more stable and more internally consistent. Two major problems with such 
conclusions, however, relate to our ability to identify the best informed 
members of our sample and the nature of the relationship between knowledge 
and attitude preference direction.
For example, in the simulation models, while controlling for a range of 
background characteristics, we impute the knowledge levels of the best 
informed members of society to everyone and then estimate the effect of this 
new knowledge on their political attitudes. While both Bartels and Althaus 
refer to this process as estimating the opinions of a 'fully informed' public, this
90 There is no sampling distribution from which to estimate standard errors for the predicted 
probabilities of the simulation models and the standard errors for point estimates from the 
deliberative poll are around 5% for sample sizes between two to three hundred.
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is clearly something of an overstatement. For scoring full marks on a short 
survey measure of political knowledge certainly does not equate to being 'fully 
informed' about politics. It is, of course, more accurate to refer to this 
technique as imputing the opinions of the currently best informed to everyone, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is bound to be some degree of error and 
lack of sensitivity in our attempts to isolate this 'best informed' sub-group of 
the population. Once we admit this weaker version of the hypothesis, 
however, new questions emerge concerning the sensitivity at the top end of 
our knowledge scale. If, as seems certain, the 'ceilings' of our knowledge 
measures do not reflect a true endpoint in terms of political knowledge, then 
the question turns to the issue of the nature of the relationship between 
knowledge and attitude, specifically, is it linear? For if there is both room for 
increases in political knowledge amongst those scoring highest on the 
knowledge measure and the relationship between knowledge and attitude is 
non-linear, then our estimates of what a better informed public would think 
may be seriously biased.
The same doubts may, of course, also be raised about the estimates produced 
by deliberative polls. -  if we observe attitude change after the 'information 
intervention', can we really assume that these more considered opinions reflect 
some sort of endpoint, or would lengthening and broadening the deliberative 
process lead to further shifts in the same or even opposite directions? In many 
respects such questions are philosophical in nature and not really amenable to 
empirical analysis. They relate to the inherent provisionality of all 'knowledge' 
and the inevitable contestibility of political discourse. However, we need not 
necessarily pursue such a strong version of the 'information deficit' hypothesis 
for concerns over .the low levels of political interest, involvement and 
knowledge of the general public to be justified. Such concerns should not be 
taken to suggest that knowledge acts as some sort of homogenising force in 
relation to political attitudes -  if everyone were better informed, they would 
hold more or less the same opinions. Rather, it should be taken to mean that
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with more information, individuals are better able to connect their political 
preferences with their own self-interest, whatever they might judge their self- 
interest to be. Beyond a certain level of knowledge or awareness, there is 
undoubtedly a high degree of diminishing marginal returns in the extent to 
which this connection is facilitated. However, this should not distract us from 
the basic point that, for a great many people, the point at which such returns 
would start to diminish is currently a long way off indeed.
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9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have attempted to evaluate the role that knowledge or 
information about politics plays in determining both the content and structure 
of individual and group belief systems. In so doing I have drawn on a tradition 
of research located at the boundaries of social psychology, sociology and 
political science. And while the primary focus of my analysis has been on the 
social psychology of attitude formation and change, it is hoped that some 
contribution has also been made toward more normative concerns over 
individual and group efficacy and how this is related to citizen knowledge and 
engagement within a democratic polity. In this regard, the main findings from 
the analyses presented here show that a significant proportion of the general 
public are not very sophisticated in the way they think about politics: they do 
not seem to regard political issues as inter-connected or related to higher order 
values and beliefs and, in many ways, cannot be said to hold attitudes at all 
across a broad range of prominent political issues.
Furthermore, this tendency seems primarily related to an individual's level of 
political awareness and engagement -  with the least politically knowledgeable 
and interested being the most likely to switch sides on the same issue over 
time, to respond to issues as if they were wholly or predominantly unrelated 
and to alter their initial opinion in the face of persuasive communications. 
Evidence from two very different empirical methodologies showed that both 
individual and aggregate measures of opinion are significantly altered when 
people become better informed about the objects of their attitudes. Taken 
together, I have interpreted these findings as indicating that 'weaker', more 
descriptive theories of democracy and Tow information rationality' models of 
voting behaviour lack basic empirical justification.
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As a researcher whose primary training has been as a social psychologist, it is 
perhaps dangerous to afford oneself the luxury of venturing very far into 
neighbouring disciplines -  particularly ones as theoretically and 
epistemologically complex as political theory and behaviour. However, if 
social-psychological theories of the attitude are to have any useful application 
outside the narrow confines of internal conceptual and methodological 
debates, such sorties on to 'foreign soil' will always be necessary. Thus, while I 
make no claims to having directly contributed to the development of theories 
of democracy in this thesis, I hope nonetheless to have provided some useful 
input to such debates by applying social psychological theories and methods 
in an assessment of questions which have, until recently, been empirically 
under-researched (Althaus 1998, Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
9.1 Caveats and Limitations
The questions and issues which I have addressed here are both complex and 
far reaching in their implications and it has not been possible, within the scope 
of this project, to directly evaluate all the various strands of the argum ent that 
uneven distribution of political knowledge and engagement within the general 
public leads to a 'stratified democracy7 in which some individuals are 
endowed with greater political efficacy than others. To do so comprehensively 
would require significantly greater time and resources than were actually 
available to me. In none of the analyses, for example, have I looked directly at 
the thorny subject of objectively defining self-interest, nor as a consequence, 
have I been able to explicitly demonstrate that when attitudes do change as a 
result of increases in information, they become more aligned with the interests 
of those who hold them. Nonetheless, it is hoped that by drawing on the 
theoretical and empirical literature from a number of different research 
traditions and combining this with a series of original analyses on high 
quality, representative data sources, it has been possible to construct a 
coherent and convincing empirical account to underpin the central line of
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argument developed in the early chapters of the thesis. In addition to the 
theoretical and normative implications of the analyses, it is hoped that some 
methodological contributions might also be made to the various fields to 
which they pertain.
For the empirical analysis I have relied entirely on "secondary7 sources of data. 
While there are clearly a number of disadvantages to such an approach, I 
believe that they are outweighed by the benefits of basing one7s conclusions on 
professionally collected, representative samples. The secondary analyst is at 
the mercy of those who originally designed the studies on which analyses are 
based, often people with completely different agendas and from other research 
paradigms and traditions. There is, for example, the constant frustration of 
finding a broken time series or the omission of a seemingly fundamental 
question to deal with. This, in addition to essentially having to adopt the 
methodological and theoretical formalisations of the research groups 
responsible for study designs places a number limitations on those who adopt 
this strategy of research (Scarbrough 2000).
Such limitations, however, are not really so problematic as might initially be 
assumed. For the divergence in theoretical and methodological approaches 
will depend on the perspective the secondary analyst him or herself brings to 
each specific data source, with different studies offering different theoretical 
and conceptual outlooks. Therefore, the questions one might wish to address 
may very often be adequately tackled via a search through the many publicly 
accessible archives, without the need for the collection of new data. This is the 
reason that the design and analysis of major, publicly funded studies does not 
begin and end with the ambitions of those responsible for designing them and 
underlies the many recent initiatives to formally document and archive all 
publicly funded empirical data. I have no idea, for instance, of the exact 
rationale for including the "left-right7 scale on the BHPS, although I doubt 
whether this explicitly included all of the uses to which I have put it in this
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thesis. Thus, while ideally a study of this kind would have drawn on primary 
survey and experimental data, I believe that it is ultimately more valid and 
reliable to be basing my conclusions on election study data than on a small and 
unrepresentative convenience sample of students.
There are, of course, other methodological avenues open to the researcher who 
wishes to investigate the issues I have sought to address in this thesis that do 
not rely on representative sample surveys. However, most of the theoretical 
problems I deal with in the thesis are inextricably linked with the 
methodologies upon which they are based. The debate over the longitudinal 
stability of attitudes addressed in chapters five and six, for example, is as 
much a question of methodology as it is a conceptual and theoretical issue. 
This is not to imply that other, non-quantitative techniques have no role to 
play in addressing the central questions of this thesis, but merely to state that 
my focus here is both theoretical and methodological and the methodology of 
the research tradition to which this thesis speaks has been almost entirely 
based on the quantitative analysis of survey data.
9.2 Overview of Main Findings
The thesis began with the proposition that perspectives which seek to 
downplay the importance of an equitably well-informed public are both 
theoretically unsound and empirically unsubstantiated. These approaches, 
reviewed in chapters one and two, have variously argued that democracy does 
not require an informed citizenry but can get by through a plurality of 
specialist interest groups (Dahl 1961, Dahl 1989) or through the mere provision 
of a public mandate to an elite executive (Schattschneider 1960, Schumpeter 
1943). More social-psychologically oriented perspectives have proposed that 
individuals can act as if  they were well informed about politics through 
recourse to, inter alia, cognitive heuristics, opinion leadership and on-line 
information processing strategies (Dimcock and Popkin 1995, Ferejohn and
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Kuklinski 1990, Lupia 1994, Page and Shapiro 1992 Lupia et al 2000). Such 
approaches, to varying degrees, rest on two key linked assumptions -  that all 
individuals hold stable, meaningful attitudes toward matters of political 
import and that the aggregate distribution of opinion on these issues would be 
unaltered were the public to become better informed. The first three empirical 
chapters address the former and the last three chapters the latter of these 
assumptions. The final empirical chapter, while shedding further light on the 
relation between political awareness and the distribution of public opinion, 
also pays particular attention to evaluating some of the methodologies 
employed in the earlier analyses.
9.2.1 Belief System Structure and the Heterogeneity of'the Public'
One of the main findings to emerge from all of the various analyses across 
chapters was the importance of recognising the true heterogeneity of belief 
system structure in the general public. In many ways, in fact, the notion of 'the 
public' when discussing not what but how people think about politics is likely 
to increase confusion rather than clarity. The analytic strategy in chapters three 
to six proceeded from fitting models to the whole population sample to re- 
estimating the model on sub-samples of both highly informed and uninformed 
sub-samples. This approach revealed that basing conclusions about the belief 
systems of 'the public' on models fitted only to the whole sample would lead 
to unwarranted over-generalisation. In all these analyses, models which fitted 
the whole sample rather well, both in terms of overall model fit and the 
significance and effect size of individual parameters, more often than not, did 
not hold when applied to sub-groups with little interest in or knowledge about 
politics. The fact that models fitted to sub-groups with the highest levels of 
political awareness exhibited substantially better overall fit and larger effect 
sizes than those fitted to the whole sample further illustrated the problems 
inherent in adopting an homogenous view of the political sophistication of the 
public.
228
Chapter Nine
Converse and others pointed out this heterogeneity many years ago, arguing 
that different issues attract different "attentive publics' constituting those 
individuals who are particularly interested and engaged in the specific issue. 
Thus, the argument goes, nonattitudes do not always reside within the same 
exact sub-group but are distributed across different individuals depending on 
the particular issue at hand. What the analyses in this thesis suggest, however, 
is that, while this may be correct in the sense that most people will have 
attitudes in some areas but not in others, the same individuals do tend to be the 
nonattitude holders across a broad range of political issues and what links 
them is their lack of knowledge about and engagement in politics. In chapter 
three, for instance, sub-groups from both the BHPS and the BGES with low 
levels of political interest, engagement, educational qualifications and political 
knowledge, were shown to have substantially lower correlations between 
items tapping attitudes toward a range of issues related to 'left-right' political 
discourse.
Confirmatory factor analysis also showed that, for these same items, a one 
factor model could not be said to fit the observed data for this group of 
respondents. Not only was the overall fit of the one factor model worse for this 
group but the factor loadings were also substantially weaker and less reliable. 
As these items were specifically designed to form a scale to measure the 'left- 
right' core value, this finding calls into question the argument that all and not 
just some sub-group of the British public think about politics in these 
'ideological' terms. And, while this latent construct could be said to act as a 
powerful and central organising principle in the belief systems of the 
politically aware, the analyses presented in chapter four suggest that, for the 
less politically aware, if such a construct can be said to exist at all, it exerts very 
little cohering influence on attitudes toward central issues of 'left-right' debate. 
Fitting regression paths from the left-right latent factor to single item policy 
attitude variables revealed strong and reliable relationships for the politically
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aware but weak and non-significant paths for the unaware group of 
respondents.
The same heterogeneity in belief system structure across levels of political 
awareness was also observed with respect to the temporal stability of political 
attitudes. In chapter five a longitudinal structural equation model showed 
that, even after correcting for measurement error in the six indicators, the 
stability of the left-right value dimension was nearly perfect over a two year 
period amongst the most politically aware but substantially lower amongst 
less politically engaged members of the public. This was even the case when 
weaker criteria were adopted for forming the political awareness groups, due 
to the poor fit of the common factor model to the groups used in chapters three 
and four. The longitudinal dimension of the data in the chapter five analysis 
allowed the inclusion of both common and unique factors as explanatory 
variables for each of the six items in the structural model. The common factor, 
representing the explanatory contribution made by the 'left-right7 value 
dimension to the variance of each item and the unique factor, representing the 
contribution made by a range of idiosyncratic characteristics of the item such 
as wording and format. Decomposing the standardised item variance into that 
which is explained by each factor showed that the explanatory power of the 
"left-right7 value dimension was three to four times greater in the politically 
aware group of respondents. This indicates that, what reliable variance there is 
in these items amongst the less politically aware, relates predominantly to 
unique and idiosyncratic characteristics of the questions rather than that which 
is common to all of them. This reiterates the conclusion from chapters three 
and four that the extent to which people organise their belief systems in terms 
of abstract, higher order dimensions or categories is strongly related to their 
level of awareness and engagement in politics. Examining the over-time 
correlations between the common factor revealed that the positions people 
held on this core belief were significantly more stable amongst the better
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informed members of the sample -  even after correcting for measurement 
error.
So the belief systems of the general public differ in a number of important 
ways across levels of political awareness. Most prominently, the less aware an 
individual is, the less their attitudes are inter-related, the less they are likely to 
make use of higher order values and beliefs and the less stable are their 
attitudes over time. These differences remain even when we have controlled 
for measurement error and seem to be quite historically persistent too. But 
what exactly underlies these differences? The answer Converse provided to 
this question when he observed the same basic phenomena some forty years 
ago was twofold. Many of the less politically aware do not even hold what any 
standard definition would constitute as an 'attitude' toward specific areas of 
government policy, nor do they think about politics in an 'ideological' manner. 
People provide essentially random (in the statistical sense), 'top of the head' 
responses merely in order to conform to the behavioural protocol of the survey 
interview and so as not to appear ignorant or stupid in front of the 
interviewer.
This explanation, however, while implicitly according an important role to 
knowledge or information, fails to explicitly articulate the exact causal 
mechanisms which lead to nonattitudes and is rather clumsy in employing a 
central construct (nonattitudes) which defines itself in terms of absence. So, 
having devoted the first three empirical chapters to demonstrating the nature 
and extent of differences in the political attitude systems of the general public, 
the later chapters of the thesis moved on to a more explicit evaluation of the 
hypothesis that it is knowledge or information about politics which is the 
fundamental factor underlying the observed differences in belief system 
structure.
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9.2.2 Information as a Determinant of Belief System Structure
A recent theoretical development which explicitly links the nonattitude 
perspective with models of survey response behaviour via level of knowledge 
or information was used as the underpinning rationale for the analyses 
presented in chapters six to eight. Zaller and Feldman's 'simple theory of the 
survey response' specifies four axioms of attitude construction and survey 
response which allow specific deductions about the response characteristics of 
groups differing in political awareness to be made. The theory rejects the 
notion of attitudes as pre-formed, crystallised entities waiting to be faithfully 
reported to interviewers. Instead it sees attitude responses as time and context 
dependent constructions derived by 'averaging' over the range of relevant 
considerations available to the respondent at the time of asking. Availability, 
in turn, depends on the extent to which contextual factors invoke 
considerations in conscious memory and the recency with which they were 
last brought to mind. A fourth axiom, resistance, states that the more informed 
an individual is, the less likely their attitudes are to be influenced by new 
information. This is because they are better able to recognise sources of 
information which conflict with the general complexion of their current beliefs 
on a particular issue and to resist incorporating this contradictory information 
within their existing belief systems.
Because the more politically involved have more relevant considerations from 
which to derive a response, the averaging axiom - in conjunction with central 
limit theorem - specifies that each response amongst this group will be closer 
to the 'true average' of the individual's range of considerations than for less 
politically involved individuals. This, in turn, implies that the attitudinal 
responses of the less politically involved and aware should be less stable over 
time and have less strong associations with responses to other attitude items. 
Which is, of course, a very accurate description of the observed response 
characteristics of this group. The Zaller and Feldman model, then, provides an
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explicit mechanism through which it is possible to explain the findings of the 
first three empirical chapters.
However, given the 'static' nature of these analyses, which rely on pre-existing 
or self-reported levels of awareness, we cannot be entirely confident that our 
theoretical model provides a valid and complete account of the observed data. 
For this reason, the second section of empirical analysis attempted to look 
more causally at the impact of increases in information on characteristics of 
survey responses to attitude items. Tentative and indirect evidence for an 
'information effect' had already been provided in chapter five, where it was 
shown that the amount of reliable variance in the indicator items in the 
longitudinal factor model significantly increased between waves one and two 
of the BHPS but not between later waves. Similar findings have been reported 
elsewhere over much shorter time periods and are argued to be the result of 
the initial presentation of questions stimulating respondents to think about the 
issues more carefully and to become familiarised with both the subject matter 
of the questionnaire and the survey procedures. This interpretation was 
supported by the fact that the increase in item reliabilities on the BHPS was 
much greater amongst the least well informed respondents, who presumably 
had more to gain from the small stimulus to think about the issues more 
closely.
In order to evaluate the ability of the Zaller and Feldman model to predict the 
effects of increases in information on attitude response characteristics, data 
from a deliberative poll was analysed using essentially the same factor model 
as had shown an increase in item reliabilities between the first two waves in 
chapter five. The logic here was that, if such an effect could be achieved by 
merely asking questions related to left-right political discourse, then the effect 
of an 'information intervention' as strong as that provided by a deliberative 
poll should be of considerably greater magnitude. The results of the analyses 
in chapter six, however, failed to bear out this expectation. There was a slight
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increase in the average item reliability after the deliberative poll weekend but 
this masked a good deal of variation across items, some of which even showed 
a reduction rather than growth in reliability.
Unlike the results reported in chapter five, there was no evidence to suggest 
that any apparent increase in reliability was concentrated predominantly 
amongst the least politically informed - the effect was negligible whatever 
one's pre-existing level of political awareness. So, there had been attitude 
change over the course of the deliberative weekend but this had not served to 
increase the internal consistency of the respondents' belief systems as a whole. 
This somewhat surprising result (given the theoretical rationale and the results 
of previous analyses) was ascribed to at least two different but not mutually 
exclusive factors. First, the factor loadings between the items and the 'left- 
right' factor were not invariant across waves. As was discussed in section 6.5.1, 
this variance in the factorial structure of an attitude is uncommon, even over 
much longer time periods and indicates that there has been some fundamental 
shift in the meaning of the latent construct.
Thus, it might have been the case that the time period under consideration was 
simply too short and that additional waves of data, after the initial 'shock' of 
the information intervention had sunk in, might have revealed response 
characteristics more in line with the working hypothesis. This line of reasoning 
was supported by the fact that, amongst the less politically aware respondents, 
one of the factor loadings of the latent attitude became non-significant after 
deliberation. This was the loading for the item which related to the balance 
between tax and spending, while the loadings of the other three items -  which 
related primarily to equalising incomes -  remained significant. This suggested 
that the increase in information caused the less politically aware respondents 
to fundamentally re-evaluate their conception of how the items related to one 
another, compartmentalising them into more tightly defined units.
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Second, there was strong evidence to suggest that the composition of the 
deliberative poll sample was biased in the direction of greater political 
awareness and involvement -  those attending the deliberative weekend being 
considerably more interested in and knowledgeable about politics than the 
general population. Therefore, it may well have been the case that there was 
some kind of 'ceiling' effect operating in terms of the reliabilities of the items 
used to measure the latent construct, due to the already high degree of 
political awareness and attitude constraint amongst those participating in the 
deliberative poll.
While the focus of chapter six had been on the direct effect of information on 
the inter-relatedness or constraint of attitude systems, chapter seven took a 
step back in the causal chain to look at how increases in information affected 
positions taken on individual attitude items and then, how such changes 
impacted on statistical measures of attitude constraint. The method adopted 
for this was the regression based 'simulation' modeling developed by Delli- 
Carpini and Keeter (1996) and Bartels (1996). This involves regressing a 
dichotomised attitude variable on to a range of theoretically related 
respondent characteristics and the interaction of these characteristics with a 
measure of the respondent's knowledge of politics. The mean of the predicted 
probability of agreeing or disagreeing with a particular policy proposition for 
a model in which 'full knowledge' is imputed to all sample members can then 
be compared with the proportion of people actually agreeing or disagreeing 
with the proposition, given current knowledge levels. Comparing the two 
estimates provides a picture of how aggregate public opinion might change if 
everyone were as well informed as the currently best informed members of the 
public .
Models were fitted to a range of attitude items on both the 1992 and 1997 
British Election Studies. Results supported the findings of previous research 
into information effects using both simulation modeling and deliberative
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polling -  despite a great deal of self-cancelling at the individual level, there 
were consistent and often substantial shifts in aggregate public opinion with a 
better informed public. These findings add to a growing body of empirical 
research which calls into question the adequacy of theories of political 
behaviour which argue that uninformed individuals are able to derive 
opinions and voting intentions no different than they would if they were better 
informed. While strategies of Tow-information' rationality may indeed be 
surprisingly effective in many situations and no doubt nearly always /better 
than nothing', they would still seem to fall some way short of what is achieved 
through rational and critical appraisal of the relevant facts. This idea is lent 
. further support by research which shows that the more knowledgeable people 
are, the less likely they are to use such strategies and, to a much greater extent, 
base their voting intentions on an appraisal of party positions and how these 
match up with their own stands on these issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 
Heath and McDonald 1988). Indeed, given the fact that the best informed 
members of society could also be argued to be those most likely to behave 
'rationally7 in classical economic terms, such evidence also questions whether 
political ignorance is really so rational after all.
It is also important to note, as was mentioned above, that the absolute amount 
of opinion change at the individual level in these analyses was diminished 
somewhat in the aggregate by attitude change moving in opposite directions. 
What this shows, in addition to the fact that just looking at macro-level change 
can underestimate the true extent of micro-level processes, is that the effect of 
increasing knowledge on opinion is not the same for all individuals but varies 
depending on the person's initial position on the issue and their reason for 
holding it. This supports the idea of 'enlightened preferences' as a working 
definition for defining objective self-interest and strongly links the notion of 
political knowledge and political empowerment within a democratic system. 
The effect of greater knowledge, from such a perspective, is not necessarily to 
increase consensus or to act as an homogenising or proscriptive force on public
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opinion -  although on some issues this may indeed be the actual result -  
because the way that one evaluates alternate courses of action and their likely 
outcomes (while facilitated with greater knowledge) will depend on the values 
and personal preferences that each individual brings to the evaluation of 
alternate outcomes.
From the final part of the analysis in chapter seven there was also tentative 
evidence that the effect of the changes in opinion at the individual level served 
to increase the internal consistency of attitude systems. On items which related 
to left wing or 'laissez-faire' approaches to economic policy, individuals with 
higher levels of knowledge more consistently adopted either a left or a right 
wing approach across different policy areas. This supports the idea that 
information or knowledge is an important factor in determining attitude 
constraint. In conjunction with the finding of a 'Socratic' effect on the BHPS in 
chapter five, this would suggest that the failure to detect a growth in the 
internal consistency and item reliability between waves of the deliberative poll 
should certainly not be taken as very conclusive. Further research on different 
deliberative polls and other study designs which involve an information 
intervention may prove more fruitful in elucidating the direct effect of political 
information on attitude constraint.
9.2.3 Evaluating the Normative Importance of Information Effects 
In a political system which affords very little direct influence or participation 
for the citizenry beyond the periodic provision of an electoral mandate, might 
not these 'information effects' ultimately prove to be of rather trivial 
significance? After all, the general tenor of the findings from chapters six to 
eight was that information had a significant but minor impact on aggregate 
public opinion across a broad range of issues. However, while not wishing to 
overstate the case, I would argue that it would be complacent to dismiss these 
effects as being too weak to have any real impact on either the party of
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government or on the policy directions that the executive chooses to follow. 
The 2000 US Presidential election provides a telling reminder that something 
as trivial as the design of a ballot paper may ultimately prove decisive in an 
election in which over one hundred million votes were cast. Bartels' estimation 
that, in most years, Democrat candidates did around two percentage points 
better than they would have in a fully informed electorate shows that, 
depending on the tightness of the contest, a more knowledgeable public may 
well elect entirely different representatives.
Beyond the narrow confines of an election, modern publics can also exert an 
influence on the direction of government policy through the reporting of the 
results of opinion polls and other measures of 'the voice of the people' in the 
media. Governments may choose to pursue a particular policy or to delay or 
speed up the introduction of legislation on the basis of its impact in the polls. 
In Britain, for example, there has been a great deal of speculation since the 
Labour party came to power in 1997 over the likely timing of a referendum on 
joining the European single currency. Analysts have argued that the 
government's thinking on this issue is largely dictated by the 'flat lining' of 
public opinion against monetary integration throughout the years of its first 
term. A referendum would be delayed until at least the second term of office, 
if not indefinitely, because of the electoral significance of a defeat judged likely 
on the basis of the polls. In a deliberative poll conducted in Britain in 1995, 
however, Fishkin and his colleagues found that support for European 
integration and monetary union increased dramatically once the members of 
the sample had become better acquainted with the 'facts' and had time to more 
fully deliberate on the issues (Fishkin, 1997). Evidence from the simulation 
models and the deliberative poll in chapter eight also suggests that support for 
monetary union would be considerably stronger if the public were better 
informed about and engaged in the issues.
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It is, of course, impossible to demonstrate from this that the government 
would have altered its policy on the timing of a referendum had public 
opinion been consistently more favourable toward the idea, although this is 
the clear extrapolation from the majority of political and media analysis of the 
issue. Thus, while the effect of information on the complexion of government 
and the direction of policy may indeed be negligible in the vast majority of 
cases, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that when elections are tight or 
when the government's favoured policy conflicts with public opinion, the 
effect of public knowledge could easily prove decisive. As the least informed 
are also most likely to be the socially and economically marginalised sections 
of society, information gradients may, therefore, serve to compound and 
perpetuate social and economic inequalities through the greater voice open to 
those in positions of socio-economic advantage.
9.2.4 Methodological Considerations
The conclusions set out above concerning the distribution of political 
awareness, how this relates to the content and structure of belief systems and 
the way in which this, in turn, impacts on the political efficacy of different 
groups and individuals in society are based on what might be considered 
rather elaborate methodologies and statistical techniques. For this reason, a 
good deal of attention was paid throughout the thesis to the validity of these 
methods and the reliability of the estimates they produce. One thing that 
featured heavily in these discussions was the issue of measurement error in 
the analysis of attitudes. It has, indeed, been suggested that measurement 
error per se is the cause of the observed differences in the properties of the 
belief systems within the general public (Achen 1975, Erikson 1979, Pierce and 
Rose 1974).
The analyses presented here, however, suggest that while there is clearly a 
good deal of error in directly observed attitude indicators, differences across
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levels of political awareness and involvement persist even once measurement 
error has been parti ailed out. It is worth reiterating though, on the basis of the 
findings from this thesis, the importance of explicitly recognising and taking 
measures to mitigate against the effects of measurement error. These include 
the use of multiple indicators to measure directly unobservable social and 
psychological constructs and the use of statistical software that allows for the 
estimation of and correction for the error in each of the individual items. Such 
strategies serve both to provide better conceptual coverage and to protect 
against a systematic tendency to underestimate the strength of structural 
relationships. In the structural equation model presented in chapter five, for 
example, the longitudinal stability of the 'left-right' value dimension in the 
British public was found to be very high, with a Pearson correlation between 
the common factor at each time point of 0.9. If a single item were used to make 
this assessment, however, without any correction for measurement error, a 
completely different picture emerges - of massive 'churn' at the individual 
level. The over-time correlations between each of the items of the 'left-right' 
scale, for example, were only around 0.39.
A good deal of attention was also paid at various points to the validity and 
reliability of estimates of 'informed opinion' provided by the simulation 
models. Beyond general scepticism that such a feat is possible with 
multivariate statistics, this was important because, firstly the inclusion of so 
many interaction effects meant that, for each individual parameter, the 
standard tests of statistical significance were too conservative, leading to Type 
II errors. Furthermore, it was felt important to include all covariates in all the 
models for theoretical reasons rather than on the basis of the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates. The robustness of the estimates was, 
therefore, assessed through two main strategies, the use of alternate measures 
of political knowledge in the same model and the replication of the same 
models on independent samples. Both strategies indicated that the estimates of 
attitude change were quite reliable - with very similar estimates obtained
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across samples and irrespective of whether a policy oriented or 
institutional/constitutionally focused measure of knowledge was used. This 
latter finding further suggests that, while different types of political 
knowledge may have different implications for the distribution of individual 
and public opinion, people nevertheless tend to be generalists when it comes 
to political knowledge. So, whichever type of knowledge measure we use, the 
estimates of opinion change we obtain are likely to be similar.
That the reliability of the estimates seems good says little about their validity 
which is much more difficult to ascertain, given the lack of any independent, 
objective standard. Therefore, a less direct strategy was adopted toward the 
assessment of the validity of these estimates. This involved comparing the 
estimates of opinion change across a number of items from the simulation 
models with those produced by the deliberative poll. The logic here is that two 
methods which purport to do the same thing -  i.e. reveal the distribution of 
"informed public opinion' -  should produce the same or at least similar results. 
There are clearly problems with this form of construct or 'concurrent" 
validation: if only one of the methods produces valid estimates then the 
comparison will tell us nothing about which is the superior. It is also possible 
that both methods might be systematically biased but produce broadly similar 
results. In such a scenario, the similarity of the estimates might lead us to 
erroneously support the validity of both methods. Nonetheless, given the wide 
divergence of the two methods involved, a comparison of the estimates they 
produce should provide some limited insight into the validity of both.
The results of the comparison showed that the estimates of opinion change 
were either very similar or quite different, depending on the level of precision 
required. If precise estimates on specific, individual issues were needed, the 
estimates produced by the two methods would likely be quite divergent. If a 
broader and more general view of information effects across a range of issues 
were desired, however, both methods would tell us pretty much the same
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thing - that, in the aggregate, the effect of a better informed public on the 
distribution of opinion is quite minimal, although with a number of exceptions 
to this general rule. Several items in chapter eight, for instance, exhibited a 
substantial shift in preference with more information and on a number of 
items the closeness of the estimates of change across methods was striking. 
Both showed, for example, that support for the Liberal Democrats would 
increase by more than twenty five percent with a better informed public. So, 
while the estimates produced by the two different methods did not match up 
perfectly, they certainly agreed more closely than chance alone would predict. 
Given the random variation due to sampling in all of these estimates, the 
similarity of the results was argued, in chapter eight, to lend support to the 
validity and reliability of both methods.
9.3 Is Political Ignorance Inevitable or Irreversible?
The findings and the interpretations placed on them in this thesis raise the 
obvious question of what can be done to improve the current state of affairs. Is 
the uneven distribution of political awareness within the general public 
inevitable? And if it isn't, what can be done about it? In many respects these 
are questions which move beyond the scope of this thesis, although some of 
the analyses presented here do go some way toward addressing them, even if 
in only an indirect manner.
One of the main justifications for those who support the idea that democracy 
can function adequately without a well-informed public or who contend that 
citizens need not be very knowledgeable about politics to make instrumental 
decisions, seems to be the idea that civic disengagement and political 
ignorance is somehow inevitable. In evidence, they point to the distinct lack of 
improvement in the public's political knowledge and the general 
sophistication of political thinking since measurements first began, despite the 
fact that many more people stay on much longer in education and are often
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explicitly tutored in how to be 'a good citizen'. Perhaps, they argue, people's 
apparent active disinterest in politics means that there will always be a section 
of the electorate who remain almost totally ignorant of the structures, 
institutions and substance of politics, no matter what steps are taken by the 
polity to mitigate against this. Accepting the inevitability of political 
ignorance, they look for ways of salvaging democracy by weakening its 
meaning (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
I would argue, however, that such perspectives take too one-sided a view of 
the empirical evidence and emerge with unduly pessimistic conclusions as a 
result. For example, the uneven distribution of political awareness and 
engagement within the general public can be argued to have potentially both 
pessimistic and optimistic implications for the future, depending on how the 
issue is framed. For the very fact that some sub-groups of the population are 
quite knowledgeable and sophisticated in the way they think about politics 
suggests optimism over whether the situation might be improved. The 
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that political knowledge and 
engagement is strongly associated with other social and economic indicators 
and, to this extent, its uneven distribution is no more inevitable than poverty, 
discrimination, illiteracy or other social ills that most would agree should not 
only be reduced but eradicated - even if this might be considered a long-term 
and rather idealistic goal.
Indeed, the fact that political knowledge and engagement seems to be most 
densely concentrated amongst those groups with an existing monopoly on 
more traditional indicators of social and economic power suggests that the 
uneven distribution of political awareness is far from accidental but, rather, 
serves to bolster and maintain existing inequalities. The analysis of the 
deliberative poll in chapter eight showed that, even on w hat might be 
considered a rather weak indicator, this quite representative sample increased 
their level of knowledge over the course of the deliberative weekend and this
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increase in information affected some quite large shifts in individual and 
aggregate opinion. This demonstrates that people can become more interested 
in and knowledgeable about politics, even over a relatively short period of 
time and suggests that we should perhaps not be too quick to discount the 
ameliorative effects of general education on interest in and knowledge of 
politics in the wider public.
But what of the seeming intransigence of political ignorance in the face of an 
ever expanding educational environment? (Bennett 1988, Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996) Surely this suggests that a significant minority of the public seem 
determined to remain switched off and ignorant about politics, no matter how 
much they are encouraged otherwise through formal education? Such a 
perspective, however, isolates education as the sole factor affecting the 
political sophistication of the general public and ignores the fact that, while the 
general level of educational attainment has undoubtedly both broadened and 
deepened over the last fifty or so years, there have also been a great many 
other social and historical changes that are likely to have simultaneously 
depressed knowledge and engagement in politics. The breakdown in social 
and civic trust, the loosening of community and family ties, in conjunction 
with the often pernicious influence of the m odern media on political discourse 
and debate are all factors which are likely to have played a major role in 
counter-acting any benign effect of education on the political involvement of 
the populace.
The widespread apathy and disengagement from politics that has emerged in 
conjunction with the social upheavals and the information and technological 
revolutions of the twentieth century is likely to have largely counteracted any 
positive influence that wider access to education might have brought. To be 
sure, knowledge of and engagement in politics are demonstrably different 
things but they are, nonetheless, intimately related. The more interested and 
engaged we are in politics, the more likely we are to seek out and retain
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political information (Zaller 1992). Thus, initiatives which serve to increase the 
extent to which the citizenry feel involved and interested in the political 
process are also likely to enhance the ability of the polity to exercise power in 
the public interest. What initiatives might serve such a function? Generally, we 
might expect that increasing the extent to which citizens feel a sense of efficacy 
in the decision-making process would serve to augment their interest in it. It 
has often been argued that the causes of political disengagement and apathy 
are to be found in the feelings of disempowerment and detachment from an 
increasingly complex and distant decision making apparatus amongst large 
sections of the public. What is the point of becoming engaged in a process over 
which one has no effective input or control?
By providing citizens with not just a sense of participation but an active role in 
the political process, we may serve to revitalise a sense of civic engagement 
which would feed through into a deeper and more equitably distributed 
awareness of politics. This will not be achieved through any simple formula or 
raft of government measures and a detailed consideration of the institutional, 
constitutional and social transformations that might ameliorate the current 
situation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, even without 
specifying the exact mechanisms through which a problem may be solved, 
demonstrating that the problem exists, showing that it is not inevitable and 
proposing the general means through which it might begin to be reversed are 
important steps in this direction.
9.4 Future directions of Research
The findings set out in the preceding chapters represent a starting point for 
many additional lines of enquiry which have emerged from attempts to 
address the questions with which the thesis began. In demonstrating, for 
instance, that a person's general knowledge of politics affects their political 
preferences, the issues of what we really mean by political knowledge and the
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exact nature of this construct's relationship with political preferences become 
more prom inent By concluding that in certain instances deliberative polls and 
simulation models come up with very similar estimates of opinion change, we 
beg the question of what factors cause estimates from the two methods to 
converge and which to diverge. In this final section, then, I look at some areas 
in which the empirical research presented in the earlier chapters might 
usefully be developed and extended.
In all of the empirical chapters of this thesis, a heavy emphasis was placed on 
establishing the robustness of any results obtained, mainly by replicating 
models on independent samples. While this strategy allows greater confidence 
to be placed in the empirical findings for any particular model, the emphasis 
on establishing the reliability of model parameters limits its use in developing 
theoretical explanations for variations and anomalies in the initial pattern of 
findings. It would be useful, therefore, to replicate the findings from the 
current analyses on further independent samples but w ith more of an 
emphasis on testing hypotheses concerning their initial variation. In this 
regard, it would be interesting to evaluate the hypothesis -  advanced in 
chapter eight - that information effects are greatest on issues on which the 
public has very little knowledge and which are not particularly prominent in 
the media or elite political discourse. This makes a certain logical sense and 
could be tested empirically by specifying a priori the level of public 
'controversy' and awareness across a range of issues and examining how this 
feeds through to the magnitude and direction of opinion change with both 
deliberative poll and simulation methods. Not only might this elucidate the 
processes underlying the relationship between knowledge and public opinion 
and why the two methods either converge or diverge across issues but it might 
also provide a useful diagnostic tool through which it might be possible to 
identify fruitful areas for further deliberative poll and simulation research.
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In chapter eight a number of problems with the political knowledge construct 
and how it is related to expressed preferences on political issues were 
discussed. These centred around the issues of w hat we mean by being 'fully' 
or 'w ell' informed about politics and the linearity or otherwise of the 
relationship between political awareness and political preferences. Both of 
these would currently appear to be under-researched areas and could be 
usefully addressed in future investigations. By using different measures of 
political knowledge which contain items with differing diagnostic sensitivities, 
it may be possible to get a more detailed picture of the amount of variation at 
the current 'ceiling' of existing measures. Seeing how any variation in 
knowledge within the group we would currently define as being 'fully 
informed' is itself related to political preferences, would provide an indication 
of the validity of our current conclusions about how knowledge is related to 
positions on particular issues. We may find, for example, that if those we 
currently define as being fully informed on our somewhat blunt measures of 
political knowledge were to become even better informed, their preferences 
would again shift on particular issues. This would be problematic for both the 
deliberative poll and simulation methods, as it would imply that knowledge is 
not related to political preference in any simple, linear manner and that neither 
the top of our knowledge scale nor one's state of mind at the end of a 
deliberative poll represent any sort of end-point in the domain of political 
knowledge. A related but more straightforward analysis might investigate the 
linearity or otherwise of the relationship between knowledge and preference 
direction within the confines of our existing knowledge scales.
The quasi-experimental and regression based analyses of chapters six through 
eight, which investigated the effect of information on the inter-related ness of 
attitude systems provided somewhat inconclusive results. In chapters five and 
e i**hT there was some strong evidence to suggest that increasing an 
individual's level of knowledge about political issues augments the strength of 
statistical associations between relevant attitude items. In chapter six,
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however, which provided the most direct and explicit test of this hypothesis, 
no evidence was found in support. It would, therefore, be valuable to gather a 
more extensive array of attitude items across a range of deliberative polls (or 
other study designs which incorporate a specific "information intervention") in 
order to evaluate the relationship between political knowledge and attitude 
constraint more thoroughly and conclusively. Ideally, this would include at 
least one deliberative poll which incorporates more than two waves of data 
collection in order to examine how response characteristics evolve after the 
initial shock of the information intervention has had time to sink in.
In a related vein, the processes hypothesised to underlie the "Socratic effect" 
reported in chapter five (and previously by Jagodzinski et al (1987) and 
Batista-Fouget and Saris (1997)) could usefully be further delineated. It has 
been argued that the increase in attitude item reliabilities observed between 
the first two waves of panel studies is due to the increased familiarity with the 
issues and question format that the subject gains from mere exposure to the 
questions. From the perspective of this thesis, it would be interesting to 
decompose this effect into its component parts, in order to establish the exact 
roles played by the respondent thinking about the issues and that by increased 
familiarity with the survey procedures and question format per se. This could 
be achieved by comparing the magnitudes of effects across surveys which 
employ different modes for different respondents on different waves. If the 
effect resulted primarily from the familiarity with the survey procedures 
rather than through a deeper consideration of the substantive issues, we might 
expect to see a reduced effect in panels which used different modes of data 
collection across the first two waves of the panel. Further comparing effects 
across respondents who were interviewed in different modes within the same 
wave would provide further insight into the dynamics of this effect. Whether 
the change in response characteristics results from a mere familiarity with 
being measured or whether it is more a function of the extent to and manner in 
which the respondent thinks about the substantive issues, has important
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implications for our conclusions about the role of information in determining 
the content and structure of attitude systems.
Zaller and Feldman's 'simple theory of the survey response' and how this 
relates to response characteristics across levels of political awareness was used 
as the main theoretical framework for the final three empirical chapters. To a 
large extent, the hypotheses generated from the four central axioms of the 
model were supported by the results of the analyses. There were, however, 
several anomalies in relation to the empirical findings and there remain a 
number of ambiguities over the central constructs and processes of this theory 
which should be addressed by future research if the theory is to be of 
continued utility in explaining how what we know is related to what we think.
The notion of 'considerations', for instance, is problematic in the same way as 
any model which tries to specify some form of hierarchical or atomic structure 
to human cognitions. If I have a 'consideration' relevant to taxation levels 
which says 'government should let people decide how to spend their own 
money', how is this any different from having a negative attitude toward high 
taxes? It is important to more closely define what is meant by each of the 
constructs specified in their formulation and to show how such definitions 
may be justified both theoretically and empirically. Furthermore, the resistance 
axiom (which specifies that people resist integrating new information which 
conflicts with their current beliefs) and the averaging axiom (people's survey 
responses are mathematical averages of the considerations in conscious 
memory) would both appear to be theoretically and empirically under­
developed. We are not really told why people resist conflicting information nor 
are we told why the weights applied to each consideration in the averaging 
process should be equal. Having said this, however, the theory is a potentially 
powerful and useful one in understanding and explaining the complexities of 
survey attitude data and certainly represents an advance in theorising the link 
between survey response characteristics and the properties of attitudes. Future
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research, both experimental and survey based, could usefully address some of 
the problematic areas of the theory outlined above.
Finally, I should note that this thesis has had considerably more to say about 
the impoverished state of the public's political knowledge and sophistication 
than it has about how this state of affairs might be ameliorated in the future. 
This is due primarily to the boundaries imposed by a limited time scale and 
resources but also reflects the predominantly social-psychological focus of the 
thesis. And although the normative implications of the empirical research have 
been discussed at some length, it would be desirable to further develop the 
empirical work in directions which might elucidate more explicitly the social 
and historical conditions which give rise to the uneven distribution of political 
knowledge and engagement in the mass public and suggest mechanisms 
through which it might be possible to intervene in order to reverse existing 
inequalities.
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Item wordings for the 'placement score'.
Each item is repeated for each of the three main parties. For the knowledge 
measure, each item is scored one if respondent places the Conservative party 
to the right of the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats, zero otherwise.
Item 1
Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's 
top priority. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel 
that keeping prices down should be the government's top priority. These 
people would put themselves in Box K. And other people have views 
somewhere in-between, along here (A-F) or along here (K-F). In the first row of 
boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the 
Conservative Party.
Item 2
Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much 
more on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box 
A. Other people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much 
less on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box 
K. And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (A-F) or 
along here (K-F). In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think 
comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party.
Item 3
Some people feel that government should nationalise many more private 
companies. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel 
that government should sell off many more nationalised industries. These 
people would put themselves in Box K. And other people have views
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somewhere in-between, along here (A-F) or along here (K-F). In the first row of 
boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to whichever box you think 
comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party.
Item 4
Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make 
people's incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box A. 
Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how 
equal people's incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box K. And 
other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (A-F) or along 
here (K-F). In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to 
whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party.
Item 5
Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the 
European Union. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people 
feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the 
European Union. These people would put themselves in Box K. And other 
people have views somewhere in-between, along here (A-F) or along here (K- 
F). In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest 
to the views of the Conservative Party.
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Dependent start L-R end L-R L-R diff. df P Pseudo R2
defence 2317 2289 28 9 .0009 .062
left wing 2170 2156 14 9 .1222 .094
authoritarian 1984 1957 27 9 .0013 .193
order 2168 2141 27 9 .0014 .066
schools comp. 1795 1778 17 9 .0517 .054
fair share 2158 2138 20 9 .0217 .078
one law for rich 2113 2100 13 9 .1620 .079
trade unions 2161 2144 17 9 .0499 .095
private ent. 1916 1901 14 9 .1180 .099
public services 2161 2131 31 9 .0004 .044
gov. resp. 2126 2057 69 9 .0000 !l48
young people 1456 1442 15 9 .0938 .088
censorship 1329 1298 30 9 .0004 .171
public meetings 2095 2049 45 9 .0000 .087
homosexuals 1989 1935 53 9 .0000 .148
totalitarian 2232 2210 22 9 .0082 .035
democracy_____ 1570 1550 19 9 .0215 .044
Table A.1 Significance of Information Effects, Quiz score 1992
Dependent start L-R end L-R L-R diff. df P Pseudo R2
defence 4720 4679 40 9 .0000 .036
left wing 3835 3788 47 9 .0000 .119
authoritarian 3632 3581 51 9 .0000 .183
order 3971 3948 23 9 .0056 .073
schools 3537 3521 16 9 .0718 .046
compete 
fair share 3903 3848 55 9 .0000 .063
one law for rich 3406 3393 12 9 .1977 .057
trade unions 3977 3931 46 9 .0000 .087
private ent. 3661 3629 32 9 .0002 .065
public services 4000 3932 69 9 .0000 .059
gov. resp. 3899 3878 21 9 .0136 .072
young people 1778 1752 26 9 .0022 .054
censorship 2358 2300 59 9 .0000 .185
public meetings 3693 3625 67 9 .0000 ..061
homosexuals 3689 3633 56 9 .0000 .159
totalitarian 4073 4009 64 9 .0000 .059
democracy 2858 2806 20 9 .0199 .032
Table A.2 Significance oflnfortnation Effects,  Placement score 1997
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Dependent start L-R end L-R L-R diff. df P Pseudo R2
defence 4720 4700 20 9 .0000 .028
left wing 3835 3818 17 9 .0000 .107
authoritarian 3632 3594 38 9 .0000 .178
order 3971 3935 36 9 .0056 .078
schools comp. 3537 3509 28 9 .0718 .051
fair share 3903 3875 28 9 .0008 .052
one law for rich 3406 3394 12 9 .2366 .057
trade unions 3977 3948 29 9 .0007 .080
private 3661 3619 42 9 .0000 .070
enterprise 
public services 4000 3959 42 9 .0000 .048
gov. 3899 3857 42 9 .0000 .081
responsibility 
young people 1778 1768 10 9 .3465 .043
censorship 2358 2312 46 9 .0000 .179
public meetings 3693 3592 101 9 .0000 .076
homosexuals 3689 3636 53 9 .0000 .158
totalitarian 4073 4009 64 9 .0000 .059
democracy 2858 2792 33 9 .0001 .039
Table A.3 Significance of Information Effects, Quiz score 1997
Question wordings for dependent variables in simulation model analysis
1. Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth.
2. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.
3. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems.
4. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.
5. It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants 
one.
6. There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employee's working 
conditions and wages.
7. People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the 
government
8. Homosexual relations are always wrong.
9. People should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives.
254
Appendix A
10. Political parties which wish to overthrow democracy should be allowed to 
stand in general elections.
11. Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.
12. Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values.
13. It is a good thing for schools to be made to compete against each other for 
pupils.
14. Do you think the government should or should not spend less on defence?
15. If you had to choose among the items on the list below, which are the two 
that seem most desirable to you? (Maintaining order in the nation)
variable name meaning
Defence spend more on defence
left wing left of centre on left-right summed scale
authoritarian authoritarian side of lib-auth scale
order selected order in nation as most desirable goal
schools compete schools should compete for pupils
fair share takes left wing position code 1 or 2
one law for rich takes left wing position code 1 or 2
trade unions takes left wing position code 1 or 2
priv ent takes left wing position code 1 or 2
public services takes left wing position code 1 or 2
gov. resp. takes left wing position code 1 or 2
young people takes liberal position code 1 or 2
censorship takes liberal position code 1 or 2
public meetings takes liberal position code 1 or 2
homosexuals takes liberal position code 1 or 2
tolerant lifestyle takes liberal position code 1 or 2
democracy takes liberal position code 1 or 2
Table AA Coding of Dependent Variables
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1992
info level all no quals quals
actual 0.43 0.31 0.39
none 0.29 0.25 0.26
full 0.42 0.38 0.38
Table A.5 Mean conelation of lib-auth items by info group 1992
1992
info level all no quals quals
actual 0.58 0.65 0.63
none 0.54 0.56 0.56
full 0.74 0.81 0.83
Table A.6 Mean correlation of left-right items by info group 1992
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Question Wordings for Placement Score
All questions are answered on a 7 point scale and each item is repeated for 
each of the three main parties. For the knowledge measure, each item is scored 
one if respondent places the Conservative party to the right of the Labour 
party and the Liberal Democrats, zero otherwise.
L. Where do the Conservative party stand on making people's incomes more 
equal? Are they in the top box agreeing completely with the statement 
below? Or in the bottom box disagreeing completely with the statement? 
Or one of the boxes somewhere in between?
Government should try much harder to 
make incomes in Britain more equal.
2. Where do the Conservative party stand on taxes and spending? Are they in 
the top box agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the 
bottom box disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes 
somewhere in between?
Government should spend a lot more on 
services like education and health, even if it 
means putting up taxes a lot.
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3. Where do the Conservative party stand on the minimum wage? Are they in 
the top box agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the 
bottom box disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes 
somewhere in between?
Government should definitely introduce a 
minimum wage so that no employer can pay 
their workers too little.
4. Where do the Conservative party stand on the European Union? Are they 
in the top box agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the 
bottom box disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes 
somewhere in between?
Government should do much more to unite 
fully with Europe.
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Figure B .l H istogram  fo r  D elibera tive P o ll Knozvledge Scale
Question Wordings for Dependent Variables in Simulation Models
1. Please tick a box to show how you feel about each of the parties below.
a) The Conservative Party
b) The Labour Party
c) The Liberal Democrats
Response scale = 5 point Likert, strongly agree to strongly disagree.
2. Thinking back to the last general election in 1992. Generally speaking, what 
do you think has happened to the economy since then. Has it...
... got a lot stronger, 
got a little stronger, 
stayed about the same,
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got a little weaker, 
or, got a lot weaker 
Can't Choose.
3. Again thinking back to the last general election in 1992. Since then, do you 
think each of these things has gone up, gone down or stayed about the 
same?
a) The rate of inflation
b) The level of unemployment
c) The overall level of taxes
d) The quality of the NHS
e) The standard of education
Response scale = 5 point Likert, gone up a lot to gone down a lo t
4. Suppose the Conservative party were to win the general election later this 
year. Generally speaking, what do you think would happen to the British 
economy over the next five years. Would it....
... get a lot stronger, 
get a little stronger, 
stay about the same, 
get a little weaker, 
or, get a lot weaker 
Can't Choose.
5. And what if the Labour party were to win the general election later this 
year. Generally speaking, what do you think would happen to the British 
economy over the next five years. Would it....
.. .get a lot stronger, 
get a little stronger, 
stay about the same,
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get a little weaker, 
or, get a lot weaker 
Can't Choose.
6. Suppose the Conservative party were to win the general election later this 
year. Over the next five years do you think each of these things would go 
up, go down or stay about the same?
f) The rate of inflation
g) The level of unemployment
h) The overall level of taxes
i) The quality of the NHS
j) The standard of education
Response scale = 5 point Likert, gone up a lot to gone down a lot.
7. What if the Labour party were to win the general election later this year. 
Over the next five years do you think each of these things would go up, go 
down or stay about the same?
k) The rate of inflation 
1) The level of unemployment 
m) The overall level of taxes 
n) The quality of the NHS 
o) The standard of education
Response scale = 5 point Likert, gone up a lot to gone down a lot.
8. Under which government do you think you personally would be better-off 
over the next five years?
much better off under a Conservative government than under a Labour one, 
a little better off under a Conservative government than under a Labour one,
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about the same under either government, 
a little better off under a Labour government than under a Conservative one, 
much better off under a Labour government than under a Conservative one,
Can't choose.
9. How fair would you say the British tax system is in the way it taxes the 
different income groups? On the whole, do you think it is...
...very fair, 
quite fair, 
not very fair, 
or, not at all fair? 
Can't choose
10. How much do you agree or disagree that people earning around £50 000 a 
year or more should pay higher income tax than now?
Agree strongly, 
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree strongly 
Can't choose
11. Where do you stand on making people's incomes more equal? Are you in 
the top box agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the 
bottom box disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes 
somewhere in between?
Government should try much harder to 
make incomes in Britain more equal.
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12. Where do you stand on taxes and spending? Are you in the top box 
agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the bottom box 
disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes somewhere 
in between?
Government should spend a lot more on 
services like education and health, even if it 
means putting up taxes a lot.
13. Where do you stand on the minimum wage? Are you in the top box 
agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the bottom box 
disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes somewhere 
in between?
Government should definitely introduce a 
minimum wage so that no employer can pay 
their workers too little.
14. Where do you stand on the European Union? Are you in the top box 
agreeing completely with the statement below? Or in the bottom box 
disagreeing completely with the statement? Or one of the boxes somewhere 
in between?
Government should do much more to unite 
fully with Europe.
15. Compared with other countries in the European Union, Britain is an 
overtaxed nation.
Agree strongly, 
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
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Disagree 
Disagree strongly 
Can't choose
16. Compared with other countries in the European Union, the British 
Government spends too little on public services like health and education.
Agree strongly, 
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree strongly 
Can't choose
17. Unless Britain keeps its own currency, it will lose too much control over its 
own economic policy.
Agree strongly, 
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree strongly 
Can't choose
18. Suppose the Conservative party were to win the general election later this 
year. Do you think each of these groups would be better off or worse than 
now?
a) People on high incomes
b) People on low incomes
c) People on benefits
d) Pensioners
264
Appendix B
All the above answered on 5 point Likert scale, a lot better off to a lot worse 
off.
19. Suppose the Labour party were to win the general election later this year. 
Do you think each of these groups would be better off or worse than now?
e) People on high incomes
f) People on low incomes
g) People on benefits
h) Pensioners
All the above answered on 5 point Likert scale, a lot better off to a lot worse 
off.
20. Please tick one box to show which party you would be most likely to vote 
for if the general election was tomorrow.
a) The Conservative Party
b) The Labour Party
c) The Liberal Democrats
d) The SNP
e) Plaid Cymru
f) Another
g) I would not vote
h) Can't choose
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